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This study examines the anti-whaling strategy of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
(SSCS). Despite being relatively small and resource poor, this confrontational marine 
conservation organization has been successful in frustrating Japanese whaling in the Southern 
Ocean through the use of what it describes as ‘aggressive non-violent direct action.’ Adopting an 
inductive approach, the study uses participant observation and process tracing in order to 
uncover those mechanisms which make the SSCS strategy effective. In understanding this 
strategy, which is unlike any other described in the transnational environmental activism 
literature, the study seeks to add to our understanding of the role and power of non-state actors in 
international affairs. 
A close examination reveals that the organization is engaging in a strategy which can be 
described as ‘direct enforcement’ (DE) – whereby it seeks to enforce existing marine 
conservation laws. The SSCS supports its claims as an enforcement organization through the use 
of legal language, symbols and imagery. It also selects targets which can be accused of violating 
the law, and gathers evidence to support these accusations. Once it has identified such a target, 
the SSCS interferes with the operations and attempts to prevent illegal and environmentally 
harmful activities, and to directly increase the target’s costs of operation.  
This study explores some of the mechanisms upon which DE relies. Aggressive 
intervention exposes activists to potential retaliation from targets and states. Several mechanisms 
reduce potential retaliation. First, activists are protected by the principle of unclean hands: 
targets do not wish to draw attention to their own wrongdoings by indicting activists. Second, 
activists surround themselves and their actions in a complex web of international laws, which 
tends to deter state prosecution, because states generally wish to avoid complications or 
potentially embarrassing international incidents. 
By actively enforcing laws where states lack capacity and/or political will to do so, DE 
enhances the compliance pull of international laws. Through the use of DE, activists also exert 
powerful legal leverage against states. Eschewing traditional activist approaches such as the 
‘mobilization of shame,’ DE not only criticizes states for their failure to live up to their 
international obligations and commitments, but supports these claims with confrontational 
actions which cannot be ignored.   
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
1.1 - Action in the Southern Ocean 
 
February 4, 2011, the Southern Ocean, Antarctica: dodging the spray from water 
cannons, two high-speed rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) from the Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society’s (SSCS) vessel the Bob Barker and the SSCS’s hydrodynamic Gojira converged on the 
Yushin Maru #3 (YM#3). This harpoon vessel was part of the Japanese whaling fleet ostensibly 
conducting ‘research’ whaling in the Southern Ocean, one of the most remote and inhospitable 
environments on the globe. The small marine conservation vessels engaged the YM#3, hooking 
long trailing lines amidships the whaling vessel. Smoke flares were thrown into the defensive 
nets of the whaling ship. At the same time SSCS crew members from the Gojira launched paint 
and stink bombs at the whaling vessel, as their vessel zigzagged across the bow of the YM#3. At 




1.2 - The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
 
The action described above was part of a multi-year SSCS campaign, which has been 
ongoing since 2005, aiming at stopping Japanese ‘research’ whaling in the Southern Ocean. The 
SSCS interferes with the hunt, actively preventing whaling from occurring by blockading the 
fleet’s factory ship, fouling propellers and by pursuing a host of other confrontational tactics. 
This approach appears to have been successful: prior to interventions by the SSCS, the Japanese 
consistently met and exceeded their self-allotted quotas of minke and fin whales. However, 
following the intervention of the SSCS, the Japanese have seen their catches decline, to the 
extent that in the 2010-2011 whaling season the whalers landed only 19% of their quota, and 
were forced to end their season early “due to repeated harassment from activists at sea.”
2
 
                                                 
1
 This action was described by Alex Cornelissen, captain of the Bob Barker, as the turning point of ‘Operation No 
Compromise’, Field Journal, February 26, 2011; see also Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Phelps Bondaroff 2014. 
2 
See for example Sky News, “Japan Announces End to Whaling Season,” February 18, 2011, available at 
http://www.skynews.com.au/businessnews/article.aspx?id=579284 (accessed April 20, 2011); ABC News, “Sea 
Shepherd Declares Japan Whaling Victory,” 10 March 2012, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-03-
10/sea-shepherd-declares-japan-whaling-victory/3881288 (accessed April 20, 2011); Brown 2012. 
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In addition to having a quantifiable impact on Japanese whaling, SSCS campaigns also 
appear to have had a broader impact on the whaling issue in general. SSCS actions have brought 
international attention to an issue which had slipped from the public spotlight, and it seems to 
have had an impact on the actions of states. Prior to SSCS campaigns, the Australian government 
had done virtually nothing to oppose Japanese whaling, a large portion of which takes place in 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). However this 
changed following several international incidents precipitated by the SSCS and subsequent 
media focus, which appears to have been influential in the Australian government’s decision to 
institute proceedings against Japan in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2010.
3
   
The SSCS’s approach also seems to have found a way around the rhetorical deadlock 
which has plagued the whaling issue in the recent decades. A transnational advocacy campaign, 
comprised of large and small international and domestic anti-whaling groups and organizations – 
such as Greenpeace, Project Jonah, the American Cetacean Society, the World Wide Fund for 
Nature (WWF
4
), the Sierra Club and others – was at first very successful in propagating and 
disseminating a global anti-whaling norm. Using conventional Transnational Advocacy 
Grouping (TAG) strategies such as awareness raising, information politics and lobbying, their 
campaign convinced “the vast majority of the industrialized world … that people should not kill 
whales.”
5
 The transnational campaign against whaling was instrumental in the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC) implementing a global moratorium on whaling in 1986. However, 
the campaign seems to have reached the limits of conventional TAG strategies. Some argue that 
additional actions at this stage may in fact strengthen anti-whaling sentiment in the few states, 
such as Iceland, Japan and Norway, where whaling persists.
6
 The IWC itself is paralyzed, unable 
to enforce its own decisions and often unable to come to agreement due to polarization between 
pro- and anti-whaling camps. The SSCS appears to have made headway circumventing this 
standoff through the use of legal rhetoric. 
                                                 
3
 Rothwell 2010:4; see also Herald Sun (Australia), “Australia Fights Japan’s Whaling in International Court,” May 
9, 2011, available at http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/breaking-news/australia-fights-japans-whaling-in-
international-court/story-e6frf7jx-1226052325625 (accessed May 9, 2011); BBC News, “Australia to Mount 
Legal Bid Against Japan Whaling,” May 28, 2010, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10179360 (accessed 
May 9, 2011). 
4
 Formerly the World Wildlife Fund (and still in North America). 
5
 Strausz 2007; Blok 2008; Hirata 2004. 
6
 Bailey 2008:302-303; Andresen and Skodvin 2008:121, 142-3; van Ginkel 2005:87-88; Kalland 1993b:3. 
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The SSCS actions and their apparent success are intriguing, and stand out as an example 
of the power that non-state actors (NSAs) can wield in international relations (IR). The action 
described at the beginning of this chapter was confrontational and highly unconventional. By 
examining the strategy of this organization, we may be able to expand our understanding of the 
ways in which NSAs, such as the SSCS, can and do exert power in international affairs.  
 
1.3 - Non-State Actors in International Relations 
 
The field of IR has been dominated by the realist tradition, and has focused on the state as 
the primary unit of analysis, but this age of IR has passed. The international system is now seen 
as a complex web of actors and networks, and while states’ power remains preeminent, it is 
increasingly being challenged and influenced by NSAs. The term ‘non-state actor’ is a negative 
term, describing that which it is not, and refers to all “actors that are not (representatives of) 
states, yet that operate at the international level and are potentially relevant to international 
relations.”
7
 The term captures a diverse range of actors which can be divided into the following 
categories: 1) Intergovernmental organizations (IOs)
8
; 2) International Non-Governmental 
Organizations (INGOs) and Transnational Advocacy Groupings/Networks (TAGs/TANs); 3) 
Corporate Interest Groups and Transnational Corporations (TNCs); Epistemic Communities; and 
4) a remaining category comprising of religious institutions, terrorist networks and organized 
crime syndicates (dark networks), sub-state agencies, social movements, liberation movements, 
professional organizations and others.
9
 Each of these actors employs a range of strategies in 
pursuit of a variety of outcomes in the international arena. Understanding these strategies is 
becoming increasingly important as NSAs grow in number and influence around the globe.  
Early scholarship sought to determine whether NSAs actually matter in IR, challenging 
the realist state-centric hegemony. Claims that IR should remain solely focused on the state 
appear increasingly antiquated, demonstrated by countless examples of NSAs having (sometimes 
dramatic) influences on IR. If NSAs matter, the remaining questions are ‘how’ and ‘how much’ 
                                                 
7
 Arts 2005:181; see also Arts 2001. 
8
Arts notes that not all scholars consider IGOs to be NSAs, as “some consider an IGO simply as an ensemble of 
states, thus being a state actor, others believe that IGOs exhibit at least some degree of autonomy and authority 
vis-à-vis states, thus constituting a non-state actor” (2005:181). 
9
 See for example Arts 2005:181; Arts 2003-2004:3, 5; Betsill and Corell 2001:66. 
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do they matter? By far the more pertinent of these two questions and the guiding question of this 
study is the ‘how’: How do NSAs exert influence and power in international affairs? The 
question of measuring the influence of various NSAs is important, however, such measurements 
provide scant insight into the mechanisms through which NSAs actually exert power. Here I use 
Tilly and Tarrow’s definition of a mechanism to mean “a delimited class of events that alter 
relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of 
situations.”
10
 It is the goal of this study to provide understandings of previously unexamined 
mechanisms in order to contribute to a growing understanding of the various strategies employed 
by NSAs. Towards this end, the study uses an inductive approach focusing on a single case, that 
of an entity employing a strategy which does not appear to fit into any of the existing typologies 
of NSA strategies.  
This study specifically seeks to further our understanding of the strategies employed by 
environmentally motivated INGOs and TAGs (IENGOs/ETAGs), and the mechanisms upon 
which they rely. In so doing, this study seeks to contribute to the improvement and refinement of 
these strategies, with the ultimate aim of increasing the effectiveness of IENGOs/ETAGs. This is 
what Bevington and Dixon describe as movement-relevant theory, the idea that the theory 




The focus on IENGOs/ETAGs is motivated by several factors. First, I am an 
environmentalist. I believe that environmental issues number amongst the most important of our 
age and it is my desire that this work contribute to improving the effectiveness of environmental 
activism. Environmental activists must engage in a high level of tactical and strategic innovation 
in order to overcome the many challenges they face. The study of IENGO/ETAG strategy can 
potentially reveal new and innovative ways by which INGOs/TAGs seek to exert influence in IR. 
The focus on radical elements within the broader environmental movement is also purposeful, 
stemming from a belief that ‘innovation occurs on the margins,’
12
 making the strategies of 
radical groups a ripe area to search for new strategic solutions to old problems.  
 
                                                 
10
 Tilly and Tarrow 2007:29. The use of this definition in no way seeks to limit the findings of this study, or 
constrain these findings within a particular segment of literature.  
11
 Bevington and Dixon 2005. 
12
 Chenoweth and Stephan 2011:55, citing Schock 2005:144.  
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1.4 - The Puzzle of the SSCS 
 
The SSCS and the approach it has taken to protect marine species, presents an intriguing 
puzzle.  Here is an organization whose strategy belies conventional understandings and 
explanations of INGOs/TAGs. SSCS is a relatively resource poor IENGO employing 
confrontational and unconventional tactics and yet is apparently extremely successful at what it 
does. The SSCS’s annual campaign against Japanese ‘research’ whaling in Antarctica has been 
very successful, so much so that even its targets have credited it with being effective.
13
 The 
SSCS has managed to achieve dramatic outcomes on the whaling issue where more conventional 
INGOs/TAGs have failed. The organization styles itself as an international conservation law 
enforcement organization, and claims to use “aggressive non-violent direct action” in order to 
enforce international conservation.
14
  This type of framing is foreign to how most INGOs/TAGs 
frame themselves and their actions. As we shall see, most environmental activists rely on moral 
authority, disseminating norms and upon appealing to values. They truck in symbols and 
information, engaging in what Keck and Sikkink describe as ‘advocacy’ – the act of organizing 
to “promote causes, principled ideas and norms.”
15
 Keck and Sikkink elaborate, suggesting that 
because INGOs/TAGs “are not powerful in the traditional sense of the word, they must use the 
power of their information, ideas and strategies to alter the information and value context within 
which states make policies.”
16
 The SSCS’s confrontational approach does not appear to rely on 
information, ideas or values in the same way. Nor does it appear to only seek “to create, 
strengthen, implement, and monitor international norms,” which Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 
describe as the primary goals of transnational advocacy.
17
 The strategies used by the SSCS are 
more confrontational and aggressive than other INGO/TAG approaches.  
The organization’s apparently successful application of its unconventional approach is at 
odds with theories within the literature which explore the strategies of INGOs/TAGs in IR, and 
the relative effectiveness of those strategies. The SSCS’s apparent success indicates a gap in the 
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literature’s understanding of how NSAs in general, and IENGOs/ETAGs specifically, achieve 
results internationally. As a result, the SSCS serves as a prime case study to further our 
understanding of the strategies employed by INGOs/TAGs in IR. 
This then leads to the principal research question of this study: What is the anti-whaling 
strategy of the SSCS, and what makes this strategy effective? Significantly, the study does not 
aim to be idiographic. While the question guiding the case-specific inquiry of this study relates to 
a single organization/phenomenon, the conclusions drawn are intended to have broader 
implications. The goal of the investigation is not to uncover some idiosyncratic strategy 
particular to the SSCS and its anti-whaling campaign, from this single case, but rather to theorize 
new strategic possibilities for NSAs in IR, using the single case study of the SSCS as a starting 
point to broaden our general understanding of INGO/TAG strategy. The research question does 
not necessarily suggest that the SSCS is completely aware of that which makes its strategy 
effective, leaving open the possibility that some of the mechanisms which make SSCS strategy 
effective are not consciously enacted by the organization.  
The principal research question focuses on the SSCS’s anti-whaling strategy. The 
organization campaigns on a variety of issues, and like most INGOs/TAGs, employs a range of 
strategies, many of which are relatively conventional. The Antarctic anti-whaling campaign has 
been selected in so far as it typifies the SSCS’s confrontational strategy and is one well suited as 
a single case study. When ‘SSCS strategy’ is referred to throughout the study, it refers 
specifically to the SSCS’s Antarctic anti-whaling campaign, unless otherwise specified.  
Other questions which extend from this principal question will be addressed over the 
course of this study. One of the assumptions which extends from the principal question is that 
SSCS strategy is somehow different from typical INGO/TAG strategies, or that it serves as a 
particularly salient example of a strategy employed by INGOs/TAGs but which is not currently 
describe in the literature. This begs the questions of what are typical INGO/TAG strategies? And 
what does the current scholarship say about the range of strategies which INGOs/TAGs are 
thought to employ? An examination of the current mainstream literature on INGO/TAG 
strategies reveals that the SSCS anti-whaling strategy is not currently described by this literature. 
The SSCS strategy even challenges classification with unconventional direct action (DA) 
employed by domestic actors.  
20 
 
This study adopts an inductive and qualitative approach in order to address these 
questions. Participant observation (PO), conducted during the 2010-2011 SSCS Antarctic anti-
whaling campaign (‘Operation No Compromise’), was used to gain firsthand experience of 
SSCS strategy in action. Primary data collection was imperative due to the paucity of reliable 
information concerning SSCS strategy and conflicting accounts from limited academic 
examinations of SSCS strategy. PO was specifically selected due to the weakness of employing 
other methods (such as interviews or surveys) to study an organization like the SSCS. The rich 
data gathered through PO was then used to fuel process tracing, which was employed to 
systematically describe and identify the causal mechanisms driving SSCS strategy. This data was 
triangulated, where possible, with news media reports, reports by the Institute of Cetacean 
Research (ICR), and was supplemented with semi-formal interviews with SSCS crew members 
conducted during and after ‘Operation No Compromise,’ and with officials and observations 
made during the 2011 meeting of the IWC.  
A final question designed to rule out the discovery of idiosyncratic strategies can be 
formulated as: Is the SSCS’s strategy tailored specifically to this organization, or can this 
strategy be employed by other organizations? In order to answer this question I first considered 
whether the organization employs a similar strategy in its other campaigns. This served to 
establish that its confrontational strategy is not dependent on any characteristics specific to this 
campaign, and therefore that the strategy is sufficiently flexible to accommodate a range of 
issues. Here the SSCS’s bluefin tuna campaign is suitable to the exploration of this point. Then, 
having isolated the mechanisms upon which the SSCS anti-whaling strategy relies, I then 
undertook a survey of other (I)NGOs/TAGs across a range of issues and theatres to identify 
whether they relied on similar mechanisms. This survey revealed that there are in fact many 
other (I)NGOs/TAGs which are employing a strategy similar to that of the SSCS, establishing 






1.5 - Review of Sea Shepherd Literature  
1.5.1 - Academic Sources 
 
An examination of the existing literature concerning the SSCS serves to elaborate on the 
current understandings of the organization and its strategy, which in turn demonstrates the need 
for primary data collection and an inductive approach. Explorations of SSCS strategy within 
academic literature are rare, and discussions of the SSCS are typically factual and often 
incidental. The SSCS is mentioned in academic sources examining such issues as: the revival of 
the Makah whale hunt in Alaska,
18





  naval terrorism and violence,
21




 and animal 
rights activity.
24
 The SSCS is discussed in academic works concerning the broader radical 
environmental movement,
25
 although of note here is that SSCS actions are included with those of 
land-based groups.
26
 The SSCS is also often mentioned in works which discuss Greenpeace,
27
  
and in those more broadly exploring the anti-whaling movement and the role of NGOs and the 
IWC.
28
  These sources provide relevant facts and help to place the SSCS in the wider 
environmental movement, and specifically the anti-whaling campaign; however discussions of 
the SSCS tend to lack depth and are often tangential.  
At the outset of this study there were very few academic sources which focused on the 
SSCS. Most of the academic literature specifically has emerged over the course of this study, 
including several legal articles.
29
 Roeschke’s study was the first to explore the question of 
whether the SSCS can legally enforce international law, as it claims to so do.
30
 His affirmative 
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conclusion was later contested by both Brown and Anton.
31
 Both Caprari and Hoek explore the 
legality of SSCS actions.
32
 Ryan examines the Bethune trial, looking at the details of the case 
surrounding the arrest of SSCS activist Pete Bethune after he boarded a Japanese whaling vessel 
in an attempt to make a citizen’s arrest of its captain in 2010 (see Bethune-Ady Gil Incident, 
Chapter 5.3.3.3).
33
 Ryan also compares legal strategies employed by the SSCS in the defense of 
Bethune, with Greenpeace’s legal defense of the Tokyo Two, two Greenpeace activists who were 
arrested in 2008 for stealing whale meat during an investigation which they were conducting into 
embezzling in the whaling industry. Ryan finds that the SSCS defence of Bethune was 
‘restrained’ and ‘ambivalent,’ and more concerned with getting Bethune out of Japan, as 
compared to Greenpeace’s ‘purposive’ defence of the Tokyo Two, which sought to use the court 
case as an extension of their campaign.
34
 Kanehara outlines some of the other legal actions taken 
by the Japanese against the SSCS, and Nucci specifically focuses on the 2012 Japanese 




 These arguments will 
be addressed in greater detail when I consider the legality of SSCS actions and claims (see 
Legality of SSCS Actions, Chapter 5.3.2.5). Generally speaking, these sources are principally 
concerned with the legality of SSCS tactics rather than the strategy of the SSCS. 
In the field of sociology Stuart et al. use interviews with SSCS crew members to explore 
identity creation amongst SSCS activists. This is one of the few studies which relies on primary 
data collection and upon interviews with SSCS members other than Paul Watson, the founder 
and head of the SSCS, and captain of the Steve Irwin during ‘Operation No Compromise.’
36
 In 
the realm of security studies, Nagtzaam and Lentini argue that the SSCS constitutes a gray area 
phenomenon, that it cannot accurately be classified as “piracy, vigilantism, terrorism, as well as 
(self-ascriptively) enforcing environmental law.”
37
 They point out that the SSCS sits in a ‘blind 
spot’ in the literature, but they do not develop their conclusion that the SSCS constitutes “a new 
type of vigilante group,” which may broaden our understanding of conventional vigilantism.
38
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Media scholars have shown an increased interest in the SSCS. Lester looks at how the 
SSCS creates image events and how it manages its media strategy. Lester’s argument that the 
SSCS is dependent on news media coverage, and that their media strategy is “unlikely to provide 
sustained news access” seems at odds with the fact that the organization has been the subject of 
an ongoing, prime-time docu-drama, Whale Wars.
39
 McHendry looks at this program, and 
through this analysis discusses how image events are treated as commodities.
40
 These sources 
tend to treat the SSCS’s actions as image events, and the SSCS strategy is described as relying 
primarily on symbolic politics, a suggestion which appears at odds with the organization’s 
insistence on achieving direct outcomes. 
Several whaling-related sources describe the SSCS as fulfilling an ad hoc enforcement 
mechanism for the IWC, in absence of any official mechanisms.
41
 Others describe the impact of 
SSCS actions on the public of target states. Bailey argues that SSCS actions do not have any 
resonance in pro-whaling countries such as Norway, and that these actions do more harm than 
good to the image of the anti-whaling movement in pro-whaling countries.
42
 Morikawa describes 




One of the few scholars who has examined SSCS strategy in any detail is Plant. In his 
first look at the issue of maritime activism and legal issues involving the interference of vessels 
at sea, Plant focuses on Greenpeace, dismissing the SSCS, noting that “their methods of protest 
are clearly illegal under international law,” and excessive.
44
 In a return to the issue, Plant 
explores maritime DA in greater detail, drawing a distinction between ‘symbolic protest’ and 
‘direct action protests’ which involves “protesters actively seeking to prevent, or at least to delay, 
conduct of the activities being protested against.”
45
 Plant examines some of the legal 
mechanisms which give power to acts of DA on the high seas, and specifically looks at the 
‘human shield’ tactics of Greenpeace, whereby activists seek “to induce or impel the target ship 
to halt or modify her activities, not out of fear for herself, but out of that of harming the 
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 While Plant repeats SSCS claims to enforce international environmental law, he 
purposefully excludes all actions which involve ‘the use of force,’ noting only that actions such 
as SSCS efforts to disable vessels with prop-foulers cannot be “regarded as true ‘human shield’ 
tactics.”
47
 In essence, the aspects of SSCS strategy explored by Plant are those which bear a 
resemblance to those of Greenpeace. He purposefully excludes the more confrontational and 
aggressive actions of the SSCS, which are the focus of this study.  
Another evaluation of SSCS strategy suggests that it constitutes a form of militant 
symbolic politics. Here such scholars as Besel and Besel, and Corell argue that the confrontation 
inherent in SSCS actions is solely designed to attract media attention.
48
 Mills and Ernst 
characterize SSCS strategy as “a means of influencing public opinion; opinion that they believe 
will influence government actors and ultimately defeat the Japanese whalers.”
49
 They draw this 
conclusion based on their findings that “[f]rom a conventional military perspective Sea 
Shepherd’s tactics have proven ineffective, as they have failed to curtail whaling.”
50
 This 
conclusion is based on the belief that “the number of whales taken by the Japanese has increased 
since Sea Shepherd began its Southern Ocean campaign.”
51
 Unfortunately the conclusion is 
drawn from a misinterpretation of the data. From 2005 to 2008, the number of whales landed by 
the Japanese was greater than previous years, however this can be attributed to the fact that after 
2005 the Japanese implemented a second phase to their ‘research’ whaling, where the annual 
quotas were double those of previous years. When one considers the percentage of the quota 
attained by the Japanese, the true impact of SSCS actions is immediately evident. Prior to 2006 
the Japanese consistently harvested their complete quota (+/- 10%, and typically closer to 110%), 
but after 2006 this number dropped dramatically, so much so that in 2011, they attained only 
19% of their quota (see Table 1, Chapter 5). 
 Another view of SSCS strategy suggests that it seeks to orchestrate international incidents 
in order to put diplomatic pressure on states. Burbach argues that “Sea Shepherd clearly hopes to 
use incidents to force the Australian government to choose between being seen actively assisting 
whalers or anti-whaling NGOs,” and that given current polls, siding with the whalers would be a 
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very unpopular move by the Australian government.
52
 The idea is that SSCS actions create a 
‘crisis point’ forcing the issue of whaling onto the agenda.
53
 This idea has some merit, but I 
found that it does not appear to be the central component of SSCS strategy (see Chapter 5.3).  
Jabour and Iliff distinguish SSCS strategy, which they classify as ‘innovative direct 
action’, from the non-violent DA and bearing witness of Greenpeace. They observe that the 
actions of the SSCS “undoubtedly put undue and unwelcome pressure on diplomatic negotiations 
between the governments concerned.”
54
 They conclude however that SSCS efforts have 
“damaged its own credibility and Australia's initially linking itself to the NGO potentially 
undermined both its own credibility (internationally) and its popular anti-whaling policy 
(domestically).”
55
 Jabour and Iliff claim that the only positive outcome of the confrontations in 
the Southern Ocean “has been an increasing respect for Greenpeace for showing restraint, and 
the saving of a few whales…”
56
 
 Mégret explores the use of civil disobedience (CD) in IR and the standing of CD under 
international law. Mégret situates CD in a “broader tradition of non-violent resistance” in which 
the opposition to unjust laws is fundamental.
57
  He notes that there are few “international legal 
cases hearing truly international law defences,” and that typically domestic groups use the 
authority of international law to justify violating domestic law, appealing to international law as 
a ‘higher law.’
58
 Megret suggests that when the SSCS claims that the Japanese are in violation of 
the ‘international whaling regime’ as justification for obstructing whaling, it is a possible 
example of an international legal case with an international legal defence. For this reason Mégret 
describes the SSCS as “a sort of ‘international law’ avant garde.”
59
 This again suggests that the 
SSCS is doing something different, however characterizing SSCS actions as CD is problematic. 
The violation of an unjust law does not appear to be part of the SSCS repertoire. The 
organization describes its actions as law enforcement, and while its actions may violate some 
laws and regulations, the SSCS does not appear to set out to actively break or change any law 
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(and as we shall see, it goes to lengths to avoid doing so), but to enforce existing laws. The idea 
of ‘enforcing international law via CD’, a strategy entirely oriented around violating and 
challenging unjust laws, is problematic.
60 
 Framing acts of CD as enforcing international law 
may work in a domestic setting, where appeals to international law serve as an appeal to a 
‘higher law.’ In the international arena activists either appeal to a ‘moral law’ above international 
law, or they claim to enforce existing international law, in which case they are not challenging 
the law at all (but rather enforcing it). This seems to suggest that there may be a role for activists 
in enforcing international law, but that the primary means by which this is accomplished is not 
CD.  
Moffa’s account is perhaps one of the most targeted, specifically examining the strategy 
of the SSCS through a comparison to Greenpeace. Through the framework of the New Haven 
School on the principal functions of international lawmaking, Moffa describes two competing 
models of activism: ‘protest’ and ‘interventionist.’ He elaborates that the strategy of Greenpeace 
is characteristic of protest activism, which “consists of publicly organized, undoubtedly legal 
activities meant to put indirect pressure on the governmental or private entities that are 
purportedly violating international law… it aspires to shift public policy and community 
expectations.”
61
 This strategy fulfills two of the seven distinct categories of lawmaking actions 
outlined by the New Haven School, ‘law-promoting’ and ‘law-prescribing.’ Sea Shepherd’s 
strategy is described as “interventionist activism, a model that involves either borderline – or 
blatantly illegal tactics – to confront violators directly.”
62
 In comparison to protest activism, 
interventionist activism fulfills the actions of ‘law invocation’ and “direct application of force to 
implement existing laws and policies.”
63
 Moffa notes that interventionist activism has been 
“more successful than protest activism in reducing the number of whales taken illegally.”
64
 
Moffa’s general argument as to why interventionist activism is effective is “that by giving real 
force to international law, the Sea Shepherds …are performing the costly, and often unfunded, 
invocation and application functions arising from obligations to international conventions.”
65
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States, such as Australia and the US, who could intervene and prevent SSCS activities choose 
not to, because the “the benefit of interventionist activism outweighs its costs.”
66
  
This account of SSCS strategy is one of the more compelling, but of course SSCS does 
not simply provide a service to states by supplying them with the law enforcement. The SSCS 
also appears to attempt to leverage states, particularly Australia, by condemning it for its inaction 
and by triggering embarrassing incidents within its jurisdiction. Factors which enable a strategy 
to be enacted are an important component of that strategy, but not the only mechanisms upon 
which a strategy relies to be effective. Moffa appears to have isolated one mechanism of SSCS 
strategy, but the SSCS seems to balance the act of providing a service for states with that of 
directly challenging them.  
It is evident that there is a range of descriptions of SSCS strategy. It has been described 
as militant symbolic politics, ‘new’ vigilantism, interventionist activism, and as a number of 
different varieties of DA, yet none of these explanations is particularly compelling, well 
developed, or supported. Each appears to capture an aspect of SSCS strategy but fails to describe 
others. One of the drawbacks faced by these studies is that they rely on mediated sources – either 
accounts directly from activists or whalers themselves, or upon information filtered through the 
press or television. This information suffers from a lack of reliability, though this is not to 
suggest that movement and media sources do not provide some insight into SSCS strategy. This 
study seeks to overcome these limitations through the use of an inductive approach and primary 
data collection.  
 
1.5.2 - Primary Sources 
 
The SSCS releases information in order to serve campaign purposes. Most sources are 
written as memoirs, documenting a specific campaign or campaigns,
67
 are autobiographical, 
written by or with Watson,
68
 or are smaller sections/articles/chapters within movement 
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 There is considerable selection bias in these works, in so far as focus is given to 
highly successful or dramatic actions, while the more mundane or unsuccessful actions receive 
little coverage. While SSCS sources provide insight into the personal motivations, philosophies, 
and backgrounds of SSCS officers and crew members, and sometimes even provides detailed 
descriptions of innovative tactics and campaign actions, there is seldom any in-depth or reliable 
investigation of strategy, its origins, development, or implementation. The SSCS also produces 
its own media, and has an extensive database of past press releases, editorials, and video clips on 
its website. Not all information initially posted on the SSCS website is archived, and furthermore 
this information is presented specifically for public consumption.
70
 
In addition to his autobiographical and campaign-specific works, Watson has also written 
several texts of a more academic and strategic nature. In ‘On Precedence of Natural Law,’ 
Watson argues that the laws of nature and ecology trump those of man. Neptune’s Manifesto is a 
call to action, exhorting readers to take dramatic action to protect marine species and 
ecosystems.
71
 Both of these texts serve as calls to and justifications for, confrontational action. In 
Earthforce!, Watson addresses many practical and tactical issues, and presents a broad range of 
strategies suited to different situations, including image politics, covert ‘ecotage’, CD and so on. 
One of these situations, which could describe SSCS anti-whaling strategy is “the fifth situation 
[which] is to operate under the authority of international rules, regulations, laws, and treaties. 
This situation is primarily for confrontations in international waters where there is no law 
enforcement body with the powers of jurisdiction.”
72
 In one page, Watson describes how one 
would go about enacting this strategy by “setting yourself up as an unofficial law enforcement 
agency...taking vigilante action,” and explains that the primary mechanism behind the strategy is 
that “[i]f you could be stopped, then so should your opposition.”
73
 While these sources are 
important, it has yet to be determined whether this strategy is actually being enacted by the 
SSCS. Furthermore, Watson does not go into detail on what might make these strategies 
effective, and as noted, entirely different mechanisms may be acting without the SSCS’s 
knowledge. 
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1.5.3 - Media Sources 
 
The SSCS has been very successful in attracting media attention, and has been the subject 
of two journalistic books, numerous magazine and news stories,
74
 and even works of fiction.
75
  It 
has also been featured in several documentary films
76
 and the television program Whale Wars.
77
 
SSCS operations are ongoing, with media clips constantly being uploaded to the internet. These 
media sources tend to lack reliability. Reports of actions are filtered through either the SSCS or 
the Japanese government, and both of these agents put their own, often conflicting, spin on 
reports. Media reports based on these press releases and accompanying footage are therefore 
prone to distortion. PO served as a means of addressing this problem. Being present on a SSCS 
campaign allowed the observation of events unfiltered as they transpired. As Jorgensen notes, 
PO is well suited to the study of phenomenon which are “somehow obscured from the view of 
outsiders.”
78
 To my knowledge, the present study is the only academic study of the SSCS 
involving the use of PO.  
 
1.6 - Clarification of Terms  
 
It is useful to clarify a number of other terms which will also be used throughout the 
study. For a study dedicated to investigating strategy, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of what this term entails and some definitions are in order. Strategy can be defined 
as a “conscious, long-range, planned, and integrated general conception of an actor’s conflict 
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behaviour on the overall context.”
79
 In other words, strategy can be seen as the principal concept 
that guides the manner in which an actor deploys assets (human, material or other) in the attempt 
to secure specific objectives.
80
 Strategy is therefore the general approach one takes to accomplish 
desired goals, and is distinct from tactics. Tactics are subordinate to strategy, and are the specific 
techniques chosen to address a given situation.
81
 Thus strategy establishes a range of tactics 
considered both appropriate and effective in achieving the aims of an organization. In this sense 
“tactics may change from one situation to another… [while] strategic concepts are more stable 
and sustained even though they may be applied in different ways in different situations.”
82
 The 
SSCS objective is to end Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean. They employ a strategy, 
which this study seeks to uncover, with the tactics they employ including prop-fouling, stink 
bombs, boardings, etc.  
I will use Ackerman and Kruegler’s definition of a campaign as being “a series of 
observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political objective.”
83
 Ackerman and Kruegler 
elaborate that campaigns tend to have “a recognizable beginning, middle, and end,” a discernible 
leadership, and will often have names, thereby distinguishing them from random or spontaneous 
events or acts.
84
 Tilly and Tarrow clarify that a campaign extends beyond a single event.
85
 The 
SSCS’s multi-year effort to end Japanese whaling constitutes a single campaign. The 
organization designates each of its annual campaigning efforts as an ‘operation’ and gives that 
operation a name – for example Leviathan, Migaloo, Musashi, and Waltzing Matilda. 
 I use the term ‘repertoires,’ to refer to “the whole set of means [a group] has for making 
claims…on different individuals or groups,” which draw on inherited forms of collective 
action.
86
 The study will avoid references to ‘protester’ and ‘protest’ and instead refer to those 
who work within INGOs/TAGs as ‘activists’ engaged in ‘activism.’ This distinction is made due 
to the difficulty in classifying the actions of the SSCS as ‘protest’, the organization’s vehement 
insistence that it does not protest, and to the limitations of this term. Despite its use as a catch-all 
term to refer to all forms of political activism, protesting connotes a specific action – appealing 
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to an authority to intervene in some way – and as a result, fails to capture the full range of 
actions in which activists engage, such as leveraging, awareness raising, or coercing.  
 In this study, SSCS strategy and actions are often classified as ‘aggressive’ and 
‘confrontational.’ Here we can build from Tilly and Tarrow’s  definition of confrontational 
contention as being “new or illegal types of protest, not characterized by violence but using 
certain resources in order to provoke surprise, thus generating tensions or feelings of defiance 
among the authorities and the public.”
87
 Definitions of violence are hotly contested; many 
activists deny that the destruction of property constitutes a form of violence, and that one can 
only be violent towards living things.
88
  As one SSCS crew member stated, “our actions are 
aggressive, [the whaler’s] actions are violent.”
89
 Designating an act as violent is often seen as a 
way to consign that act to a repertoire outside of civil society, and into the realm of what Price 
deems ‘uncivil society.’
90
 We can see this in the initial approach taken by Plant, as previously 
discussed, yet this ignores the ‘gray area phenomenon’ which may challenge or rub up against 
certain definitions of violence but still fall within the actual repertoires of INGOs/TAGs. 
Consequently the terms ‘aggressive’ and ‘confrontational’ appear to best describe SSCS strategy 
and this study avoids employing contested terms such as ‘violent.’  
 
1.7 - Outline of Study 
 
Chapter 2 begins with a review of conventional INGOs/TAGs strategies. Through this 
review, the broader trends within the literature on INGO/TAG strategy are mapped, including 
various typologies and categorizations. This section includes discussions of structure and agency 
in determining strategy, along with questions of issue selection. Specific challenges to 
IENGOs/ETAGs will be developed upon along with some of the solutions which these actors 
have employed in order to overcome these challenges. Throughout this examination, the manner 
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in which the strategy of the SSCS appears to diverge from common understandings of 
INGO/TAG strategy will be explored. 
Chapter 3 develops the methodology of the study. It elaborates on the selection of the 
single case of the SSCS anti-whaling strategy, before detailing how process tracing, PO, 
interviews, and triangulation were used in data collection. Chapter 3 also includes a discussion of 
the methodological challenges inherent in studying an organization such as the SSCS, and 
outlines how the study sought to overcome these challenges, including issues of confidentiality. 
 Chapter 4 begins by outlining the background of the whaling issue, including the history 
of whaling and the formation of the IWC. It then outlines the progress made by INGOs/TAGs 
using conventional strategies, specifically the enactment of the global moratorium on 
commercial whaling and the subsequent roadblock and standoff within the IWC following the 
moratorium. The chapter then focuses on the historical background of Japanese whaling, some of 
the challenges faced by INGOs/TAGs attempting to use conventional strategies against it, and 
questions surrounding the legality of the Japanese ‘research’ whaling program. Chapter 4 
concludes with a survey of the legal context of the Southern Ocean where the campaign occurs.   
 Chapter 5 examines the SSCS and its strategy in detail. It provides background on the 
SSCS’s philosophy and history, both of which have influenced the development of SSCS 
strategy. It then considers how the SSCS articulates its goals and the strategy it claims to use to 
accomplish these goals. The remainder of the chapter focuses specifically on the Antarctic anti-
whaling strategy of the SSCS. It begins with a short history of the SSCS anti-whaling campaign, 
and then provides a chronology of ‘Operation No Compromise.’ This is followed by 
observations made during the Operation, which are organized into sub-sections using Keck and 
Sikkink’s four categories of INGO/TAG action. This includes sub-sections examining the 
legality of SSCS actions and their impact on Japanese whaling operations, as well as other 
features of SSCS strategy gathered through fieldwork and triangulated from a range of other 
sources. Two major themes are drawn from these observations: the organization’s efforts to 
achieve direct outcomes, and a pervading use of references to international law in almost every 
aspect of operations.  
Chapter 6 considers the first of these two themes, identifying the SSCS’s focus on 
achieving direct results with the strategy of DA. A review of the limited coverage which DA has 
received by the IR literature is conducted, after which a definition of DA is developed. The 
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strategy of DA is then examined in greater depth. This chapter then considers the SSCS’s use of 
DA, seeking to determine whether the organization has simply adapted DA – a strategy most 
used in the domestic setting – for use in the international arena, or whether it is doing something 
else. The SSCS appears to be using DA as a mechanism in a more targeted enforcement strategy, 
whereby the organization attempts to directly enforce international law.  
 Chapter 7 scrutinizes the second of the two major themes, and looks at the SSCS’s use of 
DA as a means of enforcing international law, a strategy which is described as ‘direct 
enforcement’ (DE). The chapter then details why and how the DE of the SSCS works, 
developing the theory of DE. It begins with an overview of the characteristics typical of DE, and 
examines how this strategy differs from conventional INGO/TAG strategy. The key mechanisms 
of DE are then detailed, including the protection it offers practitioners, the power inherent in 
invoking the law, the type of power it exerts on states, and how making DE claims create 
practices of legality which strengthen the compliance pull of laws and asserts the right of NSAs 
to enforce international law.  
Chapter 8 uses the SSCS’s bluefin tuna campaign as a case study in order to explore issue 
selection and DE. This case study also serves as a means of establishing that DE is not unique to 
the SSCS’s anti-whaling campaign. The chapter concludes with a survey of a number of 
(I)NGOs/TAGs, ranging across issues, theatres of operation, and the domestic and international 
arenas which appear to also be employing forms of DE. This serves as a means of demonstrating 
that DE is not idiosyncratic to the SSCS, and can be employed by a wide range of NSAs.  
Chapter 9 concludes the study with a brief exploration of the possibilities that DE may 
presents to INGOs/TAGs, some of the limitations of this strategy, and additional areas of inquiry 




CHAPTER 2 – CONVENTIONAL INGO/TAG STRATEGIES 
 
This chapter explores the literature on INGOs/TAGs in IR, in order to understand how 
these actors are generally considered to exert influence and power in the international arena and 
to demonstrate how the SSCS and its strategy deviate from these conventional understandings. 
The chapter begins by defining what is meant by transnational civil society (TCS), INGO and 
TAG. The growing role of INGOs/TAGs in IR is then examined, and questions of measuring 
INGO/TAG influence, their legitimacy, and what may prompt these actors to campaign 
transnationally are explored. Conventional INGO/TAG strategies are then considered. The 
specific challenges to IENGOs/ETAGs will be elaborated along with some of the solutions 
which IENGOs/ETAGs have employed to overcome these challenges. Throughout the chapter, 
the ways in which SSCS practices deviate from those practices outlined in the literature are 
highlighted. This chapter argues that the actions of the SSCS (tactics, rhetoric, strategy), and 
their apparent success and impact cannot adequately be explained by the existing INGO/TAG 
literature.  
 
2.1 - NGOs and TAGs Defined  
2.1.1 - Transnational Civil Society and NGOs 
 
The broad aim of this study is to explore and expand our understanding of the strategies 
employed by IENGOs and ETAGs. Before this can be done, these terms must be clearly defined. 
Scholars describe IENGOs and ETAGs as being part of what is commonly referred to as TCS. 
TCS generally “refers to self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective 
action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest.”
91
 Here 
‘transnational,’ referring to coordinated campaigns of a cross-border nature, is chosen in lieu of 
‘global’ “to emphasize both the border-crossing nature of the links and the fact that rarely are 
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There are generally three broad categories of entities which campaign on environmental 
issues transnationally: 1) epistemic communities, 2) INGOs, and 3) TAGs/TANs. Epistemic 
communities are “networks of experts on a certain policy issue”
93
 with a “shared set of causal 
and principled beliefs, including shared notions of validity.”
94 
As such, they typically rely more 
on the use of information politics than do INGOs and TAGs. Khagram et al. offer a clear 
definition of non-governmental organization (NGOs) as “private, voluntary, nonprofit groups 
whose primary aim is to influence publicly some form of social change.”
95 
An international NGO 
(INGO) would then be an NGO “composed of members from two or more countries, and are 
organized to advance their member’s international goals and provide services to citizens of other 
states through routine transactions with states, private actors, and international institutions.”
96
 
Khagram et al. distinguish NGOs from more amorphous social movements by noting that 
“[g]enerally, NGOs are more formal and professional… with legal status and paid personnel.”
97
 
In other words, an INGO is an organization, with a name, structure, and voluntary membership.  
These features distinguish the INGO from the TAG in that a TAG can comprise of numerous 
INGOs and other NSAs. 
 
2.1.2 - TAGs and TANs Defined 
 
The term TAG/TAN is widely used to describe groups or networks of various NGOs and 
other NSAs operating collaboratively towards some end.
98
 A TAG is generally seen as meeting 
three requirements: TAGs are not formed by intergovernmental agreement and their views are 
independent of any national government; TAGs are organized across state boundaries and 
address issues of a trans-border nature (in other words they operate in the international arena); 
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and TAGs seek to advance ‘principled causes.’
99
  TAGs are more formalized structures than 
transnational social movements, which Khagram, Riker and Sikkink define as “sets of actors 
with common purposes and solidarities linked across country boundaries that have the capacity 
to generate coordinated and sustained social mobilization, in more than one country, to publicly 
influence social change.”
100
 Unlike TNCs or dark networks, which are motivated by private 
interests – profit – TAGs “are driven primarily by shared values or principled ideas—ideas about 
what is right and wrong—rather than shared causal ideas or instrumental goals.”
101
   
The word ‘advocacy’ is not intended to describe the primary strategy of these groups, but 
rather to reflect that “they are organized to promote causes, principled ideas and norms, and 
often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to their own 
personal ‘interests.’”
102
 Keck and Sikkink explain that “advocates plead the causes of others or 
defend a cause or proposition; they are stand-ins for persons or ideas.”
103
 Keck and Sikkink use 
the term TAN, referring to the network structure assumed by many of these entities and defining 
a network as a form of organization “characterized by voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal 
patterns of communication and exchange.”
104
 The study will not concern itself with network 
politics and the term TAG is preferred to TAN. Here networks will be treated as actors, as 
opposed to structures. This study is interested specifically in how actors employ strategy 
transnationally, in so far as they act as individual entities, and therefore treats the TAN or TAG 
as a single unit, capable of formulating and executing strategy as an individual organization, 
group, or (I)NGO. ‘INGO’ and ‘TAG’ are considered as synonymous, with these terms 
understood to refer to international actors which are purposeful and strategic actors.
105
 The study 
will therefore refer to INGO/TAG strategy.  
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2.2 - The Expansion of INGOs and TAGs in International Relations 
 
The literature describing INGOs and TAGs in general, and IENGO and ETAG strategy in 
particular, has a place in the broader IR literature. Traditionally this literature has been 
dominated by (neo-) realism and (liberal) institutionalist paradigms which focus exclusively “and 
in a self-conscious way, on the predominant role of states in world politics.”
106
 However these 
models have been increasingly challenged by positions which have given an increased role to 
NSAs. Auer described this as a “crisis in contemporary international studies [emerging] between 
the traditional or state-centered paradigm and the insurgent or multi-stakeholder paradigm of 
world politics.”
107
 This global civil society paradigm is a constructivist vision, depicted in 
Princen and Finger’s Environmental NGOs in World Politics, which describes “global 
environmental governance as a multi-level, multi-actor process, and one that bridges local, 




2.2.1 - Growing Role of NSAs in IR 
 
Theories, particularly from the constructivist school, have emerged to explain the 
increasingly visible role of NSAs in IR. While it is undeniable that states remain the “key rule-
maker, policy implementers and dispute settlers,”
109
 numerous studies identify the growing role 
of (I)NGOs and TAGs in world affairs.
110
 It should be noted that the role of INGOs and TAGs in 
IR is far from a new phenomenon; historical examples abound.
111
 However there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of TAGs in the past several decades. Scholars attribute this 
increase to several factors, foremost amongst them being technological and cultural changes such 
as the emergence and rapid expansion of the internet and the availability of cheap international 
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 Della Porta and Tarrow point out that “the collapse of the Soviet bloc encouraged the 
development of forms of nonstate action that had previously been blocked by Cold War 
divisions.”
 113
 However technological changes remain the predominant cause. As Tarrow notes, 
“[n]ew electronic technologies and broader access to them have enhanced the capacity for 
movement campaigns to be organized rapidly and effectively in many venues at once.”
114
 
ETAGs are no different, and as Sikkink and Smith note “[t]ransnational environmental 
organizations have grown most dramatically in absolute and relative terms.”
115
 After the 1972 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference), considered by 
many as the progenitor of the environmental movement, the number of environmental non-
governmental organizations (ENGO) rose from 2 in 1952 to 10, and today there are thousands of 




2.2.2 - Determining Relevance and Measuring Influence 
 
 Early studies, such as those of Wapner, and Princen and Finger, sought to establish the 
importance of these NSAs in IR.
117
 In addition to documenting the various instrumental roles of 
INGOs/TAGs, they also sought to develop means of measuring their influence or 
effectiveness.
118
 In so doing they asked two distinct questions: how much influence do 
INGOs/TAGs have? And how do INGOs/TAGs exert influence? The first question addresses 
effectiveness, the second examines strategy. While these studies serve to illuminate previously 
unexplored INGO/TAG strategies, they encounter challenges when seeking to measure 
influence.
119
 While it is possible to say that the efforts of a single INGO or TAG had an 
influence on the formulation of an international institution, regime, agreement, or policy, 
quantifying this influence is another matter. Underdal notes that while “a regime can be 
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considered effective to the extent that it successfully performs a certain (set of) function(s) or 
solves the problem(s) that motivated its establishment,” there is still considerable difficulty in 
determining effectiveness.
120
 For example, he draws a distinction “between the formal output of 
a decision-making or regime-formation… and the set of consequences flowing from the 
implementation of and adaptation to that regime.”
121
 A regime may successfully produce a new 
set of rules and regulations (output), however these must still be implemented, and then 
ultimately have an effect on behaviour (outcome), which in turn must enact some sort of positive 
change on the biophysical environment (impact).
122
 Furthermore, Underdal points out that there 
are challenges in ascribing change to the implementation of outputs, when it is also possible that 
changes in behaviour can arise unilaterally, as a result of learning which occurs during the 
negotiation process, “even in the absence of any legal obligation to do so.”
123
 Does one therefore 
consider outputs, outcomes or impacts as a means of measuring the success of a campaign? 
Impressive policy outputs may not be implemented, and implemented policies may still fail to 
have any impact on the environment.  Does raising awareness of an issue constitute a success? 
Or as Susskind and others suggest, is it “a mistake to measure success in terms of anything less 
than tangible environmental improvements”?
124
  
In the context of actually measuring influence, Underdal points to further challenges, 
such as the need to establish a point of reference, and crucially, to the use of a standard metric of 
measure. One can compare the relative effectiveness of a regime by comparing what “is actually 
accomplished and what could have been accomplished,” however as Underdal notes, this 
“immediately puts before us the intriguing question of what constitutes the maximum that a 
particular group of actors can accomplish.”
125
 An alternative is to “evaluate a regime against 
some concept of a good or ideal solution.”
126
 A further question relating to establishing a point of 
reference is that of timing; ultimately “any attempt at measuring effectiveness will have to refer 
to the state of affairs at one particular point in time.”
127
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Not only do activists attempt to influence policy, but many of their symbolic actions are 
directed at changing the minds of the general public.
128
 Wapner notes that it is difficult to 
appreciate “the political effectiveness of NGO cultural efforts because cultural changes are 
difficult to assess.”
129
 Finnemore and Sikkink explain that “internalized norms can be both 
extremely powerful (because behavior according to the norm is not questioned) and hard to 
discern (because actors do not seriously consider or discuss whether to conform).”
130
 
Consequently, work on the power of image politics and framing suggest that some of the most 
effective campaigns may be difficult to observe, let alone measure. There is also a need for a 
standardized metric of evaluation, which can be particularly challenging if various actors are 
attempting to accomplish different outputs, outcomes or impacts. If no standardized 
measurement has been determined, the “finding that one independent variable had a greater 
impact than another will be open to diverging interpretations.”
131
 
The SSCS simplifies the evaluation of its strategy. The organization measures its success 
in achieving its stated goal of stopping the Japanese from hunting whales by ‘number of whales 
saved’ – assessing the impact of its actions on the Japanese’s ability to reach their quotas. The 
SSCS is therefore focused almost entirely on ‘outcomes,’ specifically stopping whaling 
activities. It is not interested in generating ‘outputs’ in terms of cultural changes or raising 
awareness, nor does it appear particularly interested in the actual impact that saving a particular 
number of whales has on the conservation status of those species. While this allows one to 
measure the direct outcomes of SSCS actions, it does not allow one to determine whether SSCS 
strategy is more effective than those of other INGOs/TAGs. SSCS actions also exert influence on 
states. The use of counterfactuals serves as a means to identify the influence that is being 
exerted, but not how much. The aim of this study is to determine whether SSCS strategy is 
effective and the factors which make it so, not whether the strategy is more or less effective than 
other strategies. It may be possible to say that aspects of SSCS strategy are more effective at 
achieving specific outcomes than other INGOs/TAGs, for example directly saving whales or 
circumventing normative deadlocks, but not that SSCS strategy is more effective overall, in as 
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much as the strategies of other INGOs/TAGs may not attempt to directly save whales or be 
designed to circumvent normative deadlocks.  
 
2.2.3 - INGO and TAG Legitimacy 
 
The explosion in numbers of (I)NGOs/TAGs in recent years has led to another stream of 
research, a normative one, which considers whether (I)NGOs/TAGs should in fact have 
influence and power in IR.
132
 Simmons notes that while “[h]ailed as the exemplars of grassroots 
democracy in action, many TANs are, in fact, decidedly undemocratic and unaccountable to the 
people they claim to represent.”
133
 (I)NGOs and by extension TAGs, are often criticized as 
lacking transparency, and are considered neither democratic nor accountable,
134
 a lack of 
representativeness which Sikkink notes, could further accentuate North-South differences.
135
 
Risse argues that these problems are symptomatic of an already existing democratic deficit in 
IR.
136
 Price furthers that there are concerns that (I)NGOs may “subvert legitimate avenues of 
politics,”
137
 a position which is developed by Bolton and others, who argue that NGO advocacy 
gives states a ‘second bite at the apple.’
138
  Others have raised concerns over (I)NGO motives, 
and note that it is often difficult to discern “whether they are not promoting themselves as much 
as their causes.”
139
 This project will not dwell on questions of INGO/TAG legitimacy. The 
assumption is that INGOs/TAGs exist and have some degree of power; it does not necessarily 
require them to be legitimate actors. This being said, the assumption is that IENGOs/ETAGs 
fulfill an important function in working towards environmental conservation. 
Despite detractors, INGOs/TAGs are generally held in high esteem and are considered to 
speak with moral authority.  Activists are aware of this, and protect and bolster their reputations, 
building upon their ‘reputational capital.’
140 
Activists spend this reputational capital to exert 
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moral leverage. Sikkink illuminates some of the attributes which INGOs/TAGs should foster in 
order to gain legitimacy. These include: impartiality or independence, veracity and reliability, 
representativeness, accountability and transparency.
141
 Together with expertise, moral influence, 
and political legitimacy, these make up the principal sources of INGO/TAG authority.
142
 
INGOs/TAGs also have the ability to impart legitimacy to other actors and to foster legitimacy 
within institutions, for example, by serving as validators; endorsing or condemning international 
agreements. INGOs/TAGs may also serve as amicus curiae (friends of the court) in hearings, 
certify information, or establish and promote private authority regimes approving products or 
processes.
143
 As uncovered in analysis of the SSCS, international law has been overlooked as an 
alternative source of INGO/TAG authority. The SSCS does not appear to rely on moral 
authority, but rather legal authority, claiming to derive its mandate for actions not from norms, 




2.2.4 - Why Go Transnational? 
 
There is an extensive literature seeking to explain how and why NGOs campaign 
internationally and form TAGs, as well as why INGOs and TAGs may choose to work with 
domestic actors. This move from the domestic to the international is what Tarrow and McAdam 
describe as ‘upward scale shift.’
145
 Several factors explain upward scale shift. First is the fact 
that transnational issues, like environmental degradation, call out for transnational solutions, 
making these types of issues more likely to be the subject of transnational campaigns.
146
 In the 
‘Dynamic Multilevel Governance’ model Sikkink presents four different circumstances based on 
the openness of domestic and international political opportunity structures which lead to different 
models of domestic and international interaction. Tarrow defines political opportunity structure 
as the “consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent or national – dimensions of the 
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political environment that either encourage or discourage people from using collective action.”
147
 
The ‘boomerang pattern’ describes a strategy whereby “domestic NGOs bypass their state and 
directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.”
148
 
Risse and Sikkink later expanded on the boomerang model and developed the spiral model which 
takes into account the fact that this process can involve a greater range of political moves and 
become a much more extended process.
149 
 Facing a closed domestic political opportunity 
structure, activists internationally seek out those which are more open. In the ‘democratic 
deficit/defensive transnationalization’ model, “activists are forced defensively into the 
international arena, and the brunt of their activity is aimed at protecting gains made within their 
domestic polities.”
150
 Here activists endeavour to protect against a relatively open domestic 
political opportunity structure, by shifting issues to one more closed. Sikkink suggests that in 
situations where activists face closed opportunity structures at both levels there is a diminished 
chance of activism at either level.
151
 Others have noted that there are certain circumstances when 
upward scale shift may be detrimental to domestic groups, for example when so doing may cost 
domestic groups autonomy or legitimacy.
152
 
Situations where domestic and international opportunity structures are relatively open 
present the greatest range of potentially advantageous possibilities for activists. Sikkink suggests 
that when this occurs ‘insider-outsider coalitions’ can form, with domestic activists pursuing 
international options complimentary to their domestic activities.
153
 The reasons why a domestic 
group may seek to escalate their campaign to the international level even in the face of a 
relatively open domestic political opportunity structure speaks to the general benefits which 
groups accrue when making such a move. For a domestic NGO, cooperation with INGOs/TAGs 
brings “material resources, name recognition, and media attention to local or domestic 
environmental movements, not to mention access to a wider audience.”
154
 This, in turn, provides 
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domestic groups with greater legitimacy, and helps deter state violence against them.
155
 
Operating internationally also provides NGOs with a wider range of possible strategies, 
expanding the number and nature of targets and potential allies.
156
 INGOs and TAGs also benefit 
from working with domestic groups, which lend them legitimacy.
157
 Domestic groups also have 
access to ‘on the ground’ information, can act as certifiers of information, provide a human face 
to an issue, and can serve as a channel into the national political arena.
158
 
 One trend in the literature concerning (I)NGOs and TAGs, is the insistence that “all NGO 
practices remain discursively constructed through reference to the ‘local.’”
159
 Transnational 
action has been described as a continuation of domestic politics by other (transnational) 
means.
160
 Activists are, as Tarrow describes, rooted cosmopolitans, “people and groups who are 
rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that 
involve them in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts.”
161
  Risse-Kappen notes that 
“[i]n order to gain impact, transnational actors must, first, gain access to the political system of 
their target state...”
162
 This does not describe all groups, however, and in fact the SSCS stands in 
stark contrast to the general image of organizations rooted in domestic contexts. The SSCS 
appears to be a child of the international system itself, and is rooted in this system. The SSCS’s 
anti-whaling efforts do not entail campaigning in or seeking access to a domestic arena, nor do 
cooperation or alliances with grassroots groups play any significant part of SSCS campaigns. It 
appears as though SSCS strategy is formulated without reference to the local and that it focuses 
exclusively on issues within the international system.  
 
2.3 - INGO and TAG Strategy 
 
There are a broad range of strategies and tactics available to INGOs and TAGs, with the 
literature suggesting that these can be employed at three different stages of the global policy 
                                                 
155
 Bob 2005:4. 
156
 See for example Tarrow 2005:8-9. 
157
 Pralle 2006:97; see also Tarrow 2005; Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002. 
158
 Burgerman 2001:16. 
159
 Fisher 1997:454; and see Tarrow 2005:43. 
160
 Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002:511. 
161
 Tarrow 2005:29. 
162
 Risse-Kappen 1995:25; and see Tarrow 2001:6. 
45 
 
making process: 1) the agenda setting stage – identifying problems of concern, and producing 
information with an aim of promulgating norms and forcing principled issues onto the 
international agenda; 2) as indirect or direct participants in international negotiations – fostering 
policy and discursive change within institutions to develop solutions; and 3) during the 
implementation of solutions – encouraging behavioural change and compliance with regimes and 
serving as monitors of international agreements.
163
 At each stage, activists achieve influence 
through various forms of ‘advocacy’, which Fassin classifies along a continuum, ranging from 
‘engagement strategy’ which involves dialogue and persuasion to ‘confrontational strategy’ 
involving threats and adversary actions.
164
 Activists generally rely more heavily upon methods 
employing persuasion, socialization, moral pressure and information provision, rather than 
coercive methods.
165
 Florini and Simmons note that this follows from the general concept in IR, 
which assumes “a hierarchy among the instruments of power: military force ranks highest, then 
economic resources, then – far down the list, if mentioned at all – such ‘soft’ instruments as 
moral authority or the power of persuasion.”
166
 International actors – states, TNCs, TAGs, etc. – 
“vary greatly in their ability to use these instruments”
167
, and INGOs and TAGs are “rarely able 
to ‘coerce’ agreement to a norm – they must persuade.”
168
 The SSCS’s confrontational approach 
appears as more coercive than persuasive. Rather than relying on arguments, the organization 
uses action, which is designed to directly influence the behavior of targets, i.e. to make the 
Japanese stop whaling, through physical intervention. 
Examining different forms of power within the international system, Arts describes three 
‘faces’ of power: “(1) decisional power, related to policy-making and political influence; (2) 
discursive power, related to framing of discourse; and (3) regulatory power, related to rule-
making and institution-building.”
169
 Activists are able to exercise all three forms of power, but 
through different means. Activists exercise decisional power by (in)directly intervening in the 
decision making process through a range of approaches including lobbying, advocacy, 
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monitoring, protest and participation.
170
 These approaches are each designed to influence the 
decision making process, in so far as activists lack the authority to make binding decisions on 
their own. Instead, activists use information and knowledge to their advantage (see 2.3.2.1 - 
Information Politics, below), using information, along with symbolic politics through the 
exercise of discursive power, “changing the normative context of policy-making.”
171
 Activists 
are also occasionally able to wield structural power, setting the rules of the game through the 
creation of private rule-making initiatives or authority regimes.
172
 SSCS actions appear to exert a 
form of regulatory power, in so far as the organization claims to enforce existing rules, 
challenging the more passive approach generally taken by INGOs/TAGs with respect to 
regulatory power, which generally entails the creation of voluntary private authority regimes 




2.3.1 - Insider-Outsider Politics and Venue Shopping 
 
The literature makes a distinction between insider and outsider INGO/TAG strategies.
174
 
‘Insider strategies’ are aimed at influencing decision-makers directly, “using information and 
expertise to lobby policy-makers and working within institutions and with governments.”
175
 
Insiders will often take part “in highly institutionalized service and advocacy activities”, within 
international intuitions.
176
 In contrast, ‘outsider strategies’ challenge these institutions and 
organizations, and employ repertoires which include boycotts and protests.
177
 Outsider strategies 
are seen as less predictable and often as a last resort if access to an institution is denied. As a 
result, insider strategies are generally considered to be more effective.
178
 Outsider tactics are also 
seen as being more prone to backlash.
179
 The idea that insider strategies are more successful than 
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outsider strategies is challenged by the success of the SSCS’s approach, which is distinctly 
outsider. 
The distinction between insider and outsider strategies highlights another dominant theme 
in the literature; that international institutions “are of central importance for the making and 
mobilization of transnational social movements.”
180
 Tarrow describes international institutions as 
‘coral reefs,’ an analogy which depicts how institutions serve as “focal points for contention.”
181 
Institutions “present clear political opportunity structures for transnational advocacy.”
182 
 
Institutions are valuable to INGOs/TAGs for many of the same reasons that they are valuable to 
states. As Slaughter elaborates, institutions “decrease transaction costs, provide information, 
facilitate monitoring of treaty obligations, enhance possibilities for linkages in international 
negotiations, and increase the salience of State negotiations.”
183
  
Institutions create the spaces which make insider approaches possible. An entire literature 
on venue shopping explains how groups “seek out a setting where they can air their grievances 
with current policy and present alternative policy proposals.”
184
 Sound strategy dictates that 
groups seek out a “decision setting that offers the best prospects for reaching one’s policy goals, 
an activity referred to as venue shopping.”
185
 This is what Sikkink and Smith refer to as 
‘strategic venue shift.’
186
 In this way, venue shopping can act as a means of overcoming bias
187
 
and political blockages, as well as a means of forwarding a specific policy outcome, in so far as 
certain venues are tied to policy outcomes.
188
  
The possibility of selecting an ideal venue is of course constrained by the availability of 
venues. Issues such as human rights or broad environmental problems may be pursued across a 
number of venues, allowing activists to select venues which best fit with their goals. However 
this may not always be the case. Some issues lack venues, or are limited to a single venue, such 
as many of the issues upon which the SSCS campaigns, particularly whaling, which is managed 
exclusively by the IWC. Having a limited number of possible venues within which to pursue an 
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issue is not a unique situation by any means, but creative solutions to this challenge remain few. 
As we will see, the IWC is far from an ideal venue. At best it is mired in a longstanding 
deadlock. At worst it is a critically flawed and impotent organization and one which is incapable 
of making the changes necessary to rectify this predicament. Understanding the SSCS’s strategy 
therefore may shed light on how activists craft strategies which work when existing institutions 
are ineffectual. 
 
2.3.2 - Typologies of Action 
 
In their seminal book, Activists Beyond Borders, Keck and Sikkink classify activists’ 
broader strategic repertoires into a typology of four categories: 1) information politics; 2) 
symbolic politics; 3) leverage politics, and 4) accountability politics.
189
 Within each of these 
categories are a range of potential actions. Before examining these, it is important to note that 
there is considerable overlap amongst the categories. For example while the release of a 
scientific report might be considered as information politics, this information might serve to 
leverage an important actor or shame a non-compliant one, and the information may be released 
through the use of a symbolic image event. Activists cannot rely on a single method alone: an 
organization which monitors state compliance with treaties will still need to communicate their 
findings to the public and use various other forms of information and symbolic politics to 
generate support and funding from donors and attention for their cause.  
While multiple methods may be combined, organizations do not tend to embrace all 
strategies with equal fervor.  Over time, they develop preferred approaches based on their 
assessment of the relative costs and benefits of employing particular tactics. Groups develop 
structure and organizational models which support preferred strategies, gradually developing a 
repertoire.
190
 Thus over time an organization (or TAG) tends to rely on a particular repertoire of 
action which may include elements from multiple categories.  Organizations do not operate in 
isolation, especially those which are part of a TAG. Many organizations carve out an operational 
niche somewhere along the spectrum of possible actions. A campaign can include the actions of 
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groups with different repertoires along Fassin’s spectrum, and combine various elements from 
Keck and Sikkink’s different categories.
191
  Organizations may work in cooperation as part of a 
TAG, in parallel or even in opposition to one another. 
 
2.3.2.1 - Information Politics 
 
 The key currency of INGOs/TAGs is information, and the literature singles out 
‘information politics’ as the preeminent function of these actors.
192
 Keck and Sikkink define 
‘information politics’ as “the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically useable 
information and move it to where it will have the most impact.”
193
 Activists typically employ 
soft power, and exercise this soft power by “proposing, questioning, criticizing and publicizing,” 
which entails information gathering, dissemination, evaluation and certification.
194
 Activists use 
information politics at all stages of the international policy process. Transnational activists 
influence policy by calling attention to issues and by using information strategically to shape the 
way individual policy-makers perceive of problems (framing in 2.3.2.2 – Symbolic Politics, 
below).
195
 Activists also play a crucial role as suppliers of technical knowledge and expertise. 
Many transnational issues are characterized by pronounced uncertainty, allowing activists to 






Epistemic networks play an important role in the transmission of information and the 
creation of knowledge.
197
 On environmental issues, groups of experts and scientists are often 
given a very prominent role in negotiations, “bridging the gap between science and politics, facts 
and values.”
198
 Information politics is pervasive even across repertoires of action.
199
 Information 
is used by virtually all activists during campaigns, if only to serve as justification for the use of 
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other, potentially more confrontational, repertoires. The SSCS constantly employs information 
politics, using information to justify its actions, to frame actions as international law 
enforcement, to appeal to donors, leverage states and so on. But the SSCS certainly does not 
engage in its confrontational actions to bring attention to or to release specific information. Its 
use of information politics is certainly subservient to achieving other strategic objectives. 
 
2.3.2.2 - Symbolic Politics 
 
‘Symbolic politics’ refers to the ability of activists to “call upon symbols, actions, or 
stories” creating awareness of issues and to make said issues comprehensible to an international 
audience.
200
 It is the “human effort to induce cooperation through the use of symbols.”
201
 One of 
the most powerful non-material resources available to activists is “their ability to define and 
redefine issues.”
202
  This serves to expand the scope of conflicts, get issues onto the agenda, shift 
issues into more amenable venues, and ultimately to change public policy. Wapner describes this 
process as ‘cultural politics,’
203
 where through the use of symbols and framing, activists attempt 
to alter “the norm structure of global governance.”
204
 Activists use symbolic politics at all levels 
of international policy. In the agenda setting phase, activists often serve as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ 
who “call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and 
dramatizes them.”
205
 Norm entrepreneurs seek to introduce new norms to the international 
community, and use symbols and frames to define a problem, to articulate a blame story (a 
causal chain), to suggest desirable solutions, and to motivate action around the problem.
206
 Keck 
and Sikkink highlight the importance of the establishment of a causal story, which serves to 
identify the cause of a problem or injustice.
207
  
The process of defining, re-defining, interpreting, reinterpreting, naming or renaming is 
known as ‘framing.’ Symbolic politics involves the constant framing and re-framing of issues. 
                                                 
200
 Ibid, p.16; and see Keck and Sikkink 1999:95 referencing Brysk 1994.  
201
 DeLuca 1999:16, citing Brock, Scott, and Chesebro 1989:14. 
202
 Pralle 2006:6, citing Cobb and Elder 1972. 
203
 Wapner 2002:51. 
204
 Sikkink 2002:302; see also Joachim 2003:251, citing Zald 1996: 268; Slaughter 2000a:105; Keck and Sikkink 
1998. 
205
 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:897. 
206
 Yanacopulos 2009:72. 
207
 Keck and Sikkink 1998:27; see also Yanacopulos 2009:72. 
51 
 
Keck and Sikkink inter alia define framing as “the strategic efforts by groups of people to 
fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate 
collective action.”
208 
Activists “deliberately package and frame policy ideas to convince each 
other as well as the general public, that certain policy proposals constitute acceptable solutions to 
pressing problems.”
209
 Activists select and construct frames which resonate with ‘familiar 
cultural themes.’
210
 Keck and Sikkink argue, “one of the main tasks that social movements 
undertake… is to make possible the previously unimaginable, by framing problems in such a 
way that their solution comes to appear inevitable.”
211
 And activists’ efforts at framing can be 
seen during negotiations, and in the policy implementation and monitoring phase, whereby 
activists can frame non-compliance in such a way as to place greater pressure on norm violators 
and by doing so attempt to leverage compliance. Framing can be used as a means of scaling 
issues into the international arena. Activists seeking upward scale shift will attempt to mobilize 
“international symbols to frame domestic conflicts,”
212
 thereby taking advantage of international 
norms. Re-framing issues using different sets of norms can help bring those issues to the 
attention of ‘hospitable’ audiences that are often distant both geographically and politically.  
ENGOs and ETAGs face a challenge when campaigning on environmental issues, for as 
Keck and Sikkink note, “environmentalism is less a set of universally agreed upon principles 
than it is a frame within which the relations among a variety of claims about resource use, 
property, rights, and power may be reconfigured.”
213
 As such, environmental campaigners will 
often benefit by presenting a ‘human face,’ in the form of human rights and/or development 
issues, to environmental issues, in order to turn them into principled issues.
214
 In doing so 
however environmentalists risk potential backlash because framing issues from a ‘human 
perspective’ opens the issue to competing claims by disadvantaged groups.
215
  
Framing and symbolic politics are present not only in activists’ rhetoric, “but also 
through what they do – through their choices of tactics and the connections between their actions 
                                                 
208
 Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002:12, citing Snow et al. 1986; see also Tarrow 2005:61 citing Gamson 1992; and 
Keck and Sikkink 1998:17. 
209
 Joachim 2003:250-251 citing Campbell, 1988:38; see also Pralle 2003:242. 
210
 Ryan 1991:79 citing Gamson 1984:80; Thomas 2002:71; and Keck and Sikkink 1998:17.  
211
 Keck and Sikkink 1998:40-41. 
212
 Tarrow 2005:32. 
213
 Keck and Sikkink 1998:121. 
214
 Ibid, p.136-137. 
215





 IENGOs, notably Greenpeace, are well known for creating powerful 
images during their campaigns, which include activists dangling from banners, blocking effluent 
pipes, or zipping in front of whaling vessels. These acts are highly symbolic image events; what 
Hunter describes as ‘mind bombs’ – “influential, sometimes archetypal images that can cut 
through the hypnotic drone of the day-to-day babbling to reach people at a deeper emotional 
level.”
217
 These mind bombs engender symbols through the images they create, and 
Greenpeace’s mind bombs are carefully constructed to resonate both with some dominant 
cultural norms while at the same time challenging others. Images of small, brightly coloured 
zodiacs darting in front of massive rusting whaling vessels evoke a ‘David-versus-Goliath’ 
spectacle, appealing to people’s desire to root for the underdog.
218
 These events produce images 
highlighting “the utter vulnerability of protesters as they intervene on behalf of nature,”
219  
and 
employ a mechanism described as ‘manufactured vulnerability.’
220
  With manufactured 
vulnerability, activists demonstrate “their own moral commitment for a media and public 
captured by the epic quality of the confrontation,” by exposing themselves to danger and putting 
their safety in the hands of the authorities.
221
 Activists do “not oppose force with force,” but take 
the moral high ground by placing the responsibility for their “safety in the hands of the 
authorities.”
222
 Such an action romanticizes the activists, contrasting with the “oppressive and 
aggressive activities of the State.”
223
 
It is undeniable that the SSCS also engages in symbolic politics. The organization 
deploys its own ‘Jolly Roger’ pirate flag and its campaigns are replete with image events. 
However, unlike Greenpeace actions, creating a powerful ‘mind bomb’ does not appear to be the 
ultimate goal of SSCS actions. The SSCS regularly engages in actions which make for very poor 
image events, either because no/poor images are produced (such as night actions), or the images 
which are produced lack certain qualities which make them effective mind bombs. For example, 
aggressive action, coupled with such imposing visual factors as black vessels and uniforms, does 
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not foster an image of vulnerability. In engaging confrontationally and aggressively, the SSCS 
jettisons the moral high ground associated with the underdog/vulnerable/‘peaceful hippy’ image 
portrayed by Greenpeace (through the use of brightly-coloured rainbow-festooned vessels and 
activists) and instead embraces piratical and legal symbolism. SSCS image events therefore 
challenge what the literature generally considers as effective image events, with the production 
of image events appearing secondary to the goal of directly stopping Japanese whaling. The 
SSCS frames its actions differently than other IENGOs/ETAGs. The SSCS’s principal argument 
is not that what the Japanese are doing is wrong, but that it is illegal. The SSCS appears to be 
attempting to re-frame the whaling issue from normative to legal. This is not to suggest that the 
SSCS does not use normative arguments/framing, but that these are secondary to legal framing 
and rhetoric.  
 
2.3.2.3 - Leverage Politics 
 
Keck and Sikkink define leverage politics as “the ability to call upon powerful actors to 
effect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence.”
224
 They 
identify two forms of leverage, material leverage and moral leverage, explaining that “[m]aterial 
leverage usually takes the form of some kinds of issue-linkage, normally involving money or 
goods (but potentially also including votes in international organizations, prestigious offices, or 
other benefits).”
225
 Activists most often seek to achieve material leverage by threatening to harm 
the economic interests of states or other relevant actors.
226
 For example, activists can organize 
consumer boycotts of services or products, promote divestment programs, or disrupt shareholder 
meetings.
227
 States are leveraged indirectly through the targeting of specific industries, or 
activists can target companies directly.
 
 
Other kinds of material leverage involve acts of property damage or other aggressive acts, 
such as blockades, to interfere with economic activity. These types of strategies are seldom 
considered as part of the repertoires of INGOs/TAGs, and IR scholars may even define away 
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these ‘transgressive’ acts, relegating them to the repertoires of ‘uncivil society.’  These 
transgressive forms of material leverage are more commonly found in the repertoires of radical 
domestic organizations and movements. These shall be explored in greater detail in Chapter 6, 
however a general observation which can be made is that the INGO/TAG literature tends to 
ignore these more radical/confrontational/transgressive strategies.  
An extensive literature has emerged documenting and exploring the manner in which 
activists use moral leverage to achieve desirable outcomes. Activists can use this moral authority 
to leverage other actors, what Keck and Sikkink and others describe as ‘mobilizing shame.’
228
 
From a position of moral authority, and by releasing information, activists use strategies of 
‘naming and shaming’ whereby they publicize instances of noncompliance by states which have 
made previous commitments, subjecting the non-compliant state to widespread international 
public scrutiny.
229
 Moral leverage first requires the existence of international norms, or standards 
of appropriate behavior.
230
 Norms become, as Thomas argues, “the preeminent vocabulary of 
international society, which both state and nonstate actors use to justify their existence, their 
goals, and their behavior.”
231
 The more entrenched a norm becomes, the more effectively actors 
can use it as leverage. Activists can then use shame, drawing attention to non-compliance, noting 
“the distance between discourse and practice.”
232
  
States are concerned with such efforts because they “value the legitimacy they gain by 
appearing to comply with international norms, and because they value the material goods that 
others may link to certain behaviors.”
233
 Concern over reputation is not only motivated by 
morals, but by a mixture of normative and material interests. Burgerman explains that states 
concern themselves with reputations for a combination of a “need for approval and acceptance in 
a community of states bound by shared values and the material influence that more powerful 
states can bring to bear on the offenders.”
234
 Non-compliance with norms can lead to “tangible 
political or economic sanctions.”
235
 All states are susceptible to this kind of pressure, though the 
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literature generally agrees that states which are most susceptible “are those that aspire to belong 
to a normative community of nations.”
236
 This has led some commentators to suggest that this 
strategy is most effective when it is least needed.
237
 The SSCS does not appear to ‘name and 
shame’ in the conventional sense: one could characterize what it does as more akin to ‘judging 
and acting.’ The organization does not point out disparities between discourse and practice with 
respect to norms. Rather, the SSCS points out violations of the law, failures to enforce the law, 
and acts to rectify this disparity.  
 
2.3.2.4 - Accountability Politics 
 
In a sense, Keck and Sikkink’s ‘accountability politics’ represents a marriage of 
information and leverage politics. They describe accountability politics as “the effort to hold 
powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles.”
238 
Monitoring is carried out 
during the treaty making and implementation stages of the international policy making 
process.
239
 Once policy is enacted, activists monitor state compliance with treaties and 
agreements. They gather information and document instances of non-compliance, and then 
strategically disseminate this information “to ensure accountability with public statements, 
existing legislation and international standards.”
240
 Dai elaborates that “[b]y providing 
compliance information, they facilitate reciprocity and thus induce compliance.”
241
  
Not all are in agreement that INGOs and TAGs provide a service to states. Raustiala 
notes that INGOs and TAGs “remain imperfect monitoring agents, [as they are]… often less 
concerned with compliance in the narrow sense – adherence to the letter of an agreement – 
[than]… approval or disapproval of particular actions, even if those actions are not violations of 
the terms of the accord.”
242
 He cites the case of whaling to support this, noting that activists 
continue to “criticize and monitor those nations engaged in legal research whaling or that had 
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expressed reservations to particular agreements, despite the legality of their actions.”
243
 We shall 
return to this issue in greater detail in Chapter 4.2.4. 
We can see complementarity between leverage and accountability politics. Activists 
monitor compliance, and once they have identified instances of non-compliance, they use 
‘naming and shaming’ to compel states to change and become compliant. This method is used by 
INGOs and TAGs; from human rights TAGs, explored by Bergerman,
244
 to IENGOs as 
documented by Pralle, and Schofer and Hironaka.
245
 Pralle makes an interesting observation 
when she notes that  
environmental activists also used international laws, treaties, and norms to shame 
[states]… These international laws and treaties, while devoid of any real 
enforcement power, provided a rich array of symbols and arguments to 




This highlights the circumstance whereby even if states violate explicitly codified international 
laws or treaties, activists primarily use this as added moral legitimacy to their shaming efforts but 
these efforts remain symbolic and rhetorical. The SSCS appears to take this a step further, giving 
priority to legal rather than moral/normative justifications.   
INGOs/TAGs play an important role in monitoring, but general consensus is that the role 
of INGOs and TAGs in enforcement is very limited. Bergerman distinguishes enforcement from 
“other degrees of pressure in that it involves binding international decisions and either military or 
nonmilitary coercion.”
247
 Lacking military might and authority, INGOs and TAGs are not 
considered to be viable enforcement actors. Bergerman claims that this is not in itself 
disadvantageous. In some instances enforcement actions by states may be politically or militarily 
unfeasible, which provides a niche for traditional INGO/TAG leverage and information 
politics.
248
 Another means by which activists can encourage or compel enforcement by states is 
through domestic legal systems. Dai, in particular, details the importance of domestic 
constituencies in assuring state compliance.
249
 Due to their transnational nature, INGOs and 
TAGs are well placed to engage in judicial arbitrage, searching out domestic legal venues and in 
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pursuing non-compliant parties through these venues.
250
 The SSCS challenges the idea that 
NGOs cannot actively enforce international law. It presents an alternative to this type of moral 
leverage, presenting its own form of ‘legal leverage,’ and in so doing expands this area of the 
literature and our understanding of the mechanisms available to activists.  
 
2.4 - Issue Selection 
 
Given the range of strategies available to activists, two questions remain: how do activists 
decide which strategies to adopt, and how do activists select the issues upon which to campaign? 
While INGOs and TAGs are strategic actors, able to choose repertoires most likely to help 
achieve desired outcomes, they do not embrace all strategies with equal fervor. Many 
organizations shun confrontational or destructive approaches not on ground of efficacy but rather 
due to moral objections to the use of property destruction or violence. Strategies must also be 
carefully matched to political opportunity structures in order to achieve optimum effect: INGOs 
and TAGs cannot monitor treaties that do not exist, release information that is not available, or 
appeal to norms that have no resonance. Organizational structures, available resources, issues 
and venues can in turn reinforce choices of repertoires. The literature agrees that size matters. 
Arts notes that a NSAs is most relevant when “(1) its size is considerable, (2) its constituency is 
substantial and covers several countries, (3) governments and IGOs have granted it (in)formal 
access to political arenas and (4) it has shown that it is consequential to international politics.”
251
 
Large organizations are able to exercise a broader range of strategies, which puts them in a 
position to be more successful than smaller organizations.
252
 
There is also the question of how INGOs/TAGs select the issues upon which they campaign 
and how they devise strategies to achieve specific goals. One basic assumption is that 
INGOs/TAGs select issues for purely ‘principled reasons’, in other words, based on their 
perceived moral exigency. Yet, as many scholars have pointed out, this fails to explain why some 
                                                 
250
 See for example Wapner 2002:43. 
251
Arts 2003-2004:5, referencing Morss 1991. 
252
 See for example Arts 2003-2004:5; Jasanoff 1997:588; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Phelps Bondaroff 2014. 
58 
 
morally pressing issues are adopted while others are not.
253
 Clearly there are other factors which 
guide issue-selection beyond mere ‘moral urgency,’ or in the case of environmental issues, 
conservation significance. Explanations of issue-selection can be loosely divided into two broad 
categories, those which emphasize the particular characteristics or behavior of (I)NGOs/TAGs 
(agency-based explanations), and those explanations which highlight the importance of issue 
context and institutional setting, or ‘political opportunity structure’ (structural explanations).
254
 
Structural explanations of issue-selection posit that issues are adopted due to specific 
attributes which make them more amenable to international advocacy.
255
 Keck and Sikkink 
identify two issue attributes which are most frequently selected by activists:  
(1) Those involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a 
short and clear causal chain (or story) about who bears responsibility;  
(2) Issues involving legal equality of opportunity.”256 
They elaborate, noting that “[i]ssues that involve ideas about right and wrong are amenable to 
advocacy networking because they arouse strong feelings, allow networks to recruit volunteers 
and activists, and infuse meaning to these volunteer activities.”
257
 The importance of the moral 
resonance of an issue in line with existing international norms is also cited by Price as an 
important determinant of campaign success and therefore issue-selection.
258
  
Keck and Sikkink’s emphasis on issues with short and clear causal chains is also 
supported by Nelson, who agrees, and notes that long causal chains present problems with 
framing.
259
 Often issues which contain “especially potent or symbolic cases,” are ideal, because 
symbolic cases can help “organize a plethora of information into a manageable narrative that can 
be packaged for the public.”
260
 Long causal stories can be shortened through the use of symbolic 
cases. Towards this end, environmentalists often use surrogate or flagship species – “popular, 
charismatic species that serve as symbols and rallying points to stimulate conservation awareness 
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 Flagship species, such as pandas, humpback whales, polar bears or tigers, serve as 
representatives for larger ecosystems and their less charismatic residents.
262
 Other campaigns 
stress “the connection between protecting environments and protecting the often vulnerable 
people who live in them.”
263
 In contrast to structural arguments, other scholars have stressed the 
importance of agency when it comes to issue-selection. Finnemore and Sikkink highlight the 
importance of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ who push certain issues to international prominence.
264
 
Others have also stressed the significance of domestic political structures, suggesting that strong 




Both of these two broad explanatory categories has merit, and it is likely that 
INGOs/TAGs select the issues upon which they campaign based on a combination of the above 
factors, as well as available resources and regional specialities of the organization. Carpenter 
notes that existing explanations of issue-selection are theoretically insufficient, and points out 
that many issues with favourable characteristics are not selected, and likewise activists will 
frequently campaign on issues which lack any favourable characteristics whatsoever.
266
  
The case of the SSCS is interesting in that some of the issues upon which it successfully 
campaigns lack the favourable characteristics which many scholars cite as being important, 
including favourable political opportunity structures. The SSCS’s campaign on bluefin tuna 
serves as such an example. The overharvesting of bluefin tuna is not clearly a ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ 
question, it lacks a human dimension, as well as a clear causal chain, and there are no clear 
identifiable perpetrators to be held to account. Tuna themselves lack the charismatic features 
which would allow them to serve as a flagship species, with norm entrepreneurs pushing for their 
conservation, and a receptive international audience. The only thing in place is an existing 
regulatory framework, allowing the issue of bluefin tuna conservation to be framed as 
‘international law enforcement.’
267
 The SSCS’s apparent selection of some of the issues upon 
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which it campaigns based on the existence of pre-existing international law, is consistent with its 
strategy and presents additional theories contributing to the literature on issue selection.   
 
2.5 - Sea Shepherd’s Challenge to the INGO/TAG Literature  
 
In consideration of the aforementioned issues, the literature generally agrees that the 
IENGOs/ETAGs that will be the most relevant and successful have the following characteristics, 
they are: 1) large in membership and have considerable available resources,
268
 2) have a 
constituency which extends through several countries,
269
 3) have been granted (in)formal access 
to institutions where they can employ insider strategies.
270
 Furthermore these IENGOs/ETAGs 
will, 4) campaign on issues with specific characteristics – issues which are amenable to having a 
human face put on them or which feature a charismatic flagship species, and 5) involve norms 
which are consistent with pre-existing international norms and which resonate with audiences.
271
 
Bramble and Bramble note that small IENGOs/ETAGs which are effective tend to be those 
which derive “influence primarily from scientific-technical or legal expertise.”
272
 The structural 
context must also be permissive: 1) no major states must stand in strong opposition to the issue; 
2) states involved must be concerned with their international reputation, or the material costs 




The SSCS presents a challenge to these predominant positions. It is a relatively small 
organization (both in membership and financial resources), working as an outsider, employing 
confrontational – or even transgressive – action, campaigning on issues which have few of the 
positive issue attributes. The SSCS confronts powerful states and, notably, has no links to 
domestic organizations. The organization seldom campaigns in domestic settings but operates in 
international waters. If the SSCS’s apparent strategy could be classified into any of Keck and 
Sikkink’s categories, it would most likely be seen as a combination of leverage and 
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accountability politics. However the organization’s form of leverage is much more direct than 
typical forms of material leverage. The SSCS does not seek to bring about indirect material 
leverage against its targets through the mobilization of the public; instead it exacts direct material 
costs to them. Rather than targeting norm violators, the SSCS targets law violators, and it does 
not use persuasion, moral or otherwise, nor does it seek to morally shame them with words and 
symbols. The SSCS appears to use confrontational action to bring about compliance with 
international conservation laws, which it considers are being violated.  
From this review, it is evident that the SSCS strategy deviates significantly from the 
conventional understanding of INGO/TAG strategy, however, despite this the SSCS appears to 
have achieved notable successes. This clearly suggests that a study of SSCS strategy will expand 
the literature on a number of important fronts, and generally expand our understanding of how 
INGOs/TAGs influence and exert power in international affairs. 
62 
 
CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
  
3.1 - The Case Study 
 
It is clear that SSCS strategy challenges the existing IR literature on conventional 
INGO/TAG strategy. The SSCS serves as a case study, from which we can expand our 
understanding of the various strategies which NSAs use to exert power in international affairs. 
This chapter outlines the method which was used to discern SSCS strategy and the mechanisms 
which make it effective. It begins by developing the single-outlier case model which was used 
and justifies the specific case selected. The various methods which were used are explained, 
beginning with process tracing and including PO, interviews, triangulation, and counterfactuals. 
Details revealing how these methods work and the reasons for their selection are then developed. 
The chapter also outlines field work procedures; the steps taken to secure a position and to 
protect research subjects, the manner in which data was collected, and outlines some of the 
methodological challenges encountered. It concludes by discussing data analysis. 
 
3.1.1 - Case Selection 
 
Like all ETAGs, the SSCS uses a range of strategies, often employing many different 
strategies in a single campaign, and not necessarily employing aggressive confrontation in all of 
its campaigns. For example the SSCS supports anti-poaching operations in the Galapagos Marine 
Resources Reserve by providing members of the national park service with material and training, 
and recently supplied them with an AIS vessel tracking system.
274
 The ‘Cove Guardians’ in Taiji, 
Japan and ‘Dam Guardians’ in California, are almost entirely ‘bearing witness’ campaigns, 
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where activists are present, to observe and document actions to which they are opposed.
275
 
Rather than looking at all SSCS campaigns which involve confrontational action, it was 
determined that the most effective way of studying the SSCS strategy would be through an in-
depth study of a single campaign, allowing for the examination of SSCS strategy as it is enacted 
over the course of an entire campaign, providing a comprehensive picture of SSCS actions. 
Two campaigns presented themselves as potential case studies of the SSCS 
confrontational approach; the anti-whaling campaign in the Southern Ocean, and the bluefin tuna 
campaign in the Mediterranean (‘Operation Blue Rage’). The SSCS’s Antarctic anti-whaling 
campaign makes an excellent case study in the SSCS’s use of confrontational action. The 
campaign has been ongoing since 2005 (with a pilot in 2002-2003). Operations are long, carried 
out during the Austral summer (December to March). The ongoing nature of the campaign and 
the extended duration of annual operations allow for an examination of the strategic interplay 
between the SSCS and Japanese whalers and the impact of SSCS actions. Compared to other 
SSCS campaigns, the anti-whaling operations are also relatively well-documented, and the 
campaign has received considerable media attention. Information gleaned from previous annual 
operations can be used to provide a picture of SSCS strategy over an extended period of time and 
help to rule out anachronisms of a single operation, while the rich description of actions gathered 
through fieldwork serves to reveal details of SSCS strategy which are not part of the public 
record from previous operations.  
At the time that this study was initiated, the bluefin tuna campaign had not yet been 
launched. The bluefin tuna campaign also has several characteristics which render it less well 
suited as a primary case study. The SSCS has only engaged in two seasons of campaigning (2010 
and 2011), and like the bluefin tuna fishing season, campaigns were relatively short (often less 
than a month), offering scant opportunity for sustained observation. The continuity of the 
campaign is in doubt, in so far as no campaigning occurred in 2012 or 2013. The 2011 campaign 
was severely disrupted due to complications resulting from the civil war in Libya, and as a result, 
was ended early.
276
 While these characteristics make the bluefin tuna campaign a less than ideal 
choice for a single case study for inductive investigation, the campaign does serve as a means by 
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which to make evaluations of conclusions drawn from observations of the SSCS’s anti-whaling 
campaign. The bluefin tuna campaign will therefore be used as a supplementary case study to 
test any theories developed from observations of the SSCS’s anti-whaling campaign. The bluefin 
tuna case also contributed to the examination of SSCS issue selection. Whaling is an issue upon 
which the SSCS has campaigned since its inception; it is therefore difficult to clearly separate its 
historical focus on the issue in order to identify other factors which may have motivated it to 
campaign on Japanese whaling in the Southern Ocean specifically. The bluefin tuna issue on the 
other hand is an issue upon which the SSCS only recently decided to campaign, and one which 
has been selected from a range of other possibilities, and therefore provides valuable insight into 
the issue selection of the SSCS. 
 
3.1.2 - Single Case Study 
 
A case study is defined by Gerring as “an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to 
generalize across a larger set of units.”
277
 Case studies are well suited to inductive research, 
allowing “one to test a multitude of hypotheses in a rough-and-ready way,”
278
 and for producing 
an “in-depth understanding of a phenomenon and its context.”
279
 The goal of a case study, of 
course, is not only to understand the specific case under examination, but also to generalize from 
this case, and to generate potentially new hypotheses and theories from it.
280
 The principal 
benefit of the single case study is the rich data it provides. This data is invaluable to process 
tracing.
281
 Darke, Shanks and Broadbent note that a  
single case study is appropriate where it represents a critical case…where it is an 
extreme or unique case, or where it is a revelatory case…[and s]ingle cases allow 





                                                 
277
 Gerring 2004:341. 
278
 Ibid. p. 350, 349. 
279
 Darke, Shanks, and Broadbent 1998:275; Eisenhardt1989:534. 
280
 Bennett and Elman 2006:473; Bennett 2004:30; and see inter alia Gerring 2004:350; Eisenhard 1989:546; 
Becker 1958:652-653. 
281
 Creswell and Miller 2000:128. 
282
 Darke, Shanks, and Broadbent 1998:277 citing Yin 1994:38-40 and Walsham 1995. 
65 
 
Bennett further elaborates on the benefit of studying outlier cases, noting that such cases “can 
help inductively identify variables and hypotheses that have been left out of existing theories.”
283
 
At the onset of this study the SSCS presented itself as an apparently unique case, with distinct 
revelatory possibilities. Because there are few groups which do precisely what the SSCS does, 
specifically (confrontational) marine conservation in international waters, the SSCS serves as an 
excellent outlier case.  
The use of a single case study is not without challenges and detractors. One of the most 
significant risks of building theory from a single case study is that it “may result in narrow and 
idiosyncratic theory.”
284
 Generating theory which only describes the SSCS’s (anti-whaling) 
strategy would not go very far in providing insight into the larger matter of expanding our 
knowledge of the various ways in which NSAs seek to influence IR. A further risk of case study 
research is that  
the intensive use of empirical evidence can yield theory which is overly complex. 
A hallmark of good theory is parsimony, but given the typically staggering 





Given the sheer volume of data generated throughout the course of this study, this was indeed a 
temptation, but one can guard against such an eventuality by aiming to generate parsimonious 
theory, a goal of the study. Gibb and Wilkins criticise Eisenhardt’s belief that the “more cases a 
researcher studies, the better (within certain limits) for generating theory,” arguing that an 
emphasis on a larger numbers of cases loses “the essence of case study research: the careful 
study of a single case that leads researchers to see new theoretical relationships and question old 
ones.”
286
 For these scholars, the risk of producing an idiosyncratic theory is far outweighed by 
the potential novelty and validity of theory generated from the sheer richness of data produced 
from a single case study.  
Once a theory of SSCS anti-whaling strategy is developed, it will be tested against the 
bluefin tuna campaign, to verify that the theory is not idiosyncratic to the SSCS anti-whaling 
campaign. The bluefin tuna campaign will be studied in much the same way as the whaling 
campaign, but will rely more heavily on interviews with SSCS crew members and secondary 
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sources given the limitations of this campaign. ‘Most similar case’ comparison will also be used 
to further our understanding of SSCS strategy. In 2010 Greenpeace ran a concurrent bluefin tuna 
campaign which also allows for comparison between the strategies which the two organizations 
adopted. Such a comparison promises to highlight how SSCS strategy differs from that of one of 
the few other IENGOs which operates on the high seas. Any theory generated will also be 
compared to the actions of other IENGOs/ETAGs, to determine whether the theory is specific to 
the SSCS or if it can be used more broadly. Finally, I will consider whether the theory is specific 
to environmental campaigning, or whether it can apply to other (I)NGOs/TAGs and NSAs, 
thereby serving to expand our understanding of how NSAs exert power and influence in IR. 
 
3.2 - Discerning SSCS Strategy  
 
The next question is how to study the SSCS’s anti-whaling strategy in order to determine 
whether the strategy is effective and if so, what makes it effective? Within-case analysis will be 
used, because such a method is “aimed at the discovery and validation of causal mechanisms.”
287
  
Causal mechanisms are defined as the “unobservable entities or structures that operate in specific 
contexts to generate the phenomena that we observe in the physical or social world.”
288
 
Understanding the causal mechanism behind SSCS strategy is not dependent on this mechanism 
being consciously enacted through strategy. In other words, it could very well be the case that the 
SSCS perception of what it is doing and says it is doing, has little to do with the mechanisms 
which ultimately make its actions powerful, or that the SSCS may seek to accomplish certain 
outcomes, through the explicit and conscious use of certain mechanisms, while at the same time 
benefiting from other mechanisms not consciously enacted. Several methods have been chosen 
in order to uncover these mechanisms. Process tracing is used to identify a mechanism using 
information generated through PO and verified by triangulation. Counterfactuals will be used to 
measure the impact of SSCS actions, and the mechanisms behind them.
289
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3.2.1 - Process Tracing 
 
Process tracing involves “the minute tracing of the explanatory narrative to the point 
where the events to be explained are microscopic and the covering laws correspondingly more 
certain.”
290
 The goal of process tracing is “to assess causality by recording each element of the 
causal chain.”
291
 Process tracing produces narratives which “allow us to capture the unfolding of 
social action over time in a manner sensitive to the order in which events occur.”
292
 Rather than 
looking at a portion of a process, such as outcome, process tracing emphasizes studying an issue 
from its beginning to its conclusion.
293
 Bennett and Elman posit that “each process tracing 
account suggests evidence that should be found if the account is true,” and that 
 
“our confidence 
in the suggested explanation will be increased if process tracing finds evidence of observable 
implications that are inconsistent with alternative explanations.”
294
  
Betsill and Corell note that process tracing is useful “for identifying the causal 
mechanisms by which NGOs exert influence.”
295
 It is a method which is also well suited to 
seeking to identify strategy. Process tracing “investigate[s] and explain[s] the decision process 
by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes,”
296
 and it 
attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that 
makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then 





Process tracing serves to uncover “actors’ preferences, their perceptions, their evaluation of 
alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies they adopt, 
and the constraints that limit their actions.”
298 
In order to understand the mechanisms which drive SSCS strategy one must observe this 
strategy in action, throughout the course of its implementation. From looking at available 
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sources, it is difficult to discern intentional strategy from post-facto justification. It is unclear 
whether a particular outcome is the result of mechanisms triggered by SSCS strategy, luck, or 
outside factors. There is also the desire to identify all of the mechanisms involved in SSCS 
strategy, not just those which are visible to the public and which the organization publicly 
declares as important. The fieldwork component of this study seeks to follow the entirety of an 
SSCS campaign, and to track the impact of this campaign through observation of a subsequent 
meeting of the IWC and by examining the impact of the campaign on Japanese whaling 
operations. Studying an SSCS campaign in the detail and proximity required for process tracing 
recommends the use of PO. 
 
3.2.2 - Participant Observation 
 
PO was conducted on board the SSCS vessel the Bob Barker, as it participated in 
‘Operation No Compromise,’ from December 2, 2010 to March 6, 2011.  PO involves the 
researcher living with and participating in the everyday activities of those being studied.
299
 The 
ultimate goal of PO is for the researcher “to develop a holistic understanding of the phenomena 
under study that is as objective and accurate as possible given the limitations of the method.”
300
 
The researcher does this by observing the phenomenon from the position of both an insider and 
an outsider.
301
 The participant observer functions along a continuum, ranging from complete 
observer to complete participant. The researcher negotiates his/her way along this continuum 
throughout the research process, bearing in mind that the “more you participate, the less you are 
able to observe, and vice versa.”
302
 Also it is necessary to be mindful that to become a pure 
participant is to ‘go native’ or ‘become the phenomena,’ and thereby to abandon the research 
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The use of PO assists in overcoming some of the challenges inherent in studying the 
SSCS. PO is a primary data gathering method and it answers the very real need for reliable 
information concerning the SSCS. As we have seen in the review of SSCS literature (see Chapter 
1.5), there are problems with reliability of primary and movement information. This information 
also lacks detail with respect to the actual workings of SSCS strategy, in so far as it is released to 
accomplish specific campaign objectives. As with all politicized information, reliability is very 
low. This also includes information released by the Institute of Cetacean Research (ICR), the 
body which conducts the Japanese Research Whaling Program in the Antarctic (JARPA). 
As far as media and secondary sources are concerned, reliability is also dubious. SSCS 
anti-whaling operations take place in one of the most remote locations in the world, and as such 
media observers must rely on information and reports of actions filtered through either the SSCS 
or the Japanese government/ICR.  Both of these agents put their own, often conflicting, spin on 
these reports. For example in the most recent campaign (‘Operation Zero Tolerance’, 2012-
2013), an ICR press release following a collision incident was entitled “Sea Shepherd vessels 
sabotage Nisshin Maru refueling and provoke collisions.”
304
  While the SSCS’s press release was 
titled “Japanese whale poaching vessel, Nisshin Maru, rams S. Korean fuel tanker, Sea Shepherd 
ships Sam Simon, Steve Irwin, and Bob Barker.”
305
 Media reports based on these press releases 
and accompanying footage are clearly prone to distortion and cannot be relied upon. Academic 
studies of SSCS actions, their strategy or legality, are often based on these less-than-reliable 
sources of information. PO served as a means of addressing this problem. Being present on a 
campaign allowed me to observe events as they transpired, unfiltered. As Jorgensen notes PO is 
well suited to the study of phenomenon which are “somehow obscured from the view of 
outsiders.”
306
 This study serves as the only known academic study of the SSCS involving the use 
of PO.  
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PO was also selected to overcome the challenges relating to the use of interviews. 
Generally speaking, PO allows one “to check description against fact and, noting discrepancies, 
become aware of systematic distortions made by the person under study,” distortions which 
would be difficult to identify through interviews alone.
307
 Most media interviews with the SSCS 
are conducted with senior volunteers, and typically with Watson, as a result of the organization’s 
media policy. All volunteers are required to sign a ‘SSCS Media Policy and Procedure 
Agreement’ which, among other things, stipulates that “Captain Paul Watson is the primary Sea 
Shepherd media representative…. [and that] Neither volunteers nor office staff may function as 
media representatives without express written permission from the Media Director and/or CEO, 
Deputy CEO, or President.”
308
 A general mantra within the SSCS, repeated in Earth Force!, is 
“nobody talks, everybody walks” (see Appendix 1).
309
 SSCS crew members are renowned for 
their ability to follow this slogan. For example, videos and statements were released of the first 
officer of the Bob Barker, Peter Hammarstedt’s 2008 interrogation with the Canadian RCMP, 
during which he remained silent for the entire duration of a 4 hour interview.
310
 Scholars seeking 
to interview crew members have found that SSCS volunteers carefully adhere to this agreement 
and practice. Stuart et al. found that “members were clearly influenced by the ideological and 
mission statements of SSCS leader Watson, often citing him specifically and repeating some of 
his phrases to explain or manage aspects of their beliefs.”
311
 Stuart et al. also found that the fact 
that interviews were conducted with an ‘outsider’ altered participants response and “plausibly 
resulted in greater defensiveness.”
312
  
I held a preliminary interview with Watson in September 2009 which confirmed that very 
little information would be released through an interview to an outsider. At the time, Watson 
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Due to the controversial nature of SSCS and its actions, the organization cloaks itself in 
secrecy. There are security reasons for this, because the release of certain information could 
jeopardize operational effectiveness. Like any ‘deviant subculture,’ members are naturally 
guarded with regards to outsiders. Dewalt and Dewalt note that PO is often the only viable 
approach to studying ‘deviant subcultures,’ where “long-term participation in the setting was the 
only possible way to gain enough of the trust of participants to carry out research.”
314
 This 
explains why PO has often been used by scholars seeking to study radical environmental 
groups.
315
 Building trust is important, as crew members are naturally distrustful of outsiders; at 
one point I was asked outright if I was a spy.
316
 
Shared experience aids in the formation of bonds of trust between the subject and 
researcher, which, over time, further increases disclosure. Lengthy study increases the likelihood 
of a researcher being considered non-threatening or being taken for granted, increasing 
disclosure and reducing the influence of the observer effect, which is the unavoidable impact that 
the observer and their act of observing has on the behavior of those being observed.
317
  
PO also allows a researcher to “carry on a conversation running over weeks and months 
with the people,” permitting the follow-up of issues at later dates when circumstances may be 
more conducive to disclosure.
318
 Persistent close contact provides sufficient familiarity with 
research subjects to conduct future interviews. The extended nature of PO allows the researcher 
to compare responses and actions over time, and to engage in embedded process tracing.
319
 
Ultimately, sustained PO “increases the odds that researchers will uncover meaningful indicators 
of those patterns,” allowing the researcher to look for recurrence and consistency.
320
  
PO is not without its drawbacks. Buroway notes that while PO “brings insight through 
proximity,” it does so “at the cost of distortion….Even the most passive observer produces 
ripples worthy of examination.”
321
 The observer effect can be mitigated through extended 
observation; similarly the researcher should take into consideration the fact that he is “an integral 
part of the situation he is observing. He is linked with the observed in a reciprocal process of 
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 There are further risks, well documented in PO literature.
323
 These 
include the fact that the “researcher’s own beliefs, values and prior assumptions…may prevent 
adequate investigation and consideration of possible contradictory data and unduly influence the 
analysis of the case study evidence.”
324
 Here it should be disclosed that I did not have a neutral 
position at the onset of the project. I am conservationist, do not generally support whaling, and 
initiated this project, at least partially, with an aim of improving (I)ENGO and ETAG strategy. A 
position of true neutrality is highly unlikely on an issue as controversial as whaling. However 
this kind of positionality is not considered harmful to the study. One’s preference for black or 
white pieces ought to make no difference to the study of strategies in chess. Furthermore the 
general desire to produce what Bevington and Dixon call movement-relevant theory, does not 
negatively impact findings; rather “the researcher’s connection to the movement provides 
important incentives to produce more accurate information, regardless of whether the researcher 
is studying a favoured movement or its opponents.”
325
 While being connected to the movement 
is valuable, a researcher must be careful to keep some distance to avoid ‘going native.’ Likewise 
‘over-rapport’ with subjects should be avoided as close relationships may preclude investigation 
into certain questions without damaging that relationship.
326
 One effect that engaging in PO with 
the SSCS had on the research, was that it limited the ability to access Japanese officials and 
sources.  
 
3.2.3 - Triangulation 
 
Triangulation is a method which relies on “the use of multiple data types, sources, and 
methodologies,” and is typically recommended to theory-building researchers.
327
  This method 
relies upon the use of multiple data collection methods in order to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the data, and therefore any conclusions drawn from the data gathered.
328
 
Researchers use triangulation to search for “convergence among multiple and different sources 
                                                 
322
 Schwartz and Green Schwartz 1955:346. 
323
 See inter alia Dewalt and Dewalt 2002:26 citing Horowitz 1996:43; and see Jorgensen 1989:45. 
324
 Darke, Shanks, and Broadbent 1998:285-286. 
325
 Bevington and Dixon 2005:190. 
326
 Barley 1990:240; Jorgensen 1989:62. 
327 
Betsill and Corell 2001:78; see also Miles and Huberman 1994; Eisenhardt 1989:537; Mathison 1988:13.  
328
 Eisenhardt 1989:538; and see Mathison 1988:13. 
73 
 
of information to form themes or categories in a study.”
329
 Triangulation helps guard against 
biases in both collection and analysis, through the use of “multiple sources of evidence… to 
provide multiple instances from difference sources…The case study findings are strengthened by 
the convergence of information from a variety of sources, providing multiple measures of the 
same phenomenon.”
330
 Dewalt and Dewalt note, that “[i]nsights gained through participant 
observation can be cross-checked through the appropriate use of other methods.”
331
 Denzin 
outlines four types of triangulation: “(a) data triangulation including time, space, and person, (b) 
investigator triangulation, (c) theory triangulation, and (d) methodological triangulation.”
332
 
Apart from investigator triangulation, which was not possible due to a range of limitations, the 
project uses aspects of the other three types of triangulation in order to add validity to data and 
ultimately to the conclusions drawn.  
 
3.2.4 - Counterfactuals 
 
 This project seeks not only to understand the mechanisms behind SSCS strategy, but also 
to determine whether these mechanisms are ultimately effective. The data generated through PO 
and verified through triangulation, feeds process tracing, allowing for the identification of causal 
mechanisms. Counterfactual analysis was used to evaluate the impact of those causal 
mechanisms. The counterfactual approach, in essence, “looks to compare similar worlds and asks 
whether differences between them can be attributed to a change in a particular cause.”
333
 Betsill 
and Corell conceive of counterfactual analysis as “an ‘imaginative construct’ that considers what 
might have happened if one examined variable were removed from the chain of events.”
334
 It 
serves the purpose of helping to rule out alternative explanations, by having the researcher ask if 
an ENGO/ETAG had not campaigned on an issue, would the outcome and/or process have been 
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different? If the outcomes would have been the same without ENGO/ETAG participation, this is 
an indication that ENGO/ETAG influence is low.
335
 
The SSCS’s anti-whaling campaign is particularly amenable to counterfactual analysis. 
The Japanese have been engaging in ‘research’ whaling in the Southern Ocean since 1988, and 
publish annual JARPA cruise reports, documenting the details of the expedition, including kill 
numbers and even the number of days of hunting lost to harassment by activists. This is one 
means of measuring impact, but analysis of this information can be taken further. Japan sets 
specific quotas of whales to be killed each season. Years without activist harassment serve as 
baselines, which can then be compared to the kill numbers for years when harassment occurred. 
One can also observe state behavior; observations of how states behaved prior to the SSCS 
campaign is indicative of how one might have expected them to continue to act in the absence of 
an SSCS campaign (the counterfactual), which in turn can be compared to how states have 
actually reacted to the SSCS campaign.  
 
3.3 - Field Work 
3.3.1- Preparation: 
 
Contact with the SSCS was arranged through a third party, who put me in communication 
with a SSCS crew member with whom I arranged an initial meeting, which included a 
preliminary interview with Watson. A position on a SSCS vessel was secured following this 
initial contact. I submitted a general ‘crew application,’ which noted that the principal purpose of 
applying to crew a SSCS vessel was to engage in PO. The crew application included a ‘Research 
Plan,’ and a copy of the ‘Consent Form.’ In order to avoid introducing unnecessary bias, a 
description of the project’s research aims was left intentionally vague.  The application was 
accepted, however, the SSCS requires all crew members to sign confidentiality agreements, 
which could have frustrated the use of data gathered during fieldwork. Legal counsel was sought 
and an alternative confidentiality agreement was decided upon. This final agreement is not 
without its constraints upon open research, as it requires that a final draft of the study be 





submitted to the SSCS prior to publication, so that it may verify that the study did not contain 
information which would damage the SSCS, its future operations, or interests.  
In so far as the confidentiality agreement was the only hurdle to engaging in the 
fieldwork, it was decided that I should agree to abide by it, but take measures which would allow 
me the use of information that was vital to the thesis, while upholding research ethics and 
preventing harm to research subjects and the organization. The following measures, which were 
approved by the Department Degree Committee, were therefore taken. All potentially damaging 
or confidential information would be assigned to appendices so that it could be referred to in the 
text without its content being revealed. Efforts were undertaken to ensure that only necessary 
information was included in the appendices. The final draft of the thesis including appendices 
would be submitted to examiners for evaluation. Following examination, all appendices would 
be removed from the final publically available version of the thesis, and replaced with an 
annotation indicating that the information has been approved for restriction but had been made 
available to the examiners at the time of examination. In this way, only examiners would be 
privy to the confidential information, thereby protecting research subjects.  
The fieldwork was also subject to extensive risk assessment, and dangers to the 
researcher and research subjects were identified. In order to mitigate some of the risks, as well as 
to bolster the application to crew, I undertook extensive sailing training. This training was also 
aimed at increasing the validity and quality of the data I gathered, as it ensured that over the 
course of the fieldwork I could concentrate on gathering data, rather than learning to sail.  
I also took steps to uphold research ethics and to protect the subjects involved in the 
study. The ethical obligation not to harm research subjects was given precedence over any 
research goals.
336
 All subjects on the vessel were informed of the project in a short presentation 
at the onset of the campaign, and copies of the ‘Research Plan’ were made available on the crew 
bulletin board. All crew members were given an opportunity to provide written consent to have 
their identities and comments cited in the final project via a ‘Consent Form,’ and they were 
permitted to select varying degrees of anonymity. Throughout the study, crew members are 
referred to by a name which reflects the level of anonymity they selected, as either: ‘crew 
member,’ first name only, or full name. All members of the vessel, including members of the 
film crew were given consent forms, and all but one provided written consent over the course of 
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the fieldwork (one member provided oral consent and instructions to protect his/her identity). 
While some subjects chose various degrees of anonymity, the researcher’s field notes were not 
anonymized, and so care was taken to ensure that these notes were not read by others, including 




3.3.2 - The Process 
 
Understanding how data was gathered is important to understanding the data and its 
analysis. I took jot notes continuously throughout my participation on board the vessel, that is, 
short aides mémoire, sometimes accompanied by diagrams or more detailed accounts. Jot notes 
were then transferred into two journals: the ‘Daily Actions Log,’ and the ‘Field Journal.’ The 
‘Daily Action Log’ served as a chronological record of daily events, including actions, and noted 
the ship’s position at noon and during engagements. The ‘Field Journal’ consisted of a more 
detailed account of key actions, summaries of conversations with crew members,  preliminary 
analysis, and ideas for follow-up questions as well as questions for informal interviews and 
personal reflection. Both the ‘Daily Action Log’ and the ‘Field Journal’ were recorded as soon 
after events as possible in order to keep the information rich and reliable. As conversations were 
typically recorded some time after they occurred, the ability to generate verbatim quotes was 
considerably limited. I was able to make verbatim records of some crew meetings and briefings, 
as well as during some of the informal interviews. However it was found that the practicalities of 
living and working on board a vessel precluded verbatim recording. This accounts for the fact 
that there are few direct quotes from the fieldwork, and why the field notes are often cited 
without being attributed to a specific crew member.  
There was a question as to whether notes should be recorded openly or covertly.
338
 It was 
important that crew members accept me in order that they feel open to sharing information, but 
also that I maintained some distance. Ultimately ‘jot notes’ were taken when possible, and 
always discretely. The ‘Daily Action Log’ and ‘Field Journal’ were written in public spaces on 
board the ship so that I would remain visible and accessible, and so that crew members did not 
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think of my research as secretive in nature. The result was that I was often joined by crew 





3.3.3 - IWC Jersey  
 
I attended the 63
rd
 meeting of the IWC (July 11-14, 2011), serving as a journalist. Here I 
observed the meeting and held informal conversations with delegates and NGOs during breaks 
and after sessions. The information gathered in Jersey included the following: 
 Impact of SSCS actions on the behaviour of states and the content of the meeting itself 
from watching committee sessions and circulating during breaks. 
 Conversations with states and NGO delegates, journalists and lobbyists, on the workings 
of the IWC and the impact of the SSCS on the organization. Of particular interest were 
conversations with the Japanese English language lobbyists and representatives from 
IWMC World Conservation Trust, which provided the Japanese perspective on SSCS 
actions.  
 Conversations with SSCS and other NGO activists outside of the meeting. 
Through this informal process I was able to also arrange a formal interview with Gerard van 
Bohemen, the New Zealand Commissioner to the IWC, an interview which was recorded and 
transcribed. Access to other commissions, particularly the Japanese delegation was limited, 
although I did hold several informal conversations with an English-speaking Japanese 
spokesperson and with several pro-whaling lobbyists. Following the meeting, I conducted a 
formal interview with Dr. Simon Brockington, Secretary to the IWC on August 2, 2011, which 
was recorded and transcribed. I was also granted access to the IWC archives and collected copies 
of all documents making reference to the SSCS and to confrontational actions relating to anti-
whaling activism, as well as transcripts of all of the speeches relating to the SSCS given at IWC 
meetings.  
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3.3.4 - Methodological Challenges 
 
The majority of challenges faced in the field were directly related to the nature of the 
environment in which the research was conducted. Most sources suggest that a researcher take 
some time out from the field during fieldwork as an opportunity to review findings outside of the 
research environment, allowing the researcher the possibility of gaining some perspective on the 
material away from the influences and distractions of the field.
340
 This was impossible given the 
circumstances of the campaign.  
The best time for observing strategy and tactics was during ship to ship engagements, and 
small boat operations, however, as an active crew member, there was often limited opportunity 
to take notes during these times. Crew members were often barred from the bridge during 
engagements, which meant that I could seldom observe officers’ decision-making first hand. In 
addition, as became apparent during the course of the campaign, a significant number of strategic 
decisions were made by Watson, who was captain of the Steve Irwin and therefore not present 
for direct observation. However, the implementation of these decisions could be directly 
observed. Constraints were also placed on communications: all off-ship communications (phone 
calls and e-mails) were monitored by the first mate.
341
 Very limited access to materials in the 
field meant that triangulation could not be conducted during fieldwork. 
The duration of the fieldwork was helpful in moderating the observer effect; however an 
additional factor served to magnify this effect, notably the filming of the television program 
Whale Wars. Cameras were a constant presence on the vessel, particularly during actions. 
Officers were particularly reticent to disclose valuable information and were constantly ‘on 
message’ in the presence of the cameras. I attempted to offset this effect by conducting some 
informal interviews and conversations at times when cameras were not rolling.  
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3.4 - Analysis 
3.4.1 - The Data 
 
The result of the fieldwork was a collection of over 2000 pages of hand-written field 
notes containing information which included: 
 A detailed chronology of the campaign. The actions and location of the Bob Barker were 
detailed, as well as those of other SSCS vessels when they were provided in crew 
briefings. I recorded the position of the Bob Barker at noon (ship’s time) daily, and 
recorded the ship's position during actions (and see Appendix 2). This was particularly 
useful in determining in which jurisdiction the vessel was operating. 
 Descriptions of crew briefings and training. The crew received regular briefings every 
morning which detailed recent events, news stories, and plans of actions. Some crew 
briefings were elaborate, particularly those prior to complicated actions, and diagrams 
were used to explain vessel movements and so on. The deck crew (where I was assigned) 
also had morning meetings where jobs were allocated and the details of any operations 
discussed. Deck crew members, as the team responsible for launching and recovering 
RIBs, preparing tactical devices (prop-foulers, butyric acid etc.), were provided with a 
clear picture of actions. This in turn provided a clear picture of the strategic significance 
of any specific action or tactic. Errors and accidents made by the crew also provided an 
excellent opportunity to observe the decision making of the officers.  
 Reports on actions gathered from observations and debriefings with RIB crews. Actions 
involving the Bob Barker could be directly observed from where I was stationed as part 
of the stern defensive team. RIB actions could at times be observed, however many of 
these occurred at a considerable distance from the Bob Barker. Upon their return from an 
action, the crews of the RIBs would be debriefed by the captain and senior officers, who 
would then provide details to the crew. Members of RIB teams could be prompted to 
provide details of the operations through conversation.
342
 At several points during the 
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campaign, raw film footage and photographs of RIB actions were shown to the crew, 
which also provided insight into actions.
343
 
 Extensive notes detailing information from conversations with crew members. There was 
considerable down time and I held conversations with crew members on a range of 
issues. The most extensive conversations were held with my ‘chore buddy,’ fellow deck 
crew members, my roommates, and several members of the galley.
344
 These 
conversations yielded information on personal motivations and philosophies, opinions on 
strategy and tactics, details of actions and previous campaigns, and reactions to events 
and actions as they occurred throughout the operation. In addition to informal 
conversations which arose through the course of everyday activity, I also prepared a list 
of areas of inquiry which I would pursue over the course of several days. For example, 
asking for definitions of violence and for clarifications of operational goals. 
 Information from semi-formal and informal interviews. Towards the end of the 
campaign, I conducted semi-formal and informal interviews with several key officers, 
which included Captain Alex Cornelissen, Hammarstedt, second mate Vincent Burke, 
boson Benjamin (Posty) Potts, and ship’s artist and member of the bridge crew, Geert 
Vons. Asking more pointed questions about SSCS strategy, events which had occurred 
during the campaign, and previous campaigns. The interview with Potts was invaluable 
in outlining the motivations and details of the Potts-Lane incident. Vons, the director of 
SSCS Netherlands, was invaluable in detailing ship registration and flagging procedures 
in the Netherlands. 
 Notes from conversations with the film crew. These conversations represented an 
excellent opportunity to obtain information on actions (in which film crew members 
participated). I also investigated the relationship between the SSCS and Animal 
Planet/Discovery Media in order to better understand the SSCS’s media strategy (and see 
Appendix 3).  
 Detailed descriptions of conversations around tactical innovation and diagrams and plans 
of used and imagined tactics. The deck crew and other crew members were constantly 
discussing tactical innovations. These conversations were useful in that they highlighted 
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tactical aims, the role of tactics in accomplishing overall strategic objectives, and 
(strategic and ethical) restrictions on tactics.
345
  
In addition to this information, the ‘Field Journal’ also contained innocuous details on meals, 
wildlife encounters, personal introspection and so on. The need to process this data and to not get 
embroiled in details was central to the analysis.  
 
3.4.2 - Data Analysis 
 
While some information was analyzed during the course of the fieldwork, the majority of 
analysis began at the conclusion of the operation. The overall understanding of the operation and 
functioning of the SSCS was combined with a full narrative of what occurred on the operation. 
This provided a comprehensive account of a single SSCS operation. Field notes were reviewed 
with the aim of isolating important observations, key events, decision making processes and 
causality. I was particularly interested in identifying key components of SSCS strategy, and the 
various impacts these components had upon other actors. Identified components were then 
triangulated and supplemented with information which had not been available during field work. 
This was particularly useful in identifying the impacts of SSCS actions. While the field 
observations produced highly valid data, this data was somewhat unreliable. Examples of some 
components of SSCS strategy which did not occur during ‘Operation No Compromise’ but 
which had played a central role in previous operations included rammings/collisions and 
boardings. As a result, an analysis of the existing primary and secondary literature on the SSCS 
was conducted alongside that of the field observations, again seeking to identify components of 
SSCS strategy which may not have been present during ‘Operation No Compromise.’ A dynamic 
feedback process drove the analysis, with components extracted from the literature informing 
investigation into the field observations, and salient field observations driving further 
investigation into the literature. This was done to provide the most comprehensive understanding 
of the various components of SSCS strategy as possible, and in order to avoid drawing 
conclusions from potential idiosyncrasies of a single operation.  
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Once identified, the narrative and details of the operation were examined in order to 
uncover the strategic choices which caused an event/component, and the behaviours of actors as 
a result of the event/component. This permitted me to understand various components of SSCS 
strategy, the strategic choices which compelled their use, their application throughout the entire 
Antarctic anti-whaling campaign and impact on other actors. The success of these actions was 
evaluated on their capability of achieving stated campaign objectives, as determined by using 
counterfactuals. The aim was to reveal the mechanisms which are triggered by SSCS actions, and 
to ascertain what makes them effective, and ultimately, reveal SSCS strategy.  
In order to better understand the SSCS anti-whaling campaign I also undertook a detailed 
examination of the broader whaling issue (which follows in Chapter 4). This allowed me to 
situate the SSCS campaign within the anti-whaling movement, and to understand and to contrast 
the SSCS strategy with conventional INGO/TAG strategies which have been employed over the 
course of this lengthy campaign. My understanding of international whaling politics was also 
bolstered through my observations of the meeting of the IWC (see 3.3.3 – IWC Jersey, above). I 
scrutinized Japanese whaling, its origins, its legality, and factors contributing to its continued 
practice, aspects of which could effect the impact INGO/TAG strategies on Japanese whaling. I 
also explored the legal context of the Southern Ocean, the theatre in which the SSCS campaigns 
occur. A firm understanding of the numerous laws and treaties surrounding whaling allowed me 
to comprehend the impact these laws and treaties may have on SSCS operations and strategies, 




CHAPTER 4 – HISTORY OF WHALING AND THE ANTI-WHALING CAMPAIGN 
4.1 - Of Regulations and Whales 
 
 This chapter provides background to the whaling issue. It begins with a short history of 
whaling, the IWC and early attempts by this IO to protect whales. It then examines the 
transnational campaign to end whaling and the strategies and tactics which led to a global 
moratorium on commercial whaling. The impact of the moratorium is explored, as are some of 
the ad hoc enforcement mechanisms which have emerged alongside it. Post-moratorium whaling 
diplomacy in the IWC is characterized by a standoff between pro- and anti-whaling groups. 
Understanding the inability of INGOs/TAGs employing conventional strategies to make progress 
towards ending whaling practices serves to demonstrate the significance of apparently 
unconventional strategies such as those employed by the SSCS. The chapter also provides an in-
depth examination of Japanese whaling, starting with the history and structure of the Japanese 
whaling industry, followed by observations as to how it has been affected by the moratorium, 
and discussions of why Japan continues whaling and of the legality of these practices. The 
chapter concludes with an outline of the legal context in which Japanese whaling, and 
consequently SSCS operations occur, with an examination of the multitude of international and 
domestic laws in the Southern Ocean.  
 
4.1.1 - The Creation and Troubles of the IWC 
 
Humans have hunted whales throughout history, treating them as res nullius – free 
property that anyone could hunt.
346
 In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century the introduction of new 
technology – the factory ship, the explosive harpoon, and the inflation lance – caused the 
exploitation of whale populations to reach industrial levels.
347
 These improved hunting methods 
led to the rapid decline of whale populations worldwide. As easily accessible whale stocks 
declined, whalers ventured further afield. Declining populations demanded regulation, and a first 
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attempt was made in 1931, with the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. This treaty called 
for the barest minimum of actions, such as prohibitions on the taking of right whales, calves, 
immature and lactating whales.
348
 The failure of this treaty has been blamed on a lack of 




In 1946 the major whaling nations signed the International Convention for the Regulation 
of Whaling (ICRW). The ICRW established the IWC which was tasked with securing the 
“proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the 
whaling industry.”
350
 The IWC was created essentially as an exclusive club among whaling 
nations in order to protect the industry.
351
 In its early years, the IWC was ineffective in reducing 
whale harvests. Although the IWC’s Scientific Committee made repeated recommendations for 
the restriction of whale harvests between 1949 and 1979,
352
 its recommendations were largely 
ignored, often because insufficient scientific data precluded accurate population estimates, and 
the precautionary principle was balanced in favor of the whaling industry.
353
 During this period, 
already unsustainable quotas were habitually exceeded by member states, catch reports were 
falsified, and ‘pirate whaling’ – i.e. harvesting by ships registered to countries that were not IWC 
members – was widespread.
354
  
 One of the primary reasons the IWC failed to sustainably manage whale populations, was 
the fact that the IWC was in essence a whalers club – foxes in charge of sustainably managing 
the henhouse.
355
 Commercial interests persistently won out over sound conservation science. The 
failure of the IWC can also be attributed to defects in the ICRW itself. The IWC ultimately lacks 
an enforcement mechanism, and is only capable of making “recommendations calling upon 
contracting parties to conform to IWC regulations.”
356
 Member states can however unilaterally 
enforce IWC regulations “within the boundaries of international law.”
357
 Even if the IWC did 
have the power to sanction violators, it would still be faced with a second major challenge, 
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notably the ‘objection’ or ‘opt-out’ provision. Under the ICRW, any member is entitled to object 
to an amendment to the Schedule, and by so doing, to become exempt from any requirements of 
that amendment, until such time as that member withdraws their objections.
358
 The ICRW also 
lacks adequate dispute settlement provisions.
359
  These issues continue to plague the IWC today. 
 
4.1.2 - Early Anti-Whaling Efforts 
 
 The failure of the IWC to effectively regulate whaling became increasingly apparent as 
whale stocks plummeted. Whale populations around the world teetered on the brink of 
extinction, even those inhabiting such remote locations as Antarctica.
360
 The sixties and seventies 
saw the emergence of the environmental movement, and activists quickly began a transnational 
‘Save the Whale’ campaign.
361
 The widespread awareness campaign that mobilized public 
opinion against whaling used animal rights and conservation arguments, arguing that whaling 
was both unethical and threatened the long term survival of whale species. People were 
introduced to the haunting sounds of humpback whale songs through a recording included in the 
January 1979 National Geographic Magazine.
362
 A group called Project Jonah produced the 




Kalland suggests that these early awareness raising efforts led to the creation of a ‘super 
whale,’ a totemized symbolic whale constructed by “lumping together traits found in a number 
of species.”
364
 This had the effect of masking the “great variety that exists in size, behaviour and 
abundance among the 75 or so species of cetaceans.”
365
 This ‘super whale’ was ascribed 
symbolic significance, it became anthropomorphized, and as a result whales were portrayed as 
“rights-bearing persons, sacred human-like creatures, whose killing is immoral and 
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 Groups such as the Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the nascent Greenpeace, 
through various means, effectively re-framed the whaling issue from one of resource 
management to an environmental and ethical issue.
367
  
The campaign achieved its first breakthrough at the 1972 United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment in Stockholm, which passed a resolution (52-0) recommending a ten-
year moratorium on commercial whaling.
368
 A similar motion was defeated by the IWC later the 
same year. Meanwhile, individual states were beginning to take action outside the IWC. The US 
had already enacted the ‘Pelly Amendment’ to the US Fishermen’s Protection Act in 1971, 
which enabled the U.S. government to place trade embargoes on states that violated U.S. 
Fisheries laws.
369
 This was further bolstered in 1973 when the US passed the Endangered 
Species Act and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, essentially closing U.S. markets to whale 
products.
370
 In 1979 the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment reinforced existing legislation with 
respect to whaling by allowing for a reduction of a foreign country’s fishing allocations in US 
waters if that country’s actions were deemed to undermine the effectiveness of the IWC.
371
 In 
1975 the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) took force, severely restricting the international trade in whale products, with most 
great whales listed in Appendix I and the remaining of the order of Cetacea in Appendix II.
372
 
Various countries adopted laws protecting whales and the trade in whale products, including 
Australia, which passed the Whale Protection Act in 1980.
373
 
During this time the transnational campaign to end whaling was very active. Groups such 
as FoE, WWF, and Greenpeace engaged in classic awareness and persuasion campaigns. They 
initiated letter-writing campaigns, mobilized school children and conducted street theatre outside 
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IWC meetings. Greenpeace brought the issue of whaling to the attention of the world through its 
novel and daring actions. In 1975, the Greenpeace vessel the Phyllis Cormack engaged the 
Soviet whaling fleet in the Pacific Ocean. Greenpeace launched zodiacs, and placed them 
between the whalers and their prey.
374
 Mandel describes Greenpeace’s actions as ‘direct action’, 
noting that Greenpeace was able to directly save around 100 whales.
375
 However this did not 
appear to be the primary goal of Greenpeace action, as Mandel elaborates, “preventing the 
slaughter of whales is not only an end in itself but also, through the dramatic form in which it 
takes place, a means of raising the environmental consciousness of both the resource consumers 
and the world at large.”
376
 In addition, ‘David and Goliath’ imagery produced by Greenpeace 
actions resulted in some of the most iconic images of the environmental movement.
377 
The SSCS 
became involved in the emerging ‘whale war’ in the late seventies, which is discussed in the 
following chapter (Chapter 5.1.2).  
 
4.1.3 - The Moratorium 
 
Activists were also heavily involved in and around the IWC employing insider strategies. 
NGO attendance at meetings of the IWC grew substantially. Bailey notes that “five attended in 
1972 and eight attended in 1973, 57 observers of all kinds (including pro-whaling groups) 
attended in 1982, reaching a peak in 1996 with 114.
378
 The International Union for Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN), WWF, Greenpeace, and other INGOs/TAGs lobbied the IWC Scientific 
Committee and national delegations, supplied scientific data and recorded violations of the 
ICRW.
379
 Greenpeace activists recruited anti-whaling states to join the IWC, going so far as to 
help states prepare applications, and even paying membership dues and travels expenses for 
delegates.
380
 These efforts were necessary in so far as while resolutions within the IWC require a 
simple majority, amendments to the Schedule, which regulates seasons and quotas, requires a 
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 Recruitment and lobby efforts were successful and helped shift the 
balance within the IWC into the anti-whaling camp. In 1982, after several failed attempts, the 
IWC voted to amend Section 10(e) of the Schedule, instituting a 10-year moratorium on 
commercial whaling to take effect in 1986.
382
 
 The moratorium enacted an absolute ban on commercial whaling; however, like the 
ICRW itself, the moratorium is riddled with exceptions. Whaling is still permitted for ‘aboriginal 
subsistence’ purposes,
383
 and whaling is permitted under special research permits. Article VIII of 
the ICRW provides that, 
any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit 
authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific 
research ... and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accordance with the 





As with all decisions of the IWC, members are permitted to opt-out by formally entering 
reservations to a decision. Immediately after the IWC adopted the moratorium, Japan, Norway, 
Peru and the USSR filed formal objections, thereby declining to be bound by the moratorium.
385
  
As a result of continued whaling following the moratorium, “the zero quotas for 1986 
made no difference to the number of whales that would be killed.”
386
 The battle to stop whaling 
was far from over. Efforts to compel member states to remove their objections to the moratorium 
were initially led by the US, who, through the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, 
threatened trade sanctions against any country that objected to or violated the moratorium.
387
 
Threats of embargoes on fish product imports and reductions in fishery allocations were 
sufficient to compel Spain, Korea, Taiwan and Chile to all bring their whaling practices in line 
with the IWC.
388
 Iceland, who did not object to the moratorium but initiated a ‘scientific’ 
whaling program in 1987, reduced its quotas after strong pressure from the US and a high profile 
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Greenpeace boycott of its seafood.
389
 Iceland later quit the IWC in 1992, only to rejoin later, 
with a partial objection to the moratorium.
390
 Norway initially suspended whaling operations, but 
resumed in 1993.
391
 At one stage in 1992 Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands 
sought to establish the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO). This was 
done to allow these states to whale outside of the IWC while still complying with Article 65 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), which requires that states 
work through an appropriate international organization with regards to regulating whaling.
392
 In 
1986, Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium under heavy U.S. pressure, but 
subsequently announced that it would launch a ‘scientific’ whaling program.
393
  
 Scholars generally describe two ad hoc enforcement measures which have developed 
outside but alongside the IWC. The first involved the US, and its use of economic sanction.  The 
second has been described as the actions of “militant non-governmental organizations.”
394
 NGOs 
such as Greenpeace and the Humane Society International (HSI) attend IWC meetings and serve 
a monitoring function, however it is the DA of the SSCS that is in fact cited as one of the 
enforcement mechanisms of the IWC. It is interesting that the SSCS’s actions should be cited as 
one of the two major (ad hoc) enforcement mechanisms of the IWC, when the IWC has passed 
resolutions condemning SSCS actions.
395
 The role of the US as the ‘policeman’ of the IWC has 
also been significantly reduced in recent years, despite considerable domestic and transnational 
pressure placed on the US to take action against continued whaling operations.
396
 The US’s 
softened position can be explained by its desire to receive approval for aboriginal subsistence 
quotas. In 1997 the US and Russia negotiated subsistence quotas for various ‘aboriginal’ groups 
within their borders, however at their 2002 Annual Meeting the IWC defeated a US attempt to 
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renew its quota. The US has been cast into a conflicted position as both a strong anti-whaling 




4.2.4 - The Current Standoff in the IWC 
 
Almost immediately following the implementation of the moratorium, measures were 
being taken within the IWC to prepare for the end of the 10-year moratorium. The Revised 
Management Procedure (RMP) sought to determine sustainable quotas for species, such as the 
minke, which was considered to have recovered sufficiently to permit the resumption of limited 
whaling, but efforts to resume some commercial whaling were unsuccessful.
398
 The scientific 
committee made “recommendations for limited commercial whaling of specific species at two 
consecutive IWC meetings. The IWC membership rejected the recommendations on both 
occasions, resulting in the resignation of the chairman of the scientific committee.”
399
 The global 
norm against whaling is powerful, so much so that the issue had gone beyond that of the 
sustainable management of a resource.
400
 Mitchell argues that this represented the beginning of 





The IWC is currently in an ‘adversarial deadlock’ polarized between the pro- and anti-
whaling camps, and is generally viewed as dysfunctional,
 




 The IWC is incapable of making any substantive decisions because 
each side demands such “extreme degrees of certainty in any decisions on the taking of 
whales.”
403  
Some have argued that the decisions the IWC have managed to reach, such as the 
creation of various ‘whale sanctuaries,’ are in fact very dangerous, as such actions do “little more 
than provide a false sense of security by assuming that protection for whale populations are in 
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 In recent years, in order to reduce the characteristic acrimony within meetings, as well 
as to address the fact that any dissenting party can simply opt-out of a decision, the IWC has 
sought to employ consensus decision making. Members go to considerable lengths to avoid 
bringing an issue to a potentially divisive vote.
405
Anton characterizes the current standoff within 
the IWC as “a Pareto-optimal situation – even if the situation is messy and unstable.”
406
 Ishii and 
Okubo agree, and note that “the primary objective of Japanese whaling diplomacy…is the 
continuation of so-called ‘scientific’ whaling… and not the resumption of commercial 
whaling.”
407
 They argue that Japan (and others), do not in fact want to lift the moratorium, but 
rather that this position is adopted in order to maintain the current deadlocked status-quo, which 
in turn allows their ‘scientific’ whaling program to continue.
408
 This view is of course 
controversial and contested, and a variety of explanations have been posited seeking to explain 
Japan’s current position on whaling. 
The IWC remains deadlocked and the transnational campaign against whaling appears to 
have reached the limit of its ability to use conventional INGO/TAG strategies to end whaling. 
The movement was successful in disseminating the anti-whaling norm around the world.
409
 
There are several holdouts, and it has been argued that the anti-whaling movement may have 
strengthened these states’ commitment to whaling.
410
 For example, public backlash against the 
anti-whaling movement in Iceland and Norway has led to the creation of several pro-whaling 
organizations (e.g. the High North Alliance and the Group to Preserve Whale Dietary Culture).
411
 
Similarly, external pressure appears to have increased Faroese support of its pilot whale hunt.
412
 
This has also been the case in Japan, where traditional transnational campaigning has had very 
limited success. 
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4.2 - Japan and Whaling 
4.2.1 - History and Structure 
 
The Japanese government has long argued that Japan has a distinct whale-eating culture – 
gyoshoku-bunka – that the practice of eating whale is widespread, and dates back thousands of 
years.
413
 However this is true only for a small number of isolated coastal communities and 
‘exceptional individual cases.’
414
 Commercial whaling – particularly Antarctic whaling – and the 
widespread consumption of whale, is in fact a legacy of the Second World War. The 
consumption of whale meat became commonplace after General McArthur supported the 
resumption of Antarctic whaling as a means of addressing the humanitarian situation arising 
from the war, the result of a critical shortage of protein, fats and oil.
415
 Morikawa argues that “it 
is both unfair and misleading to assert that these exceptional individual cases and the later 
transitory post-war phenomenon form an overall historical precedent and a basis for justifying 
and promoting Japan's modern-day commercial whaling.”
416
 Whaling persisted long after the 
post-war protein crisis, though the popularity of whale meat gradually flagged, and costs 
escalated. As a result, the major whaling companies soon ran into financial difficulties, and in 
1975 they “held urgent summit talks and… agreed to create a new integrated flagship company 




4.2.2 - Japanese Whaling After the Moratorium  
 
The moratorium had little effect on Japanese whaling practices, and Japan has continued 
to whale by promoting the whaling of ‘small type whales’ (which fall outside the control of the 
IWC), and by initiating its ‘research’ whaling program.  In 1987 the Japanese legislatures 
“unanimously adopted a resolution requesting that the government devote itself to conducting 
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scientific whaling as much as possible.”
418
 Two ‘research’ whaling programs were established: 
JARPN in the north-western Pacific, and JARPA in the Southern Ocean.
419
 The whaling industry 
was also reorganized: Nippon Kyodo was folded and was transformed into Kyodo Senpaku 
Kaisha Ltd. (Kyodo), represented by the Japan Whaling Association (JWA). The Institute of 
Cetacean Research (ICR) was created in 1987. The ICR (a zaidan hojin or quango) is entrusted 
by the Fisheries Agency (FA) (under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF)), with conducting its ‘scientific’ whale research. The ICR charters Kyodo’s 
fleet to conduct its ‘research whaling.
420
 
 MAFF and the FA maintain that the moratorium was only a temporary measure and have 
been operating and setting policy under this assumption. Japan explicitly launched its ‘research’ 
whaling program as a means to gather sufficient evidence to support a resumption of commercial 
whaling.
421
 JARPA I was carried out from 1987 to 2005, with the goal of  
elucidating the role of whales in the Antarctic marine ecosystem, the effect of 
environmental changes on cetaceans, and the stock structure of the Southern 
Hemisphere minke whales to improve stock management, as well as estimating 





Following an initial trial year, quotas given to JARPA by the Japanese government were 
gradually increased (see Table 1, Chapter 5).
423
 Overall more than 6800 minke were killed 
through JARPA I.
424
 Baker et al. note that JARPA I killed 2.4 times more whales than all the 
research whaling conducted from 1949 to 1987 by all states combined.
425
 Furthermore, the 
number of whales killed during the first JARPA I cruise in 1987 “exceeded the number of whales 
taken in commercial whaling activities in the previous season.”
426
 The whales killed by Japanese 
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‘research’ represent 91% of all catches under IWC special research permits since such permits 
were first used in 1985.
427
  
 In 2005 Japan announced JARPA II; raised the quota of minke, and included the 
harvesting of 10 endangered fin whales. JARPA II had similar objectives to its predecessor, and 
sought to gather the data required to make the case for “developing future management 
objectives”, in other words, the resumption of commercial whaling.
428
 After a two year 
feasibility study, Japan raised the number of fin whales to 50 in 2007 and added 50 humpback 
whales to the quota.
429
 The 50 endangered humpbacks were later removed, which Malcolm 




In actions similar to those of activists, Japan has sought to bolster its position within the 
IWC by recruiting ‘pro-whaling’ members. The number of bonafide ‘pro-whaling’ countries in 
the world is very small. In order to recruit supporters Japan has used “the promise of aid to small, 
impoverished nations ‘in order to gain appreciation of Japan’s position’ on the whaling issues,” a 
position which has been categorized as buying votes with fisheries grants.
431
 Japan’s whaling 
diplomacy has been painted as a ‘worrisomely fragmented diplomatic approach’ whereby the 
MAFF – and specifically the FA – engage in diplomacy which often conflicts with efforts of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
432
 Within the IWC, Japan appears to intentionally foster acrimony 
and has a very aggressive and disruptive negotiation strategy.
433
 Japan brings, by far, the largest 
delegation to IWC meetings, bolstered by professional and expensive lobbyists, such as 
Butterfield Carter and Associates, along with a host of ‘NGOs,’ including the JWA and 
numerous ‘Astroturf groups’ such as the Shimonoseki Group to Preserve Whale Dietary Culture, 
the All Japan Seamen’s Union, and the Japan Small-Type Whaling Association.
434
 Morikawa 
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characterizes Japan’s position, based on its current whaling practices, as seeking “the 




4.2.3 - Why Japan Whales 
 
As has been noted, whale meat is not particularly popular in Japan. Surveys suggest that 
less than 4% of Japanese regularly eat whale meat,
436
 that whale comprises only 0.28% of all 
Japanese seafood consumption,
437
 and that 83% of Japanese have never eaten whale.
438
 In Japan 
whales are considered fish, and people are generally indifferent to the whaling issue.
439
 Demand 
for whale meat is so low that MAFF statistics reported whale meat stocks in 2005 at 3,511 
tonnes, and growing.
440
 It has been reported that unsold whale meat has been provided free to 
schools in order to build a market for whale meat.
441 
This does little to support Japanese 
government claims as a ‘traditional whale-eating culture.’ However claims that whale-eating is 
somehow an integral part of Japanese culture have allowed the government to brand any attack 
against whaling as ‘cultural imperialism.’
442
 As a result of perceptions of cultural imperialism, it 
has been argued that anti-whaling activism (of all types) appears to have led to backlash within 
Japan, boosting support for Japan’s whaling program by linking it to nationalism.
443
 This creates 
a complex situation; whereby the vast majority of Japanese do not eat whale meat, and as one 
survey noted, would not support additional government funding towards the whaling program, 
but where more Japanese support the general existence of the whaling program (27%) than are 
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opposed to it (18.5%) (though the majority of people have no opinion on whaling whatsoever), 
and where the government is staunchly pro-whaling.
444
  
Given these numbers it is not surprising that there is dearth of domestic anti-whaling 
pressure in Japan. The Whale Conservation Coalition of Japan, “established in 2001 to mobilize 
public opinion against whaling in advance of the IWC annual meeting in 2002,” is comprised of 
the Dolphin and Whale Action Network, the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), 
Greenpeace Japan, and the Japan Whale Conservation Network.
445
 Thus far this Coalition has 
conducted small rallies, issued protest letters and promoted public education. It has met with 
limited success, in so far as Japan’s “bureaucracy-centered decision-making system has allowed 
virtually no room for citizens’ groups to effect Japan’s whaling policy.”
446
   
There also appears to be a “strong pro-whaling consensus among Japan's power elites,” 
and powerful bureaucratic interests at stake.
447
 The FA is “authorized to formulate policy on all 
whaling matters.”
448
 Bureaucratic organizations are loath to relinquish vested interests, power, 
and resources. Given the amount of resources and political power granted to the MAFF and FA 
as a result of Japan’s continued whaling operations, it is unlikely that these entities would 
welcome an end to Japanese whaling.
449
 Whaling is also seen in the light of broader fisheries’ 
issues. Fish are a very important part of Japanese diet, and with fish stocks are rapidly depleting 
globally, issues involving fisheries fall into the area of food security.
450
 Japan is concerned that 
“a major loss of concession on this issue [the whaling issue] could potentially have severe 
ramifications for Japan’s extensive and critically important fisheries agreements elsewhere.”
451
 
Japan continues to whale in spite of a powerful global norm against whaling and large scale and 
protracted transnational advocacy. It is clear that traditional advocacy strategies have had little 
impact on Japanese whaling.  
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4.2.4 - The ‘Science’ and Legality of JARPA 
 
 Japan’s whaling operations are ‘facially legal’ under the IWC; Article VIII of the ICRW 
allows member governments to grant permits for the purpose of killing whales for scientific 
research (even in designated sanctuaries), and leaves the specifics of these permits entirely in the 
hands of the member government.
452
 It sanctions the sale of whale meat by stipulating that “[a]ny 
whales taken under these special permits shall so far as practicable be processed and the 
proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance with directions issued by the Government by which 
the permit was granted.”
453
 The ICR earns more than 85% of its income from the sale of meat in 
this way.
454
 The soundness and legality of JARPA has, however, been questioned, with the 
quality of JARPA’s science having a direct relationship to its legality. 
The scientific credibility of JARPA is regularly disparaged.
455
 JARPA is criticized for 
conducting the bare minimum of science on whale carcasses, and for being “designed to gather 
data to justify the resumption of commercial whaling, rather than to independently analyze data 
for scientific purposes.”
456
 Clapham et al. condemn JARPA’s use of lethal sampling, arguing that 
“if a whale can be hit with a harpoon, the same target can just as easily be struck with a biopsy 
dart.”
457
 The sheer number of whales killed and the absence of any substantial scientific findings 
has led most to consider JARPA as a commercial rather than a scientific venture.
458
 The IWC has 
passed several resolutions calling on Japan to abandon JARPA and to revise its scientific 
program to focus on non-lethal means of research.
459
  
The overall legality of JARPA has also been called into question. In 2006, two panels of 
legal experts convened to consider the legality of JARPA II: an International Panel of 
Independent Legal Experts met in Paris (‘Paris Panel’) and the Sydney Panel of Independent 
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International Law Experts (‘Sydney Panel’) held discussions.
 
The Paris Panel concluded that 
Japan was “conducting purportedly scientific whaling on an increasingly commercial scale 
which threatens to undermine conservation measures adopted by the Parties to the ICRW and to 
promote the illegal international trade in whale meat.”
460
 The Sydney Panel suggested that 
Japan’s program violated a range of treaties, and that Australia and New Zealand could pursue 
claims before the Antarctic Treaty (AT) parties.
461
 The issue is currently before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ).  
 The first complaint against JARPA II, and one of the principal findings of the Paris 
Panel, and Australia’s chief complaint at the ICJ, is that “Japanese whaling violates the ‘abuse of 
right’ and ‘good faith’ doctrines embraced by the IWC through Resolution 2001-1.
462
 The Paris 
Panel defined an abuse of right as “a State exercising a right either in a way which impedes the 
enjoyment by other States of their own rights or for an end different from that for which the right 
was created, to the injury of another state.”
463 
JARPA II also violates “the customary 
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, codified in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, requiring that Japan perform its treaty obligation in ‘good faith.’”
464
 Those who 
defend JARPA II, argue that “no such principle even exists under international law.”
465
  
Regarding the ‘abuse of rights’ and ‘good faith’ doctrines, Hoek notes that  
the problem associated with these Articles is that they are difficult to enforce. 
They require compliance only ‘as far as possible and appropriate,’ and similar to 





 International lawyers, including the Sydney Panel, argue that JARPA II may violate the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the preamble of which states that, “where there is a 
threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty 
                                                 
460
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should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat…”
467
 
Klein argues that Japan has failed in its obligations to the CBD under Articles 5, 6, 8 and 14.
468
 
Sand and others criticize JARPA II for violating CITES, which prohibits the trade of any whale 
species.
469
 There is also strong evidence to suggest that JARPA II is in violation of UNCLOS, 
specifically Article 241 which notes that “[m]arine scientific research shall not constitute the 
legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine environment or its resources.”
470
 The overall 
legality of JARPA II is therefore decidedly in question. 
 
4.3 - The Legal Context of the Southern Ocean 
 
 With respect to the legality of JARPA II, a further set of complications arise from the fact 
that the program is carried out in the Southern Ocean. Here the Japanese encounter the overlap of 
an IWC whale sanctuary, the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and Australian domestic law. These 
overlapping legal systems further challenge the legality of JARPA II but also increase the 
difficulty of states, particularly Australia, in intervening against the program. This is the legal 
context in which the SSCS and JARPA operate. In 1994, the IWC voted to create a Southern 
Ocean Whale Sanctuary (SOWS), which prohibits all commercial whaling in the Southern Ocean 
south of 40 degrees.
471
 Japan objected to the SOWS, insisting that it is ultra vires of the IWC, 
and that it violated Article V of the ICRW, which states that sanctuaries must be based on 
scientific findings and take into consideration the interests of the consumers of whale 
products.
472
  The following year the IWC voted to ban all scientific whaling within the SOWS 
and recommended the suspension of all lethal forms of whale research.
473
   
 Antarctica represents a complex international political environment; it contains a large 
sector of unclaimed territory; and three overlapping claims. Most “territorial claims are not 
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recognized by non-claimant States representing the great majority of the international 
community.”
474
 The continent also challenges traditional understandings of sovereignty. Inter 
alia, the harsh climate provides a challenge to the continuous display of authority. The AT and 
the ATS, which comprises the additional treaties and agreements that have built up around the 
AT, have been developed as a means of addressing some of the political challenges presented by 
the southern continent. The AT is in effect an agreement to disagree; it makes no effort to resolve 
the conflicting territorial claims in Antarctica, but rather ‘freezes’ the legal status quo.
475
 Article 
IV, stipulates that “[n]o acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica...”
476
 Furthermore, no new claim or enlargement of an existing claim can be made 
with the Treaty in force.
477
 The ATS has “proved remarkably resilient” and serves as an example 
of a successful ‘framework treaty.’
478
  
The ATS presents a significant challenge to the Australian government within whose 
waters most of JARPA is conducted. Australia has claimed territory in Antarctica, the Australian 
Antarctic Territory (AAT), since 1936. This claim covers 42% of the Antarctic mainland, but is 
only recognized by France, New Zealand, Great Britain, and Norway.
479 
Australia passed the 
Whale Protection Act in 1980, which specifically applied to Australian nationals in all Australian 
waters, but only to non-nationals within the Australian Fisheries Zone, not comprising the waters 
around the AAT.
480
 In 1999 Australia’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act (EPBC) created the Australian Whale Sanctuary (AWS), and made it “an offense to kill, 
injure or interfere with a cetacean” within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of Australia, 
including the AAT.
481
 The AWS also overlaps with portions of the SOWS, and within 
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This presents Australia with a dilemma. As Mossop elaborates, “[u]nder Australian 
federal law, killing or injuring whales in the EEZ is prohibited and attracts penalties including 
fines or imprisonment. Much of the Japanese scientific whaling programme takes place in 
Australia’s EEZ off the AAT, prima facie breaching Australian law.”
483
 Australia’s jurisdiction 
to enforce the EPBC is uncertain. Australia declared its EEZ in 1994, including the EEZ of the 
AAT.
484
 The question is whether Australia has the jurisdiction to intervene against Japanese 
‘research’ whaling, which clearly contravenes the EPBC?  
There has been considerable debate on this subject – whether enforcing an existing law 
constitutes a new sovereignty claim and as such whether Australia would legally be able to act 
against the Japanese without violating or upsetting the ATS.
485
 The ATS comprises not only the 
AT, but also several other conservation agreements, including the Madrid Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Seals (CCAS).
486 
One concern, noted by Anton, is that if Australia were to assert 
jurisdiction in the AWS, it would do so at the risk of the “continuing stability of the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) and the broader environmental values it serves.”
487  
 As a result of this dilemma, Australia has sought to avoid controversy, and until 2007, 
laws were generally “not enforced against foreign nationals.”
488
 In the 2007 federal election, the 
Australian Labour party pledged to “enforce Australian law banning the slaughter of whales in 
the Australian Whale Sanctuary.”
489
 Following the election, the government appointed a special 
whale envoy to Japan, whose 2009 visit to Japan was deemed unsuccessful and not repeated.
490
 It 
is interesting to note that from the initial JARPA survey until 2007, the government was content 
to ignore Japanese ‘research’ whaling within its waters. The two things which changed over this 
time were the increased public awareness of the issue and resulting pressure in large part brought 
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on by sustained SSCS campaigns, and a law suit brought by HSI in 2004. The HSI sought an 
injunction and a declaration against Kyodo for illegally whaling under Australian federal law.
491 
In the HSI case the initial ruling was consistent with the idea that Australian action against 
Kyodo would “prompt a significant adverse reaction from other Antarctic Treaty Parties.”
492
 The 
case was appealed, and in 2008 the Australian Federal Court issued declaratory relief and an 
injunction against Kyodo.
493 
The court found the whaling company had “breached sections 229-
232 and 238 of the EPBC Act by killing, treating, and possessing whales in the AWS in the EEZ 
adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory.”
494
 The Australian Attorney-General, in 2008, 
took the view that an “attempt to enforce the EPBC Act may upset the diplomatic status quo 
under the Antarctic Treaty and be contrary to Australia’s long term national interests, including 
its interests connected with its claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.”
495
  
 Australia and Japan are very close trading partners. Both governments have been loath to 
jeopardise this relationship for a relatively secondary issue such as whaling.
496
 However, despite 
this and a long history of inaction on the part of the Australian government, Australia has 
recently decided to pursue the issue. In May 2010, Australia initiated proceedings against Japan 
in the ICJ, asserting that Japan was violating its obligation under the ICRW to observe the 
moratorium on commercial whaling, to act in good faith, and to refrain from commercial whaling 
in the Indian and Southern Ocean Sanctuaries.
497
 Australia further asserted that Japan was 
violating obligations under the CBD to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states.
498
 Japan’s position is based “on a plain interpretation 
of the language of the ICRW,” one which strictly defines the purpose of the IWC as a body for 
regulating whaling, rather than whale conservation.
499
 The outcome of this case is pending.  
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4.4 - Anti-Whaling and Conventional INGO/TAG Strategies 
 
Several general observations can be made from this overview. First, the IWC is incapable 
of enforcing its own decisions and is mired in a political deadlock, making any reforms virtually 
impossible. Lobbying efforts within the IWC on the part of INGOs and TAGs appear to be of 
little use given the organization’s failings. This suggests that conventional INGO/TAG insider 
strategies such as lobbying, scientific reporting, or even monitoring, have little impact. 
Information politics are ineffective in an era of ‘moral management.’
500
  
The transnational campaign against whaling was initially very successful; activists 
achieved successes in disseminating a powerful anti-whaling norm around the world, and worked 
hard within the IWC to obtain the current moratorium. While the vast majority of people living 
in anti-whaling states oppose whaling, the anti-whaling norm has yet to resonate in staunchly 
pro-whaling states. It seems that if conventional awareness raising and re-framing by 
INGOs/TAGs were to work in countries such as Japan and Norway, they would have indeed 
done so by now, or that such strategies require such considerable time that they are essentially 
ineffective. Image events, which served to mobilize anti-whaling sentiment in other states, may 
even have the contrary effect of strengthening pro-whaling sentiment by being linked to cultural 
issues and to patriotism.  
Similar reasoning suggests the use of moral leverage as ineffective; efforts at shaming 
Japan into compliance with the global anti-whaling norm are met with accusations of cultural 
imperialism. The Japanese government can use its pro-whaling position to appear strong in the 
face of gaiatsu – foreign pressure.
501
 Efforts to portray whaling as a moral issue have had no 
resonance where whaling is synonymous with fishing and whale meat is considered another type 
of acceptable seafood. Japanese are quick to point out that Westerners who are critical of 
Japanese whaling eat burgers and support a factory farming system which is even crueler than 
whaling.
502
 The use of material leverage is also limited. INGOs/TAGs appear incapable of 
organizing boycotts on a sufficient scale to have an impact on holdouts like Japan and Norway. 
Anti-whaling activists appear incapable of leveraging the US into using unilateral economic 
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sanctions, one of the traditional ad hoc enforcement mechanisms of the IWC.
503
 Conventional 
strategies were unable to make progress against hold-out pro-whaling states like Japan. The 
SSCS has adopted an unconventional approach as a means of circumventing the deadlock which 
has plagued the whaling issue to achieve direct results.  
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CHAPTER 5 – OBSERVATIONS OF SSCS OPERATIONS 
 
This chapter examines SSCS strategy in detail. It provides background information on the 
SSCS’s philosophy and history, both of which have influenced the development of SSCS 
strategy. It then explores how the SSCS articulates its goals and the strategy it claims to use to 
accomplish these goals. A survey of existing evaluations of the legality of SSCS actions follows. 
The remainder of the chapter focuses specifically on the Antarctic anti-whaling strategy of the 
SSCS. It begins with a short history of the SSCS anti-whaling campaign, and then provides a 
chronology of ‘Operation No Compromise.’ This is followed by observations made during the 
Operation, which are organized into sub-sections using Keck and Sikkink’s four categories of 
INGO/TAG action, though as will become evident, many of the SSCS actions fall outside of this 
typology, and suggest its expansion. 
 
5.1 - The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society 
5.1.1 - The Philosophy of the SSCS 
 
Understanding the general philosophy of the SSCS is important in so far as this 
philosophy drives and limits certain strategic and tactical choices. Classifying the underlying 
philosophy of the SSCS is somewhat confused by its use of animal rights rhetoric, its focus on 
specific marine species, and by the strong involvement of animal rights/liberation activists within 
the organization, and by the large number of animal rights/liberation oriented donors it 
attracts.
504
  The organization engages in campaigns, such as the Dam and Cove Guardians, which 
appear to be principally motivated by animal rights/liberation, rather than conservation concerns. 
However the organization remains conservation focused – concerned with protecting the 
environment, ecosystems, and with preserving species, due in large part to the central role played 
by Watson and the centrality of his beliefs and philosophy with that of the SSCS.  
                                                 
504
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Watson describes deep ecology as central to his own philosophy, noting that rather than 
being conquerors of Earth, humans must be “plain citizens upon it, equal to other citizen 
species.”
505
  Deep ecology advocates biocentrism, wherein the environment is considered to be 
“intrinsically valuable in and of itself” and the wellbeing of ecosystems a priority.
506
 Deep 
ecology and its adherents have often been described as misanthropic, and this is an adjective 
which Watson accepts.
507
 Watson is consistently biocentric in his treatise ‘On Natural Law,’ 
wherein he enumerates the three laws of ecology (summarized as interdependence, diversity and 
finite resources) and explains how these laws take precedent over manmade laws.
508
 Human laws 
cannot violate ecological laws without “terrible justice rendered against us by the Earth 
herself.”
509
 Deep ecology leaves little room for compromise, and calls for adherents to take 
action to prevent environmental harms. This exhortation to action can be seen in Neptune’s 
Manifesto.
510
 Along these lines, Watson declares that there can be ‘no compromise’ and named 
the 2010-2011 campaign – ‘Operation No Compromise.’
511
 
The SSCS’s position on violence and the destruction of property places limitations on its 
strategy, which in turn informs its choice of tactics. Violence is a contested term and highly 
politicized. The major point of contention in the debate over the definition of violence is the 
question of whether violence includes acts committed against property. Chenoweth and Stephan 
inter alia, define violence as “other types of physical harm of people and property.”
512
 Many 
contest the inclusion of damage to property within the definition of violence.
513
 The SSCS’s 
position on property destruction, as articulated by Watson, is that this is legitimate 1) 
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because“[t]he right of living things to live is more important than the right of living things to 
possess property”
514
; and 2) that the “object in question is used illegally to destroy life.”
515
  
While violence against property may be justified, the SSCS avoids all actions which 
could endanger lives. The organization maintains a strict code of non-violence, following the 
principles that crew members “cannot use weapons; they cannot use explosives; they cannot 
undertake any action that could result in a physical injury to humans; they must take 
responsibility for their actions; and they must accept moral and legal consequences for their 
actions.”
516
 During ‘Operation No Compromise,’ crew members were briefed to take extreme 
care to avoid harming Japanese whalers. During a briefing, crew members were instructed not to 
“do anything which endangers lives” in the event of a boarding, such as pushing boarders off the 
ships rails,
517
 and throwers (of butyric acid and cellulose) were instructed to aim away from 
people.
518
 Not only are these measures consistent with deep ecology, but they are also 
pragmatic.
519
 If the SSCS were ever to injure or kill someone, Watson notes, “we would be 
condemned by our governments; there’s no way they would justify it.”
520
 The SSCS walks a fine 
line, because creating casualties would push the organization into the category inhabited by 
terrorists.  
 
5.1.2 - History of the SSCS and its Anti-Whaling Campaigns 
  
Watson was the youngest founding member of Greenpeace and split with this 
organization in 1977 after a disagreement concerning the role of property destruction during 
actions.
521
 As a result, there has been constant acrimony between the two organizations.
522 
Jabour 
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and Iliff explain the basis of this animosity as being tied to the fact that both organizations are in 
direct competition for public donations and supporters, and we can see that through such 
criticism each organization is seeking to establish their specific niche.
523 
After leaving 
Greenpeace, Watson set his sights on pirate whaling, and specifically the Sierra, a vessel with 
complicated international ownership which had been whaling illegally since 1967.
524
 With help 
from Cleveland Amory’s Fund for Animals, Watson purchased the Sea Shepherd.  On July 16, 
1979 off the coast of Portugal, he rammed and disabled the Sierra, which was allowed to 
struggle into Lisbon harbour.
525
 Eight months after the ramming, the repaired Sierra was sunk at 
dockside in Lisbon harbour by the use of limpet mines.
526
 Watson later claimed that SSCS 
operatives were responsible for the action. 
 
 
The SSCS was formed in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1979 as a support group for the 
ship.
 
The newly minted SSCS aggressively targeted other pirate whalers and achieved 
considerable success. In May 1980, the Susan and Theresa, sister ships of the Sierra, were seized 
by the South African government after the SSCS “documented that they were engaged in pirate 
whaling.”
527
 In the spring of 1980, SSCS activists sank, at dockside, two Spanish whalers—Ibsa 
I and II, which constituted 40% of the Spanish whaling fleet.
528 
The Spanish whaler Astrid was 
quietly retired by her owners after the SSCS offered a $25,000 USD ‘bounty’ for anyone who 
would sink the vessel.
529 
 These actions effectively ended pirate whaling in the North Atlantic. 
Over the next decade the SSCS campaigned on other marine conservation issues, and 
continued to pursue both legal and pirate whaling. It used a range of strategies in its fight against 
whaling – from the classic INGO/TAG monitoring and ‘naming and shaming,’ such as 
documenting Soviet misrepresentation of ‘subsistence whaling’ in 1981,
530
 to more 
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confrontational approaches, such as the 1986 ‘raid on Reykjavik.’ Here two SSCS activists 
attacked whaling infrastructure in Iceland, vandalizing a whale processing plant, and then 
proceeded to sink half of the Icelandic whaling fleet – the Hvalur 6 and Hvalur 7 – in Reykjavik 
Harbour. The action was estimated to have caused upwards to $8 million in damages.
531
 As a 
result of this action, Watson and the SSCS were banned from attending future meetings of the 
IWC.
532
 If the SSCS had truly desired to build towards adopting an insider strategy, this would 
seem to be the exact opposite way to go about it. 
In December 1992, Watson and others opened the sea valves on the Norwegian whaling 
vessel Nybraena, the following month the Norwegian whaler Senet was also sunk.
533 
That same 
year the SSCS returned to Norway with the brightly-painted Whales Forever, and attempted to 
enter a Norwegian harbour, but was intercepted and ordered to halt by the Norwegian cutter 
Andenes.
534
  In the ensuing engagement, the two vessels collided, and the Norwegians fired live 
warning rounds and used depth charges in a failed attempt to stop Whales Forever.
535
 Some 
scholars claim that the SSCS actions against Norway represented “a public relations disaster for 
the (always modest) anti-whaling forces in that country.”
536
 As an ‘image event,’ SSCS actions 
in this case appear to have alienated rather than won over a Norwegian audience. The SSCS 
actions did, however, have a direct impact on Norwegian whaling. Bailey notes that as a result of 
the SSCS sinkings of Norwegian ships “insurance companies were said to be denying coverage 
to whaling vessels on the grounds that those vessels were operating under conditions of war.”
537
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5.2 - The SSCS Antarctic Anti-Whaling Campaign 
5.2.1 - History of Operations 
 
In 2002-2003 the SSCS launched its Antarctic anti-whaling campaign. The specific goal 
was “to enforce the global moratorium against commercial whaling and to enforce the protection 
regulations granted to the whales inside the official Southern Ocean [Whale] Sanctuary.”
538
 
Towards accomplishing this broad goal the SSCS described two specific objectives of its 
campaigns: “First to save the lives of as many whales as possible, and second to sink the 
Japanese whaling fleet economically.”
539
 The initial 2002-2003 operation was unsuccessful in 
locating the whaling fleet, and the SSCS did not launch a subsequent operation until 2005-2006. 
Since 2006 operations have been run annually. 
During its Antarctic campaigns, the SSCS employs a wide range of tactics aimed at 
disrupting whaling operations. The ultimate goal of SSCS operations is to block the slipway of 
the Nisshin Maru factory ship, and thereby prevent all whales from being loaded and as a result, 
halt whaling operations.
540
 The SSCS also attempts to disrupt whaling through other forms of 
harassment, which include throwing canisters of butyric acid (stink bombs, which contaminate 
whale meat and make decks unworkable) and cellulose powder (to makes decks slippery), 
deploying prop-foulers (to disable whaling vessels by entangling prop fouling lines in their 
propellers), and sending activists to board whaling ships (which cause diplomatic delays).
541
  
Several collisions between Sea Shepherd and whaling vessels have also occurred over the years. 
None of these actions has resulted in any casualties or injuries to either activists or their targets. 
Operations have been documented by the television program Whale Wars since the 2007/2008 
operation. 
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5.2.2 - Operation No Compromise – Details and Chronology 
 
This section contains a brief chronological outline of ‘Operation No Compromise,’ in 
order to provide context for observations and to provide a clear picture of a complete SSCS 
operation. Some of the events described in the chronology are developed in greater detail below, 
as they refer to specific aspects of SSCS strategy.  
 
5.2.2.1 - Participating Vessels 
 
PO was conducted from November 23, 2010 to March 9, 2011 which included the entire 
duration of ‘Operation No Compromise’ (December 2, 2010 to March 6, 2011). The SSCS fleet 
for the operation comprised of three vessels:  
 MY Steve Irwin: Dutch registered. 59m, 885 gross register tonnage (GRT). Former 
Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency vessel, acquired by SSCS in 2005. Captained by 
Paul Watson (Canadian). Deploying two RIBs, one zodiac, one Jet Ski, and a 4-person 
helicopter.  
 MY Bob Barker: Dutch registered. 52m, 801 GRT. Former Norwegian whaler, acquired 
in 2009. Captained by Alex Cornelissen (Dutch). Deploying two RIBs and equipped with 
helipad. 
 MV Gojira (currently MV Brigitte Bardot): Australian registered. 35m, 41 GRT. 
Stabilized mono-hull trimaran. Captained by Lockhart "Locky" MacLean (Canadian). 
Capable of reaching speeds in excess of 24 knots, faster than the whaling fleets harpoon 
vessels. Deploying one emergency Jet Ski. 
Both of the SSCS large vessels are protected by anti-boarding spikes, are painted black and are 
emblazoned with the SSCS website address. I conducted PO while serving on the deck crew of 
the Bob Barker.  The role of a deck crew member involved daily non-mechanical maintenance of 
the vessel. The deck crew were also responsible for launching the small boats during actions, 
were assigned a role on the vessel’s firefighting and anti-boarding teams, helped to manufacture 
various tactical items (prop-foulers, smoke flares etc.), and generally supported the activities of 
the vessel.  
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The Japanese whaling fleet has varied over the years. In 2010-2011 it comprised of: 
 MV Nisshin Maru: Japanese registered. 130m, 8030 GRT. Factory ship.  
 Three harpoon vessels: the MV Yushin Maru (YM#1), Yushin Maru #2 (YM#2) and 
Yushin Maru #3 (YM#3): Japanese registered. 70m, 750 GRT. Harpoon vessels. The 
YM#3 was equipped with a water canon in lieu of a harpoon and served as the whaling 
fleet’s security vessel. Hammarstedt described the general behavior of these vessels as 
clumsy, quiet, and very aggressive respectively.
542
 
 Sun Laurel: Panamanian registered, Korean owned. 104m, 4067 GRT. Oil tanker, fleet’s 
re-fueling vessel. 
All of the whaling vessels (which excludes the tanker) were protected by defensive netting, and 
equipped with water hoses, and emblazoned with the English word ‘Research.’   
 
5.2.2.2 - Chronology 
 
The SSCS fleet departed from Hobart, Australia, and dispersed.
543
 The Bob Barker spent 
the first month of the campaign in the Southern Ocean engaging in training and in search of the 
whaling fleet. This time was also spent developing new tactics; two innovative tactics developed 
during campaign were ‘Mick Jaggers’ – smoke flares with hooks attached such that they would 
become caught in the whaling vessels protective netting, and ‘Shepherd’s Crooks’ – long metal 
hooks connected to a prop-fouler by a length of chain.
544
  
A harpoon vessel was first encountered by the Bob Barker in the Ross Sea on December 
31, 2010.
545
 The harpoon vessel proceeded to shadow the Bob Barker, from December 31, 2010 
to February 5, 2011, in spite of several attempts to delay and disable it through the use of prop-
foulers and other tactics. During this time, the Steve Irwin was similarly shadowed. Tailing 
harpoon vessels prevented SSCS vessels from finding the Nisshin Maru by relaying the SSCS 
vessel’s positions to the factory ship, and as a result, a tactical deadlock emerged. Many of the 
                                                 
542
 Field Journal Hammarstedt, December 18, 2010. 
543
 For a more detailed chronology see Phelps Bondaroff 2011. 
544
 Field Journal, for ‘Mick Jagger’s’ see January 4, 2011; for Shepherd’s Crooks see January 2, 2011; and see 
Phelps Bondaroff 2011:27, fn.47.  
545
 Ibid, and Daily Action Log, December 31, 2010. 
113 
 
crew members expressed satisfaction with this deadlock because the SSCS was succeeding in 
tying up two thirds of the whaling fleets resources, which would otherwise be whaling.
546
  
In mid-January, as a means of breaking the tactical deadlock, the SSCS launched a RIB 
operation and succeeded in attaching a tracking device to the hull of the YM#2.
547
 The harpoon 
vessel was tracked back to the Sun Laurel, a ship chartered to refuel the whaling fleet. The SSCS 
argued that refueling below 60°S violates the ATS, and all three of the SSCS vessels converged 
upon the Sun Laurel.
548
 The Bob Barker blockaded the vessel, preventing any refueling from 
January 13 to 20, 2011. The Bob Barker disengaged from the tanker once it had been pursued 
outside of the SOWS.
549
  
On the evening of February 9, 2011 the Gojira located the Nisshin Maru and a short time 
later the Bob Barker assumed a position behind the slipway of the factory ship, a position it 
maintained from February 9 to 19, 2011, preventing all further whaling.
550
 The Nisshin Maru 
travelled east, which drew it ever closer to the Drake Passage, well outside the ICR’s designated 
whaling area. The Antarctic Peninsula includes the overlapping territorial claims of several 
states, and as a result the Drake Passage is a veritable political mine field of overlapping 
EEZs.
551
 The first EEZ the Japanese would enter, if they attempted to navigate the Passage, 
would have been that of Chile, a member of the Buenos Aires Group, a caucus within the IWC of 
member states with very strong anti-whaling positions.
552
 Entering the Chilean EEZ transporting 
whale meat or whaling would constitute a violation of Chilean domestic laws.
553
 On February 18, 
2011, the Nisshin Maru abruptly turned north, just prior to entering the EEZ of Chile’s Antarctic 
claim –unwilling to test the staunchly anti-whaling Chilean government’s threats that it would be 
arrested if it entered Chile’s EEZ. On the same day, the Japanese government announced an 
early end to their whaling season. The fleet returned almost a month earlier than previous 
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seasons. Japanese officials declared that the reason for their departure was “due to repeated 
harassment from activists at sea.”
554
  
The Bob Barker disengaged from the Nisshin Maru and set a course for Hobart, where it 
arrived on March 6, 2011, and was briefly detained and searched by the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP).
555
 This was pursuant to a formal request which the Australian government had 
received from Japan, regarding Australia’s obligation under the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) to “ensure that appropriate 
action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships.”
556
  The SSCS cooperated 
with AFP officers by providing them with copies of the ship’s log and Animal Planet provided 
copies of its footage.   
 
5.3 - Observations of the SSCS  
 
 This section (5.3) explores SSCS strategy, drawn both from observations made during 
field work and an examination of previous SSCS operations. It explores how each component of 
SSCS’s anti-whaling campaign fits into the existing INGO/TAG literature. The SSCS does 
engage in information, symbolic, leverage and accountability politics, however its use of these 
forms of action does not closely resemble those of other INGOs/TAGs. From this examination, 
we can begin to see that aspects of SSCS strategy resemble the strategy of DA, a strategy which 
is more commonly associated with the repertoires of domestic radical groups (explored in 
Chapter 6). Explaining SSCS strategy as a form of DA applied to the international arena and the 
high seas has explanatory power: however it still fails to explain all aspects of SSCS strategy, 
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5.3.1 - Information Politics 
 
 The SSCS’s use of information and framing can be contrasted with that of other anti-
whaling INGOs/TAGs. At the 2011 meeting of the IWC, activists provided technical reports on 
the toxicity of whale meat,
557
 the cruelty of whaling,
558
 the hunting and sale of endangered 
species,
559
 and the importance of whale conservation.
560
 SSCS communications contain 
information relating to the conservation status of whales, and often mention the cruelty of 
whaling, however this kind of information is far removed from being technical and detailed, nor 
is it central the SSCS message. The information disseminated by the SSCS appears to be 
designed to frame its actions as law enforcement. The SSCS does this in two ways; first, it 
provides legal justification for its overall approach – a legal mandate to enforce international 
law, and secondly, it provides information concerning the legality of the actions of its targets, 
judging these actions to be illegal and thereby justifying enforcement actions against them. The 
SSCS also releases information concerning the effectiveness of its campaigns, i.e. the number of 
whales its actions purport to have saved (see Direct Impacts of SSCS Actions on Japanese 
Whaling, Chapter 5.3.3.1 below). 
 
5.3.1.1 - Legal Justifications 
 
Watson claims that “Sea Shepherd’s empowered to intervene by virtue of the United 
Nations World Charter for Nature, which allows for NGOs and individuals to uphold 
international conservation law.”
561
 Specifically, the SSCS points to Section 21 of the United 
Nations World Charter for Nature (WCN) which declares that, 
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…states and, to the extent they are able, other public authorities, international 
organizations, individuals, groups and corporations shall: (a) co-operate in the task 
of conserving nature through common activities and other relevant actions, 
including information exchange and consultations...and (e) Safeguard and conserve 




And Section 24 which further stipulates that, 
Each person…acting individually, in association with others or through 
participation in the political process…shall strive to ensure that the objectives and 




This has not always been the strategy adopted by the SSCS. As Watson notes, he started the 
SSCS “five years before the Charter came into existence, but it was in anticipation of the need 
for the Charter that I did so. In 1982, the Charter simply gave us some legal authority to act.”
564
 
In 1995 Watson cited the WCN for the first time, using its authority to chase Spanish and Cuban 
trawlers off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.
565
 Watson was arrested and charged with 
mischief, but was later acquitted ‘by reason of colour of right,’ “an honest belief in a state of 
facts (or law…) which, if it existed, would be a legal justification or excuse.”
566
 Watson cites this 
case as establishing a precedent for the WCN thus justifying SSCS intervention.  
The SSCS has also sought to bolster legal justifications for its actions. In 2008 the SSCS 
requested an arrest warrant from the Australian government to serve to Japanese whalers, but the 
request was turned down.
567
 In a subsequent press release, the SSCS declared that it was 
enforcing the January 15, 2008 ruling of the Australian Federal Court, the final result of the HSI 
case. The press release went on to enumerate all of the international and Australian laws which 
the Japanese whaling program was in breach of, and ended with Watson granting the SSCS a 
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warrant “for action to restrain Japanese whaling activities in accordance with the January 15, 
2008 ruling of the Australian Federal Court” by the authority of the WCN.
568
   
Most of the current academic literature on the SSCS explores the legitimacy of its claims 
to enforce international law. Roeschke is one of the few who argues that the SSCS does have 
legal authority through the WCN, and should be permitted to enforce international conservation 
law given a lack of political will and inherent costs, although he recommends that the SSCS use 
less ‘controversial means.’
569
 However, most scholars argue that SSCS claims to legitimacy 
under the WCN are exaggerated. Caprari notes that the WCN is a UN resolution “and is 
therefore non-binding on any party to it because it does not constitute a formal source of 
international law.”
570 
Anton argues that even if the WCN did represent “legal normativity of the 
hardest variety, nothing in it confers authority on non-state actors to enforce international law in 
the self-help, physical way asserted by Watson and Sea Shepherd,”
571
 and that any efforts to 
support the objectives and requirements of the Charter be “subject to lawful avenues of 
action.”
572
 Anton suggests that efforts to conduct citizen arrests are far more rooted in the 
domestic rather than the international legal tradition, and that Section 3Z of the Crimes Act, 
allows for citizen arrest under Australian law.
573
 Anton does go on to note that this may be 
problematic under international law as “no state (much less Sea Shepherd) has the power to seize 
and arrest Japanese Whalers on the high seas in the Southern Ocean.”
574
 While the literature 
suggests that the WCN, or any other international law, is not a license for vigilantism,
575
 the fact 
that the SSCS can claim to draw a mandate from this Charter appears to provide the organization 
with several benefits; the technical legal legitimacy of this claim does not appear to matter.  
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5.3.1.2 - Use of Legal Language 
 
In addition to justifying its overall approach through the WCN, the SSCS also defines 
individual actions and operations as enforcement actions, by highlighting the illegality of its 
target’s actions, pointing to violations of specific laws. As Vons, director of SSCS Netherlands 
notes: “We are an international law enforcement and anti-poaching organization and we 
reinforce this role through the use of legal language and by targeting poaching and other illegal 
activity.”
576
  Information released by the SSCS refers to the JARPA as violating international 
conservation law (WCN, CITES, ATS, SOWS, ICRW) and Australian domestic law (EPBC, 
AWS).
577
 For example Watson stated the following with regards to the campaign: 
The Japanese are targeting endangered species in an established whale sanctuary in 
Antarctica, in violation of the regulations of the IWC, in violation of the Antarctic 
Treaty, in violation of the CITES…in violation of Australian law. In fact, Australia 
has ruled that taking whales in the Australian-Antarctic territory cannot take place 
and they have warned Japan to stay out of there. And then when Japan continued, 
they cited them in contempt of a court order, so they’re actually in violation of an 




This statement is typical of SSCS discourse. Prior to the beginning of ‘Operation No 
Compromise’, tours of the Bob Barker were made available to the general public, and visitors 
were shown a video about the SSCS, which emphasized the SSCS’s WCN mandate and pointed 




 SSCS discourse is filled with language and information which endeavours to frame the 
actions of the Japanese as illegal and SSCS actions as legal enforcement.  It should be noted that 
as the entire operation was filmed as part of Whale Wars, all of the discourse of crew members 
represented potential content for the program, and therefore information to be disseminated to 
the public. Crew members, and particularly officers, often injected legal terminology into their 
discourse and referred to the Japanese as violating the law. For example, during a briefing, 
Hammarstedt advised that when throwing, to “aim at illegal property being used to commit 
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 Such was the ubiquitous use of this type of language, that Chris Graves, member 
of the Animal Planet film crew on board the Bob Barker, declared that she “wishes he 
[Hammarstedt] wouldn’t say ‘illegal whaling’ every five minutes,” as Animal Planet would 
likely be unable to air clips containing such language for legal purposes (see also Appendix 4).
581
  
 Officers were particularly aware of the power of language and labelling in supporting the 
SSCS’s enforcement message. Prop foulers were designated as ‘safety lines’
582
 or ‘defensive 
lines,’
583
 ‘paintball guns’ as ‘paintball markers,’
584
 ‘butyric acid’ as ‘stink bombs,’ ‘research’ as 
‘criminal,’ and ‘harvesting’ as ‘killing’ or ‘poaching.’
585
A salient example this type of labelling 
can be seen in the naming of prop foulers. Over the course of the operation, the deck crew 
manufactured numerous prop foulers, which were named after crew members, or given names 
reflecting their design, such as ‘Anemone’ or ‘Turtle Grass.’ Hammarstedt commented that the 
prop fouler dubbed ‘The Tentacles of Death,’ “should have been called ‘Tentacles of 
Enforcement.’”
586
 The SSCS also incorporated information supporting its ‘enforcement’ frame 
through the manner in which it communicated with targets. When communicating with other 
vessels, the SSCS referred to its own vessels as ‘marine patrol ships.’
587
 Targets were accused of 
breaking the law, and often cited the laws that they were seen as violating.
588
 Looking at SSCS 
information politics, it is clear that the organization concentrates its use of information towards 
framing itself as having a mandate to enforce international law, and in portraying its targets as 
being in violation of the law. While the later frame may be relatively common amongst 
INGO/TAGs, the emphasis on justifying vigilante enforcement of laws is much less common. 
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5.3.2 - Symbolic Politics 
 
A powerful tool incorporated into the image events of INGOs/TAGs is David and Goliath 
imagery or manufactured vulnerability, often created when activists serve as human shields. The 
intent of ‘human shield’ tactics “is to induce or impel the target ship to halt or modify her 
activities, not out of fear for herself, but out of that of harming the protesters.”
589
 Greenpeace is 
particularly well known for incorporating ‘human shield’ tactics into its actions, generating 
images of activists dangling from precarious perches or being hosed down.
590
 Land-based radical 
environmental activists will often take advantage of the added moral resonance evoked through 
manufactured vulnerability, for example, through the use of tripods or tree-sits.
591
  
It is undeniable that SSCS actions produce dramatic images and thereby attract media 
attention and that the SSCS employs symbolic politics, however SSCS image events do not rely 
on the symbols typical of INGOs/TAGs. The SSCS is not playing the role of the morally 
justified and motivated protester, bearing witness and putting its activists’ safety in the hands of 
the whalers: it is aggressively intervening against the whalers. The images produced by SSCS 
actions accentuate the organization and its aggressiveness, which is further reinforced through 
the use of pirate symbolism, yet at the same time, the SSCS also goes to considerable lengths to 
present itself as a law enforcement organization. It has already been noted that the organization 
injects its rhetoric with legal content, but the SSCS also employs legal imagery and incorporates 
legal practices, such as the gathering of evidence, into its actions. Rather than ‘David and 
Goliath,’ the SSCS injects its actions with a ‘cops and robbers’ frame.  
Supporting its image as a conservation organization, the SSCS also makes efforts to 
avoid having its actions appear environmentally harmful. The SSCS balances its ‘aggressive 
pirate image’ with its ‘law enforcement image’ through the use of proportionality. The 
organization carefully avoids unnecessarily violating the law or appearing excessively violent, 
going so far as to avoid tactics which would otherwise be effective at stopping the whalers, but 
which might appear disproportionate. The overall legality of SSCS actions remains in dispute, 
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 Doherty 2000:69. 
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however the fact that any potential legal violations on part of the SSCS appear less significant 
than those of its target, further reinforce the SSCS’s image as a law enforcement organization.  
An additional feature of SSCS’s overall strategy is the role played by symbolic politics. 
Unlike the actions of organizations such as Greenpeace, it does not appear as though the primary 
purpose of SSCS actions is the creation of image events. The SSCS engages in actions for which 
it does not seek publicity, with such actions not always benefiting from publicity. The media 
strategy of the SSCS is much less oriented around attracting the media given that its actions 
attract attention on their own, and because the organization has captured media attention in the 
form of its own ongoing television program, Whale Wars.  
 
5.3.2.1 - Use of Legal Imagery 
 
The SSCS uses a range of legal symbols in order to appear as an enforcement 
organization. Cornelissen noted that the when the SSCS flies the UN flag, it is not only doing so 
to symbolically represent global opposition to whaling, but to represent the WCN – the SSCS’s 
mandate.
592
 Following ‘Operation No Compromise,’ the SSCS vessels were re-painted with 
naval camouflage – in varying shades of gray, blue and white. Similar to naval vessels, each 
vessel was painted with a bow number.
593
 Long-serving crew members recounted incidents 
where SSCS vessels and personnel had been mistaken as belonging to law enforcement.
594
 In a 
form of symbolic politics of their own, the Japanese have written ‘RESEARCH’ (in English) on 
the sides of its vessels, and the YM#3 and the Nisshin Maru both sported banners which read 
‘Animal Planet Promotes Ecoterrorism.’
595
 In response the SSCS recently painted ‘ANTI-
POACHING’ and its Japanese translation 密漁反対, on the side of the Sam Simon, a former 
Japanese weather research ship acquired in 2012.
596
 These observations lend support to the 
findings that the SSCS supports its claims to enforce international law by employing legal 
imagery.  
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Care was taken to ensure that crew members looked and acted like enforcement officials. 
During a briefing, Hammarstedt advised crew members to behave professionally during actions, 
and advised RIB crews to avoid shouting profanity, ‘yipee ki yay,’ or a combination of the 
two.
597
 Crew members were required to wear uniforms at all times. The ‘Crew Welcome: 
Guidelines and Policies’ specified that “You are required to be neat and wear the SSCS 
‘uniform’ which means wearing our Sea Shepherd t-shirts, sweatshirts, and hats (if you wear 
hats) only.”
598
 This ‘uniform,’ though vague (it included any SSCS clothing and gear), was 
strictly enforced. Early on in the campaign I wore a non-SSCS shirt, and was quickly asked to 
change.
599
  Potts and Hammarstedt explained the SSCS ‘grew up a lot’ between season one and 
two of Whale Wars, with the first seasons plagued by accidents and mishaps. As a result, a more 
concerted effort was made to make the crew look and behave more professionally, as would be 
expected of law enforcement officers.
600
 SSCS officers also wear uniforms, and Watson is well 





5.3.2.2 - Gathering Evidence and ‘Legal Practices’ 
  
The SSCS also incorporates legal practices into its actions, further reinforcing the 
organization’s law enforcement image. Crew members, when possible, gather evidence of a 
target’s violations of laws and regulations. What differentiates SSCS’s evidence gathering from 
that of INGOs/TAGs engaged in conventional accountability politics is that the SSCS does not 
use the evidence it gathers to shame targets into compliance, or as part of a broader lobbying 
strategy. SSCS evidence gathering serves to establish whether the SSCS can intervene against a 
target, building a case to justify actions against that target. Similar to conventional INGO/TAG 
monitoring strategies the SSCS does provide its evidence to IOs and states, where the SSCS 
differs, it does not wait for IOs and states to act on this information. For example while searching 
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for the Nisshin Maru, a lookout spotted pink objects floating in the sea.  A RIB was launched and 
a chunk, which was identified as whale blubber, was recovered.
602
 The blubber was stored in the 
ship’s freezer.
603
 Cornelissen informed me that the act of disposing of whale offal at sea violated 
a range of environmental protocols of the AT, as well as the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which prohibits dumping food waste of a certain 
size, with the exception of fish, thereby putting the Japanese in violation of these treaties.
604
  
A second incident stands out where the SSCS first verified that the target of its actions 
was in violation of the law, prior to acting.
 
On December 22, 2010, the Bob Barker spotted 
several buoys, indicating a fishing operation. The first buoy was found at 65°50’S and 146°40’E, 
placing it within the Convention Area of CCAMLR, specifically Statistical Area 58.4.1. 
CCAMLR reports that this area has “high levels of IUU fishing, in 2005/06, 2006/07 and 
2009/10 resulted in the total removals being well in excess of the catch limits.”
605
 Vessels 
engaged in fishing in this area must be specifically licensed and Cornelissen was aware of this 
fact.
606
A vessel was spotted on the horizon and hailed: “Unknown vessel, this is the Antarctic 
patrol vessel the Bob Barker, please identify yourself.”
607
 The vessel failed to identify itself and 
fled. RIBs were launched to inspect the buoys for radio beacons or identifying marks, which 
would have been present in legally set lines. No such evidence was found, and the lines were 
determined to be those of poachers, fishing for threatened Patagonian toothfish. The crew set 
about recovering the lines and, working through the night, recovered over 3kms of line, and sunk 
two remaining nets. CCAMRL specifies that the Statistical Area is only open to an ‘exploratory 
long-line fishery,’ and once recovered it was found that the lines further violated CCAMLR, 
because they were gill nets.
608
 Cornelissen noted that this was not the first time the SSCS had 
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5.3.2.3 - Pirate Symbolism  
 
In apparent contradiction to its efforts to portray itself as a law enforcement organization 
through the use of legal language and symbolism, the SSCS deploys pirate symbolism and 
iconography. The SSCS has its own Jolly Roger, a skull over a crossed trident and shepherd’s 
crook with marine mammal embellishments.
610
 During ‘Operation No Compromise’ RIBs were 
decorated with ‘shark mouth’ nose art (popular with World War II airplanes) and SSCS’ vessel 
were painted black and decorated with ‘kill flags’ of the vessels ‘sunk’ by the SSCS.
611
 The rails 
of the Bob Barker were covered in prominent yellow anti-boarding spikes which Burke 
described as ‘passive aggressive spikes,’ noting that “they only work when people see them and 
not when they are tested.”
612
 In other words, the spikes are more symbolic, conveying the 
SSCS’s ‘hardcore look’ over functionality. These efforts all contribute to the SSCS’s ‘pirate 
brand.’
613
 Watson attempts to explain the apparent contradiction between simultaneously 
employing law enforcement and pirate symbolism by describing the SSCS as “pirates of 
compassion in pursuit of pirates of profit.”
614
 Watson argues that “[p]iracy was finally shut down 
in the Spanish Main by the pirate Sir Henry Morgan. It took a pirate to end piracy.”
615
 In 
essence, Watson is attempting to portray the SSCS as privateers, with a letter of marque in the 
form of the WCN.  
The use of this language and symbolism does not suggest that the SSCS is admitting to 
actually committing acts of piracy, which, as explored below, would be very problematic. 
Instead, the SSCS is attempting to draw on the positive cultural connotations of pirates, such as 
the pirate as a romantic renegade – Robin Hood, Captain Blood, or Captain Jack Sparrow. It is 
these charming and heroic icons which often come to the mind of the general public when pirate 
symbolism is used, not the realities of piracy off the coast of Somalia or in the Straits of 
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 The use of pirate symbolism ultimately serves as short hand, to describe the 
organization as aggressive and confrontational yet ultimately on the side of good. 
Pirate symbolism also helps the SSCS differentiate itself from other organizations and 
appeal to potential supporters. Stuart et al. suggest that SSCS members use labels like pirate to 
describe themselves as ‘hardcore’ and to distinguish the SSCS from other, less ‘hardcore’ 
groups.
617
 Using pirate symbolism appeals to supporters, because pirates are cool. As Watson 
summarizes, “it’s all theatrics. Kids love the pirate image.”
618
 This allows the SSCS to attract 
supporters from demographics which may otherwise be uninterested in conservation issues.  
 
5.3.2.4 - Aggressive Action and Reputation 
 
The SSCS’s use of pirate imagery is not exclusively ‘theatrics’ as Watson suggests, it is 
also a means by which the SSCS can quickly convey the message that it is “the most aggressive, 
determined, and effective marine wildlife conservation organization.”
619
 Pirate symbolism is part 
of the broader reputation that the SSCS has for being aggressive – an organization to be taken 
seriously. This image serves several strategic purposes. It allows the SSCS to win victories on 
reputation alone. Throughout its history, the SSCS has achieved outcomes by maintaining a high 
threat capacity, for having a “reputation for not backing down.”
620
 Nagtzaam and Lentini note 
that the SSCS’s “preferred way of negotiation is by intimidation,”
621
 and targets know from the 
organization’s reputation that the SSCS will not, as the name of the operation suggests, 
compromise. The message conveyed by SSCS reputation is that targets can expect 
confrontational action which will likely interfere with their operations, and those wishing to 
avoid such interference should stop their actions.
622
 
The SSCS also incorporates a variety of elements designed to convey its high threat 
capacity into its operations. Campaign names and vessel names are chosen to mock, antagonise 
or intimidate opponents. The operations Musashi (2008-2009) and Divine Wind (2011-2012) 
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were clearly selected for their references to Japanese culture, Miyamoto Musashi being a famous 
strategist, tactician and undefeated rōnin, and a reference to the famous tsunami, respectively. 
Operation names such as ‘No Compromise’ (2010-2011), ‘Zero Tolerance’ (2012-2013), and the 
upcoming ‘Relentless’ (2013-2014), similarly seek to convey specific connotations. Watson 
explains that the name Gojira “is a form of psychological warfare. It’s an intimidating looking 
vessel and also we gave it the name Gojira which means Godzilla which is much more relevant 
in than outside Japan.”
623
  
The SSCS clearly goes to lengths to portray itself as confrontational and aggressive. 
Highlighting aggressiveness is not typically a tool of INGOs/TAGs, but it is a clear component 
of SSCS, providing the organization with tactical and strategic advantages. Most INGOs/TAGs 
use norms as the primary vocabulary; they make normative claims, advocate on principled 
issues, exert moral leverage, and attempt to introduce and propagate norms in TCS.
624
 The SSCS 
is not engaging in CD, where activists demonstrate the righteousness of their cause through the 
righteousness of their actions. As Burke pointed out, with the SSCS approach, you “don’t forfeit 
the moral high ground, because you don’t seek it.”
625
 The SSCS does not frame its actions as 
challenging and violating unjust laws, but rather as enforcing existing ones, and doing so 
aggressively. 
 
5.3.2.5 - Legality of SSCS Actions 
 
The legality of SSCS actions is hotly contested. For an organization which claims to 
enforce the law, the SSCS has been branded as ‘pirates’ and ‘terrorists’ by states, other NSAs, 
and scholars alike.
626
 Being branded as a pirate is highly problematic, piracy jure gentium is jus 
cogens – a norm which is recognized as being fundamental to the maintenance of international 
order, and under international law states have universal jurisdiction to punish pirates, as pirata 
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est hostis generis humani.
627
 Generally speaking, piracy is defined as “any illegal acts of 
violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft” occurring outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
any state.
628
 The general consensus is that SSCS actions do not constitute piratical acts, as they 
lack the intent to pursue private ends (animo furandi).
629
 Appearing to confirm this is the fact 
that when Pete Bethune was arrested for boarding one of the Japanese vessels in 2010 (see 
Bethune-Ady Gil Incident, Chapter 5.3.3.3) he was not charged with piracy.
630
 A recent ruling by 
the 9
th
 District Court in the US appears to challenge the consensus. In 2012 Japan sought an 
injunction against the SSCS in the US. The initial request was denied, but later granted upon 
appeal, placing an injunction on SSCS USA and Watson.
631
 The SSCS quickly reorganized 
itself: Watson stepped down as head of the organization, replaced by noted Australian Green’s 
politician Bob Brown, and the 2012-2013 campaign proceeded as planned with the coordinating 
body being SSCS Australia rather than SSCS USA.
632
 Watson remains highly influential within 
the SSCS.  
This is not the first time that the Japanese have sought to ‘undermine the SSCS’s legal 
legitimacy’ and actions through legal means.
633
 Japan has made numerous attempts by way of 
international warrants through the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) to 
have prominent SSCS members arrested.
634 
This approach was largely unsuccessful until May 
2012 when Watson was arrested in Germany for extradition to Costa Rica, to answer for alleged 
attempted murder in a ramming incident which occurred during anti-shark fin operations in 
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The SSCS has also been accused of committing (eco)terrorism.
637
 There are no specific 
international laws on ecoterrorism, especially at sea; the nearest approximation is the SUA, 
which was adopted in 1988 in order to address forms of violence at sea committed for non-
private ends, omitted from UNCLOS.
638
 Caprari argues that SSCS actions violate SUA, 
specifically Article 3(1)(c), by attempting to cause damage to a ship “which is likely to endanger 
the safe navigation of that ship,” through such actions as prop-fouling.
639
 States party to SUA 
must investigate allegations of violations of the Convention, but there is no requirement that they 
“complete prosecution and punish the individual appropriately.”
640
 Japan has repeatedly 
requested that Australia investigate SSCS actions as violations of SUA, which the Australian 
government does, though not wholeheartedly. The AFP search SSCS ships upon their arrival in 
port following campaigns, but no prosecutions have arisen from these investigations.
641
 Jabour 
and Iliff argue that SSCS actions do not meet the definition of maritime terrorism under 
Australian law, which states that “any action which can be deemed a ‘protest’ and is not intended 
to cause serious harm is not a terrorist act.”
642
 One thing which is clear is that in their 
manoeuvres, which often lead to collisions or to bring vessels dangerously close, both the SSCS 
and the ICR/Kyodo are likely guilty of violating the International Regulations for the Prevention 
of Collisions at Sea 1972 (IRPCS/COLREGs).
643 
Brown concludes that the SSCS actions likely 
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violate Australian and New Zealand navigation laws, as well as criminal laws (common assault 




5.3.2.6 - Proportionality and Adhering to the Law 
 
The overall legality of SSCS actions remains in dispute. SSCS actions are at times 
aggressive, and some may violate shipping regulations, but the organization goes to considerable 
lengths to avoid unnecessarily violating laws and regulations, to eschew tactics which may 
appear as illegal, violent or excessive, and to avoid harming the environment. On several 
occasions over the course of ‘Operation No Compromise,’ the SSCS eschewed tactics which 
may have otherwise been effective, but which would have appeared disproportionate, and 
thereby harmful to the SSCS’s carefully constructed image as an enforcement organization. 
The SSCS has moderated its tactics since its earlier days. The organization has declared 
that it no longer sinks ships and had disavowed the use of ramming.
645
 The ‘kill flags’ on the Bob 
Barker serve to illustrate this point; adjacent to the flags and ship names of the vessels under the 
heading of ‘sunk,’ was a second set of flags and ship names under the heading ‘rammed,’ 
however this has been painted over.
646
  
During ‘Operation No Compromise’ the SSCS avoided unnecessarily violating laws. The 
helicopter, which would have been an effective tool for deploying projectiles around defensive 
netting and for other offensive tactical actions, was expressly reserved for reconnaissance and 
surveillance of actions. I was informed that using the helicopter for anything else would violate 
the law, cost the pilot his license and make the helicopter a viable target for retaliation, 
potentially threatening lives (see also Appendix 5).
647
 The Bob Barker is a Dutch registered ship, 
and following Japanese complaints as a result of incidents on previous campaigns, the Dutch 
government had instructed the SSCS not to throw butyric acid from any Dutch registered ships 
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and to abide by the rules of good seamanship.
648
 Cornelissen, a Dutch citizen, was particularly 
concerned with adhering to this request, as throwing things from the Bob Barker would “receive 
lots of criticism,” and potentially jeopardise the vessel’s flag. As a result, deck crews on board 
the Bob Barker were briefed to only throw butyric acid on explicit orders.
649
 As a result, no 
butyric acid was thrown from the Bob Barker during the entire operation (see also Appendix 6).  
The SSCS was careful to ensure that the regulations it may have broken were 
proportionately less serious than those which it accused it targets of violating. When it was dark, 
even while being pursued by a harpoon vessel, the Bob Barker’s navigation lights were on. 
Hammarstedt noted that this was “so they can’t claim we’ve broken international regulations for 
safe navigation.”
650
 Navigation lights were only turned off when the Bob Barker attempted to 
lose its tail in a night operation and prior to encountering the fleet.
651
 The SSCS was very serious 
when it came to upholding its obligation to respond to a Mayday call. On February 4, 2011 the 
SSCS succeeded in fouling the propeller of the YM#3 during an engagement. The disabled ship 
released a distress call and the SSCS RIBs immediately ceased engagement with the vessel. In a 
press release following the incident, the ICR stated that  
continuing [to] attack even after the YS3[YM#3] had sent a Mayday signal not 
only infringes international law regarding the orderly navigation on the seas but it 
is a clear outrage against humanity, that further demonstrates the need to put an 




The SSCS quickly released video footage of the crew of the Gojira responding to the call.
653
  
After less than an hour the YM#3 succeeded in freeing its prop, only to have it fouled a few hours 
later. This time the harpoon vessel was disabled for three days, during which time the Gojira 
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stood by, fulfilling its obligation to offer assistance, until the Australian maritime authorities who 
were handling the distress call informed the vessel it could stand down.
654
 
Gary Stokes, photographer on the Bob Barker, commented, “we should avoid doing 
things which look too aggressive and do nothing…”
655
 Several proposed tactics were rejected 
due to appearing too violent or radical, for example the suggestion that grappling hooks be used 
to pull down Japanese netting
656
 and the possibility of staging a fake boarding with a dummy 
(and see Appendix 7).
657
  The SSCS also adjusted its tactics given responses to them.  A further 
example where officers rejected an action or tactic which appeared disproportionately violent 
and illegal involved the ‘Mick Jagger’ flares. On January 9, 2011, RIBs from the Bob Barker 
engaged with the YM#2, attempting to prevent it from tailing the Bob Barker. Small boat teams 
threw ‘Mick Jagger’ smoke flares into the defensive netting of the whaling vessel. Amongst the 
smoke flares, each small boat threw a hand-held phosphorus signal flare, which burn bright-red 
for several minutes, similarly fitted like the ‘Mick Jagger’ smokes. The ICR accused the SSCS of 
throwing incendiary devices and military ‘flash-bang’ grenades.
658
 In public Watson claimed that 
Japanese water hoses were more dangerous than the flares,
659
 however Cornelissen was very 
concerned, as neither he, nor any SSCS officer, had authorized the use of the flares, and noted 
that he would likely receive a call from the AFP as a result of the incident.
660
 Members of the 
crew, watching ICR video footage of the incident, noted that it did not look good.
661
 The deck 
crew was given a serious dressing down for including the flares in the RIBs arsenals, and 
protocols were developed to prevent such a thing from happening in future actions.
662
 
The SSCS also avoided using tactics which might have harmed people or the 
environment. The SSCS avoided targeting the Sun Laurel with prop-foulers or butyric acid, and 
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instead chose to picket the vessel and to ‘escort it north of 60°.’
663
 Targeting a tanker with 
anything could be (perceived as) dangerous and as such, was avoided. As a conservation 
organization, the SSCS cannot appear to damage the environment through its actions. When 
designing new tactics – such as innovative ways by which to deploy cellulose powder or fouling 
props – the crew was very careful to ensure that these tactics: 1) did not run the risk of hurting a 
member of the whaling crew, 2) would not harm the oceans and marine wildlife, and 3) would be 
effective, in that order. For example, using balloons inside papier-mâché balls to deploy cellulose 
powder was rejected due to the detrimental effect of balloons on marine wildlife, and nets, 
generally seen as the most effective means of fouling a propeller, were rejected on similar 
grounds.
664
 Hammarstedt joked that SSCS tactics were “organic, fair trade, non-lethal, non-
violent, non-toxic, biodegradable, [and] vegan.”
665
 The SSCS also maintains vegan vessels, 
whereby all food served on board its ships does not contain any animal products, this not only 
serves to bolster the organization’s environmental and animal rights credentials and placate 
animal rights/liberation oriented crew members, but also to deflect claims of cultural 
imperialism, the so called ‘you eat chicken and burgers’ arguments.
666
 
Not all consider SSCS actions as restrained, ICR press releases regularly describe the 
SSCS as terrorists. Similarly SSCS actions are condemned at the IWC. At the 2011 Meeting in 
Jersey a ‘Safety at Sea’ resolution was unanimously passed which “condemned any actions that 
intentionally imperil human life, the marine environment, or property, during demonstrations, 
protests or confrontations on the high seas.”
667
  In an interview Dr. Brockington, the Secretary of 
the IWC, highlighted the “potential cost of human lives,” and noted that the potential for 
rammings to “cause very serious incidents” is one of the reasons as to why there is a high level 
of agreement for the condemnation of SSCS actions within the IWC.
668
 SSCS actions remain 
controversial, and it is apparent that the SSCS is conscious of the fine line that it walks, taking 
steps to counter claims which would challenge the legality of its actions. Maintaining an image 
of proportionality, while remaining aggressive, appears integral to SSCS strategy.  
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5.3.2.7 - SSCS and the Media 
 
The SSCS can be described as having moved beyond simply attracting media attention to 
capturing it and the organization also seems to have addressed the issue of movement-media 
asymmetry in a novel and innovative way. Unlike most INGO/TAG media attention, the 
principal target of SSCS messaging is governments rather than the public. Movement-media 
relations are generally seen as being characterized by asymmetry, whereby “[m]ovements are 
generally much more dependent on media than the reverse.”
669
 Movements need the media to 
help with, as Gamson notes, mobilization (recruiting and encouraging supporters),
670
 validation 
(lending credibility, legitimacy and significance to activists’ cause),
671
 and scope enlargement 
(generating sympathy for the activists’ cause amidst the broader public).
672
 The media is 
generally much less dependent on individual movements, in so far as other movements, events or 
causes can generate media coverage, and as a result activists are required to develop innovative 
ways of attracting media attention. Having secured media attention, additional challenges include 
sustaining this attention, and ensuring that the media conveys desirable frames.   
One of the ways in which activists can attract media attention is by changing their 
behavior to conform to mainstream news criteria, however by so doing, activists “run the risk 
that these criteria will distort their identity and goals.”
673 
In framing issues in a manner which is 
palatable to mainstream media, activists abandon the “broader structural and cultural sources of 
environmental problems” leaving them “unchallenged and implicitly reinforced.”
674  
Such an 
approach is problematic for an organization wishing to present a position which challenges 
dominant frames, as is the case with the SSCS. SSCS rhetoric on the whaling issue, and on 
environmental issues in general, is profoundly critical of the international structure and of the 
sources of environmental problems, levelling its blame on pervasive and systemic non-
compliance.  Re-framing its message to fit within dominant frames would sterilize this message 
considerably. 
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Another means by which activists have conventionally sought to attract media attention is 
through the creation of poignant image events –‘mind-bombs.’ Hammarstedt explained that 
rammings and collisions are necessarily dramatic and guarantee media exposure, noting that the 
high level of press censorship in Japan can be broken by ‘intense’ actions which the press must 
cover.
675
 However with these dramatic actions, activists run the risk of having their message 
being lost in the reporting and/or subjected to negative spin. Stories involving dramatic actions 
tend to focus on activists means rather than their ends.
676
 Stories involving confrontation also 
tend to be covered as crime stories. In other words “[r]evolutionaries… can achieve media 
standing only as deviants,”
677
 and radicals are portrayed as ‘illegitimate sideshows.’
678
 
The SSCS faces the challenge of attracting media attention while controlling spin, and 
appears to have accomplished this through the use of the television program Whale Wars. This 
highly-rated docu-drama program has aired for five seasons on the US cable station Animal 
Planet. Each episode serves as a 45-minute infomercial for SSCS, paid for and produced by the 
network, airing during a slow news season for the SSCS (the Boreal summer). Multi-episode 
story arcs tell stories in a way which could not be captured even by the most comprehensive of 
news story. In a sense one can see the SSCS use of Whale Wars as the infiltration of fringe ideas 
into the mainstream.
679
 The popular and mainstream-oriented docu-drama format serves as a 
carrier for a much less conventional message.    
SSCS’s actions attract news media coverage, but the organization can be confident of 
additional coverage months later, essentially ‘media capture’ on the part of the SSCS. The 
program is one of the network’s highest rated and garners considerable revenue for the network, 
which is strong motivation for Animal Planet to continue covering SSCS actions, and to do so in 
an at least somewhat favourable manner, in order to maintain a positive working relationship 
with the organization. The film crews are captive media, living on board SSCS vessels. This 
embeddedness further enhances the likeliness of positive coverage. Not having to worry about 
attracting the media and being relatively confident that its own framing will be conveyed, the 
SSCS does not need to moderate its methods or message. When asked the effect that the program 
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has had on SSCS operations, most long-serving crew members described it as minimal, noting 
that the program resulted in more inter-ship communication done by satellite phone rather than e-
mail, additional helicopter launches for aerial shots, the use of crew uniforms, and the occasional 
meeting of the three ships captains.
680
  
Whale Wars benefits the SSCS not only by disseminating awareness of the organization 
and by raising awareness for the whaling issue, it also assists in attracting additional financial 
support. In 2008, the tax year prior to the premier of Whale Wars, the SSCS received $3.4 
million in contributions, the following year contributions reached $9.4 million.
681
 As is common 
practice with reality television programs, the subjects receive some compensation. Hammarstedt 
noted that the SSCS receives a ‘location fee’ from Animal Planet, which ostensibly covers the 
cost to the SSCS of housing and feeding the television crew for the entire duration of the 
campaign (and see Appendix 8).
682
  
Crew members described how the program was beneficial to the SSCS in other ways. 
Hammarstedt noted that it “lets us reach segments of the populations that wouldn’t [otherwise] 
hear our message,” and that the program reaches people other than the readers of vegan and 
environmental magazines.
683
 Cornelissen quipped that “as soon as they know they are being 
documented, they are less likely to shoot at us,” highlighting how the presence of cameras, 
especially those of the ‘third party,’ provides a degree of security for activists.
684
 It is interesting 
to consider who the primary target of the SSCS message is. Hammarstedt elaborated that 
“dramatic footage guarantees media exposure and wakes governments up, especially Australia 
and New Zealand.”
685
 When Potts explained that SSCS actions “sets the general precedent that 
these issues can and should be dealt with as law enforcement, [SSCS action] sets an example of 
what governments should be doing,” the primary target of this message is governments.
686
 
Though Hammarstedt admitted that SSCS actions “do set an example which resonates with 
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people who then pressure their governments,” a more conventional form of advocacy, the SSCS 
could accomplish this without the appeal to the law. Legal framing and language appears to be 
principally targeted at states, bypassing the public and sending the message directly to states that 
“international law can’t be voluntary.”
687
 
The confrontational nature of SSCS actions naturally attract media attention, however 
SSCS RIBs are not decorated with anti-whaling slogans, and as has been indicated throughout 
this chapter, images produced by the SSCS are not necessarily designed as ideal ‘mind bombs.’ 
Observations suggest that the ultimate aim of SSCS actions, unlike those of Greenpeace for 
example, is not image events and media attention, but rather something more direct. 
Hammarstedt noted, in discussing Whale Wars and the media, that “in one way public opinion 
doesn’t matter, they [the Japanese] will have to quit.”
688
 Here what he is referring to is the fact 
that SSCS actions have a direct impact on Japanese whaling, and that they have this effect 
regardless of the amount and nature of the media coverage they receive. This indicates that the 
SSCS is engaging in a form of DA, and that image politics is secondary to the campaign 
objectives of stopping Japanese whaling.  
Throughout the campaign, actions were launched with the aim of achieving direct results 
over images. A salient example is the January 20
th
 action to attach a tracking device to the Sun 
Laurel, an operation conducted entirely under the cover of darkness.
689
 The goal of numerous 
actions, as emphasized in crew briefings, was the accomplishment of direct objectives – in this 
instance, to delay the tailing harpoon vessel. The February 4
th
 actions which resulted in the 
disabling of the YM#3 provides another example of this practice. Prior to the action, the SSCS 
negotiated with the film crew to have fewer camera people onboard the RIBs in order to make 
room for additional activists and to thereby increase the effective deployment of prop-foulers.
690
 
As one crew member noted, “what’s the point of lots of pictures of a failed actions versus a 
successful one?” Clearly images were not the priority.
691
  Press coverage was not always seen as 
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a boon to SSCS actions. Cornelissen noted that while the media is important, it draws attention to 




5.3.3 - Leverage Politics 
 
The SSCS certainly uses leverage politics, but its use of leverage differs considerably 
from conventional use of leverage by INGOs/TAGs. SSCS actions are adept at exerting direct 
material leverage upon Japanese whalers. The SSCS’s efforts to physically stop whaling, rather 
than indirectly through attracting media attention or the indirect material leverage of a boycott, 
are a clear indication that the organization is engaged in DA. The SSCS did not emphasize the 
moral reasons in support of its actions, but goes to lengths to orchestrate its operations in order 
that they exert a form of legal leverage on states. 
 
5.3.3.1 - Direct Impacts of SSCS Actions on Japanese Whaling 
 
 The SSCS has declared that its goal is to stop Japanese whaling in the SOWS, thus one 
can evaluate the effectiveness of SSCS actions in achieving this goal by examining the impact 
they have had on Japanese whaling.  The SSCS measures success quantitatively, and compares 
Japanese quotas with actual catches to arrive at the number of whales saved.  
Table 1, generated from data provided in JARPA Annual Cruise Reports, shows that 
from 1987 until 2005/06, the seasons prior to SSCS involvement, Japanese whalers consistently 
filled their quotas, taking between 90-110% of the yearly catch allowed under scientific 
permits.
693
 Notably, this was during a time when major ENGOs such as WWF and Greenpeace 
waged an intense media campaign against whaling, and at times had vessels present in the 
Southern Ocean. From this information we can build a counterfactual, using years prior to SSCS 
intervention as baselines. It can be assumed that, barring any external factors, the ICR would 
continue to reach its quotas, +/- 10%, were it not for SSCS intervention. The only year in which 
an external factor did appear to influence Japanese whaling was in 2006/2007 when a fire, 
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unrelated to SSCS activity, forced the Nisshin Maru to delay whaling operations. Delays due to 
another fire in 1998/1999 appear to have had minimal impact on reaching that season’s quota. 
Following the launch of the SSCS’s enforcement campaign, Japanese whaling has been 
sharply reduced. The ICR documents the number of days that its operations were ‘interrupted’ by 
“violent actions by anti-whaling groups”, and as a direct result has been required to cancel 
sampling surveys.
694
 The ICR reports that as a result of SSCS actions it has often been required 
to designate one of its vessels “dedicated to the security task for long time, which resulted 
limited research activity.”
695
 The ICR has also blamed “the continued illegal attacks and 
sabotage” by the SSCS for ending its seasons early in 2011, 2012 and 2013.
696
  
In terms of directly reducing whale harvests, SSCS actions appear to be very effective. 
The SSCS reports on these numbers, and even sells t-shirts sporting the number of whales it 
purports to have saved. Cornelissen notes that such reporting serves to demoralize the whalers.
697
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Table 1: Impact of Activists on JARPA Hunt 
Season 
Quota  
(+/- 10% allowance) 











Duration Fin Minke Total Fin Minke Total 
1987/1988 0 300 300 0 273 273 91.0% 0 0/70 
1988/1989 0 300 300 0 241 241 80.3% 1-GP 10/79 
1989/1990 0 300 300 0 330 330 110.0% 0 0/97 
1990/1991 0 300 300 0 327 327 109.0% 1-GP 700-/94 
1991/1992 0 300 300 0 288 288 96.0% 1-GP 56/112 
1992/1993 0 300 300 0 327 327 109.0% 1-GP -/113 
1993/1994 0 300 300 0 330 330 110.0% 0 0/107 
1994/1995 0 300 300 0 330 330 110.0% 1-GP 17/109 
1995/1996 0 400 400 0 440 440 110.0% 0 0/118 
1996/1997 0 400 400 0 440 440 110.0% 0 0/103 
1997/1998 0 400 400 0 438 438 109.5% 0 0/98 
1998/1999
701 0 400 400 0 389 389 97.3% 0 0/78 
1999/2000 0 400 400 0 439 439 109.8% 1-GP 27/97 
2000/2001 0 400 400 0 440 440 110.0% 0 0/100 
2001/2002 0 400 400 0 440 440 110.0% 0 0/101 
2002/2003 0 400 400 0 440 440 110.0% 1-SS 0/97 
2003/2004 0 400 400 0 440 440 110.0% 0 0/95 
2004/2005 0 400 400 0 440 440 110.0% 0 0/92 
2005/2006 10 850 860 10 853 863 100.3% 1-SS,1-GP 9/108 
2006/2007
702
   10 850 860 3 505 508 59.1% 2-SS, 1-GP 3/76 
2007/2008
703 50 850 900 0 551 551 61.2% 1-SS, 1-GP 70431/101 
2008/2009 50 850 900 1 679 680 75.6% 1-SS 16/103 
2009/2010 50 850 900 1 506 507 56.3% 3-SS 31/97 
2010/2011 50 705850 900 2 170 172 19.1% 3-SS 21/52 
2011/2012 50 850 900 1 266 267 29.7% 3-SS 15/66 
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In addition to saving whales, crew members emphasized that one of the primary goals of 
actions was to “make poachers pay” – to take away the financial motivations for exploiting 
marine life.
706
 The idea is that SSCS actions increase the costs to whalers so that eventually they 
will be forced to abandon their project. Crew members speculated about the economic impacts of 
SSCS actions, and worked out rough calculations to determine how much they were costing the 
whalers.
707
 The actual numbers support these speculations. Reduced harvests have led to reduced 
revenue from sales of whale meat, with a number of sources reporting that the ICR has been 
operating in the red. The financial viability of the whaling industry in Japan was already in 
question prior to the moratorium. Tinch and Phang calculate that since 1988, the sales of whale 
by-products has experienced a loss of an estimated $223 million.
708
 The ICR sells whale meat to 
fund its operating costs which are estimated at $65-$76 million annually.
709 
The sale of whale 
meat is unable to cover all expenses, and as a result, the Japanese government supports the ICR 
with $5.4-$9.7 million annually, with the whaling program having received over ¥30 billion 
($320 million).
710
 In addition to lost revenue, SSCS actions have also caused damage to vessels 
(no precise amounts have been reported to date, see below), and have forced Kyodo to increase 
security on its vessels: installing defensive netting, water cannons, anti-boarding spikes, at times 
assigning Japanese Coast Guard officers to vessels and to the designation of one of the three 
harpoon vessels as a security vessel.
711
 In 2011 the ICR received an injection of  roughly $30 
million, reportedly from tsunami relief funds. Greenpeace reports that 20% of this subsidy went 
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to security, specifically to chartering the Shonan Maru #2 (SM#2) to serve as the fleet’s 
designated security vessel.
712
   
Cornelissen noted that damage caused by SSCS activity does not constitute criminal 
damage – that is, damage to property – but rather lost profits.
713
 This is consistent with the 
SSCS’s emphasis on the proportionality and legality of its actions. Andrea Gordon, the ship’s 
manager, and Cornelissen noted that the costs of repairs which result from a collision (and other 
forms of property damage) are insignificant compared to lost profits.
714
 Also of note is the 
relative lack of importance attributed to tactics involving throwing projectiles (butyric acid, 
cellulose powder, ‘Mick Jaggers’). It was noted by a crew member that these tactics largely 
served the purpose of keeping ‘movement types’ happy.
715
 Notably it was the SSCS’s overall 
approach that was seen as effective.
716
 The SSCS’s emphasis on direct leverage supports its 
claims that the organization is engaging in a form of DA. 
 
5.3.3.2 - Red Tape and Leverage 
 
The SSCS does not appear to rely on moral leverage – the ‘mobilization of shame’ – 
which is often seen as the mainstay of INGOs/TAGs. This is not to say that leverage is not an 
important component of the SSCS strategy. It seems instead to rely on a type of legal leverage. 
The SSCS uses international law as a means of both protecting itself from prosecution by the 
authorities, and of exerting pressure on states to intervene. It could be relatively easy for states, 
such as Australia, to intervene against the SSCS and thus frustrate the organization’s ability to 
operate. Yet Australia continues to allow the SSCS access to its ports and has ignored Japanese 
pleas to apprehend and prosecute SSCS crewmembers operating in Australian territory.
717
 Both 
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Moffa and Roeschke suggest that this tolerance can be attributed to the fact that the SSCS, by 
giving force to environmental laws, provides a public benefit.
718
 This alone however does not 
seem sufficient to explain the protection the SSCS seems to enjoy. 
The SSCS appears to be proactive in this respect and protects itself by enveloping its 
campaigns, vessels, and actions, in a complicated web of international law. This web, in turn, 
serves to dissuade states from targeting the SSCS, because doing so would open a can of 
‘international legal’ worms. Thus law seems to be the mechanism upon which the SSCS relies in 
order to protect itself while carrying out aggressive actions on the high seas. This is evident in 
several actions taken by the SSCS. As previously noted, the SSCS claims a mandate from the 
WCN, uses legal language and claims to enforce international law. The organization operates on 
the high seas, and in contested waters within the AAT-EEZ. Cornelissen noted that in Antarctica 
the SSCS can “get away with so much more because it’s in international waters.”
719
 The 
interdiction of a vessel on the high seas by another vessel is a very complicated matter. For a 
Japanese (or other) vessel to interdict, board, and seize a vessel registered in another nation 
would invariably raise complicated legal questions. It is the case that  
[t]he Southern Ocean is part of the ‘High Seas’ which are those waters that lie 
beyond the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of any state. The state of 
nationality of a ship (the flag state) has exclusive jurisdiction over the ship when it 




As a result, just as no state has the power to seize or arrest Japanese whalers, similarly states do 
not have the jurisdiction to intervene against SSCS vessels.
721
 Issues of jurisdiction are further 
complicated within the AAT-EEZ. Only a handful of states actually recognize Australia’s claims 
in Antarctica, and as previously indicated, Australia is reticent to enforce any of its national laws 
within the EEZ of its Antarctic claims for fear of upsetting the ATS.
722
 Japan is severely limited 
with respect to taking DA against the SSCS, in so far as the ATS establishes that Antarctica be 
“used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international 
discord” and further that military personnel and equipment are only permitted if they are engaged 
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in the support of peaceful research, and only after notice is given to other contracting states.
723
 
Ultimately as Hoek and others note, “confusing and overlapping international laws allow Sea 
Shepherd to continue their pursuits virtually unpunished.”
724
  
In addition to the legal vagaries of the theatre in which it operates, the SSCS also takes 
steps to avoid jurisdictional controls.
725
 The SSCS avoids engaging in confrontational actions 
within the maritime jurisdictions of states. Cornelissen noted that the SSCS has been forced to 
change its approach when operating within the jurisdictions of states, and provided examples 
such as the SSCS operations in the Faroe Islands, where during the previous year, Hammarstedt 
had gone undercover to document the islands’ pilot whale hunt.
726
 Crew members explained that 
the Faroe Island and Canadian seal hunt campaigns, both of which occurred within the national 
jurisdictions of their respective states, had been difficult because they were ‘protest actions,’ 
implying that the Antarctic anti-whaling campaign was not.
727
 The AAT-EEZ represents an 
exception given the previously discussed challenges faced by Australia with respect to 
enforcement in these waters.  The use of proportionality in tactics also serves the purpose of 
helping the SSCS remain a gray area phenomenon, and therefore confusing potential legal 
attacks against it. Violations of SUA or the IRPCS do not invoke universal jurisdiction, however 
piracy does, and the SSCS is careful to avoid acts of piracy or acts which could be construed as 
piracy.
728
 For example during boardings, the SSCS is careful to protect its crew members from 
accusations of piracy by equipping them with documents for delivery (see International 
Incidents, Chapter 5.3.3.3, below). 
The SSCS further protects itself by operating its vessels with multinational crews. During 
the 2010-2011 Antarctic campaign, 23 nationalities (including dual citizenships) were 
represented amongst the crews of the three SSCS ships.
729
 This dissuades interference on the part 
of targets or target governments, because “it maximises the number of states which might be 
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willing and able to take action... on behalf of their nationals against such interference.”
730
 The 
selection of multinational crews for vessels and for operations involving small boats and 
boardings is intentional. Hammarstedt noted that it was particularly useful to have Australian and 
New Zealand citizens on board “as these are the countries we have to reach.”
731
 Cornelissen 
noted that the use of multi-national crews is also highly symbolic, demonstrating widespread 
disapproval of whaling.
732
 Cornelissen also noted that the SSCS may select the nationality of its 
top officers in such a way as to put pressure on certain states. He explained that when the SSCS 
sent the Dutch-registered Farley Mowat to eastern Canada for the anti-sealing campaign, 
Cornelissen (Dutch) and Hammarstedt (US/Swedish) were selected as officers, rather than 
Watson (Canadian). This had the effect of putting pressure on European states in addition to 
Canada, and to protect the officers in the event of arrest. When the ship was seized by the 
RCMP, Cornelissen and Hammarstedt were eventually deported and barred from entering 
Canada, a much less serious fate than would have befallen Watson.  
The SSCS is also strategic concerning where it registers and flags its vessels. It has 
purposefully selected Dutch registration for its two large vessels, the Steve Irwin and the Bob 
Barker in so far as Dutch registration is notoriously difficult to revoke.
733
 Vons notes that the 
Netherlands is a signatory to all the major international conservation conventions which the 
SSCS claims to enforce, as well as all international human rights conventions, has strong 
domestic freedom of speech legislation, and no legislation permitting the de-flagging of Dutch 
vessels.
734
 SSCS vessels are also registered as ‘motor yachts’ rather than commercial vessels, 
which would require that the SSCS adhere to more regulations and become more problematic in 
the event of a collision.
735
 The SSCS has used other registrations in the past; Vons noted that 




The SSCS also flags its vessels with the intention of putting pressure on states. The SSCS 
flagged its smaller ‘interceptor’ vessels with an aim of drawing regional actors into the issue, the 
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Gojira was flagged in Australia, and the ill-fated Ady Gil was flagged in New Zealand (see 
example below).
737
 While flagging its smaller interceptor vessels in this way allows the SSCS to 
exert additional leverage on target states, it also exposes these vessels to additional scrutiny, and 
potential prosecution, by flag states. Hammarstedt explained that the first country in which a 
vessel docks is responsible for handling any legal claims against that vessel, and therefore it is 
important to select the right country.
738
As a result, at the end of the campaign the SSCS arranged 
for the Australian-registered Gojira to terminate its voyage in Tahiti rather than Australia with 
the rest of the Dutch-registered fleet.
739
 
These calculated manoeuvres indicate that the SSCS takes full advantage of legal means 
in order to exert leverage on states. This approach can be described as a ‘red tape defensive 
strategy’ whereby complicated layers of legal issues protect the SSCS from state prosecution, in 
so far as states prefer to avoid causing complicated international legal incidents. This legal 
complexity also serves to exert leverage upon states to act. Given the nature of SSCS operations, 
incidents are inevitable, and when they do occur, given the legal embroilments, states are often 
obliged to act.  
 
5.3.3.3 - International Incidents 
 
An international incident has the effect of implicating a number of states and ultimately 
of leveraging one state’s power against another. As Burbach notes, an incident creates a ‘crisis 
point’ that forces the issue of whaling onto the agenda.
740
 Regarding international incidents, 
Hammarstedt noted that one can “use these to politicize an issue, to make an environmental issue 
into a political issue.”
741
 It forces states to alter their default position on any issue (having no 
policy or position on that issue), into being forced to take a position. Incidents invariably involve 
matters of high politics – questions of sovereignty, international law, and the safety of nationals 
abroad – which serve as a means of raising the matter of whaling (or other environmental issues) 
from a secondary issue, to a matter of high politics, and thus increasing the likelihood of state 
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action, yet another reason why states tend to want to avoid them. The point made by Jabour and 
Iliff and Burbach, is that not only does the SSCS benefit from incidents when they occur, but that 
it will occasionally go about purposefully orchestrating them, and by doing so, be able to exert 




From examining existing SSCS literature, and from previous operations, it is clear that 
SSCS actions do trigger international incidents, but it is unclear as to whether they set about 
intentionally doing so, and the extent to which the SSCS can control outcomes once incidents 
occur.  During ‘Operation No Compromise’ no boardings were attempted, however officers and 
crew members did discuss the possibility.
743
An examination of actions from other anti-whaling 
operations reveals three particular incidents which stand out as exemplary of the ‘international 




In January 2008, two crew members of the SSCS vessel Steve Irwin boarded the YM#2 in 
the Southern Ocean.
744
 The SSCS purposefully selected Australian (Potts) and UK (Lane) 
citizens for the boarding party and took the legal precaution of equipping them with letters of 
intent, as a means of pre-empting claims of piracy.
745 
Leading up to and during the boarding, 
Watson and crew members made constant reference to the creation of international incidents on 
the program Whale Wars; the episode documenting the boarding was called ‘International 
Incidents R Us.’
746
 Potts notes that the target of the action was primarily the Australian 
government, and that “because of the situation, they were forced into action,” and required to 
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send a vessel to the area.
747
 He suggested that the message the boarding would send was “we just 
boarded a ship, so why can’t you?”
748
  
The boarders were detained and the SSCS immediately accused the Japanese of 
kidnapping.
749
 What ensued was a complicated diplomatic incident involving the Australian, 
British and Japanese governments to negotiate the release of the British and Australian citizens 
involved. Cornelissen noted, “governments are sometimes unwilling to act, so having an 
Australian board a Japanese ship forces Australia to act to get them off, which creates media 
attention.”
750
 In addition to drawing international attention to the continued and controversial 
Japanese whaling program in the area, the incident forced the states of the nationals and of the 
vessels involved to negotiate the tangential issue of the return of detained nationals, one which 
involved international laws unrelated to the question of whaling, but extremely important with 
respect to questions of state sovereignty.  
 
Bethune and Ady Gil Incident 
 
The New Zealand-registered Ady Gil was an SSCS trimaran which was used during the 
2009-2010 campaign. In January 2010 during an engagement with the SM#2, the Ady Gil was 
struck and cut in half. The damaged vessel was later scuttled by the SSCS. Subsequently, the 
captain of the Ady Gil (Pete Bethune, a New Zealand national) was detained by the Japanese 
when he boarded the SM#2, in an attempt to make a citizen’s arrest of the whaling vessel’s 
captain. Bethune was returned to Japan where he was charged with several minor offences and 
given a two year suspended sentence.
751
 Ryan notes that what is of interest is what “Bethune was 
not charged with,” specifically piracy or terrorism offences.
752
 Again the SSCS attempted to 
protect their boarder by providing him with legal cover, in this case the citizen’s arrest. Ryan 
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notes that such a move was legally problematic.
753
 Several countries were involved as a result of 
the incident, including New Zealand, Australia (within whose EEZ the incident occurred), and 
Japan. With regards to the initial collision, lengthy investigations initiated by the New Zealand 
and Australian governments found that both parties were at fault, and no further actions were 
taken.
754
   
 
Forest Rescue Boarding 
 
In addition to these two prominent examples, a further boarding was executed by three 
members of Forest Rescue Australia, a land-based radical environmental group which campaigns 
on forestry issues in Western Australia.
755
 The SSCS assisted the activists with the boarding, by 
allowing them to use the Steve Irwin as a staging platform and through the use of SSCS RIBs. 
Three Australian citizens boarded the SM#2 (a designated security vessels the whaling fleet has 
employed during various seasons), on January 8, 2012, claiming to be at 32°57’48”S, 115° 
20’24”E, which would have put the location of the Japanese vessel at 16.2 nautical miles off the 
coast of Western Australia. This placed the Japanese vessel within the EEZ of continental 
Australia, and not in the contested EEZ of the AAT. The SSCS and the activists describe the goal 
of the action as “illustrate[ing] the lack of action by the government to end illegal whaling in the 
Southern Ocean and to attempt to slow down the Shonan Maru #2 to allow  the Steve Irwin to 
escape the tail,”
756
 to “[f]ocus international public attention on Japan's continued illegal whaling 
operations and the lack of action by the Gillard government….[and to e]mbarrass the Japanese 
security vessel by breaching their security thereby causing them to lose face.”
757
 The action was 
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unsuccessful in delaying the security vessel, and the boarders were detained.
758
 The activists 
were transferred to an Australian customs vessel without any charges laid, on January 12, 
2012.
759
 Newspaper articles claimed that the release of the activists without a charge avoided a 
‘diplomatic row.’
760
 The use of activists from another organization appears to be a move on the 
part of the SSCS to provide distance between itself and the boarding (to avoid a repeat of the 
Bethune incident), and to place additional pressure on the Australian government to intervene 
against Japanese whaling operations and enforce its own laws, in so far as the activists 
represented an Australian-based NGO. 
 
The afore mentioned actions indicate a chronology of SSCS and Japanese learning with 
respect to boardings in particular, and demonstrate both the power of boardings and the risks. 
The Potts-Lane Incident was certainly experimental: the SSCS had no way of knowing how the 
Japanese would react, and appears to have caught both the Japanese and Australian governments 
off guard. The strength of boardings is that they produce dramatic media events, attracting 
considerable press. The Potts-Lane Incident arguably played an important role in making 
whaling a national issue in Australia.
761
 Such incidents also tend to level acute pressure to bear 
on states. Citizens are detained and subsequently the negotiations must take place are 
consequences consistent with each of the incidents. These incidents appear as win-win scenarios 
for the SSCS because even in the worst case scenario, where activists are detained and 
subsequently charged, the attention of states and the public is dramatically shifted to the whaling 
issue. But such outcomes are far from ideal. Comparing the final outcomes of each of the 
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incidents provides evidence that outcomes are highly unpredictable, and once triggered, that the 
SSCS has little control over the outcome.  
A lack of control of outcomes is further evidenced by an examination of the Ady Gil 
Incident. The incident shone the world spotlight on the whaling issue, but the significance of the 
issue depended largely on the morally superior position granted the SSCS as a result of the 
sinking of the Ady Gil. There was sufficient reason for people to believe that the SSCS did not 
intentionally ram a 747 ton steel ice-reinforced harpoon vessel with a 13 ton Kevlar-coated 
fibreglass trimaran. While the SSCS benefited from positive press attention, it did not orchestrate 
the event. Enticing targets into disproportionate responses is consistent with conventional 
INGO/TAG strategies, but is a dangerous prospect on the high seas.
762
 If the SSCS were to 
pursue international incidents in this manner, their actions could appear reckless and this would 
arguably counter any benefits that could conceivably be gained from such an incident.  
Furthermore, such strategies rely on activists presenting themselves as innocents; making such a 
claim is difficult given the aggressive nature of SSCS actions. 
It appears that basing a strategy exclusively on the triggering of international incidents 
would be haphazard at best. The use of boardings by the SSCS appears opportunistic, rather than 
central to its strategy. Incidents are inevitable given the confrontational nature of SSCS actions, 
but the SSCS rarely goes about triggering them purposefully. It seems that is not the incidents 
themselves that serve to power the SSCS strategy, but rather the broader power that incidents 
bring to bear on states, as a form of legal leverage. These incidents exemplify an additional 
component of SSCS actions; that they do not call on states to take action, but rather attempt to 
force states into action. 
 
5.3.3.4 - Influence on States 
 
 The SSCS is ultimately trying force Japan to stop whaling, with its actions directly 
targeting Japanese vessels, but the SSCS also successfully brings the power of other states to 
bear against Japan. This is particularly the case with Australia. There is evidence that SSCS 
actions also served to draw the Chilean government to leverage both Australia and Japan. SSCS 
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actions, not only boardings, but all aspects of SSCS actions, place considerable pressure upon 
governments to act. Requests of an INGO/TAG for a government to intervene in an issue are 
easily and often ignored by states. While SSCS press releases may beseech the Australian 
government to intervene, the power of SSCS is that these requests are supported with actions that 




The SSCS fleet operates out of Hobart, Tasmania and within the AAT-EEZ for a 
considerable portion its campaigns. The Australian government could easily frustrate the SSCS’s 
ability to operate, and has at times done so; however these efforts were largely symbolic. The 
Australian government appears to be simply ‘going through the motions’ in order to placate 
requests from Japan while not upsetting Australian voters, who are generally anti-whaling and 
supportive of SSCS actions. The only recorded incidents of Australian interference were 1) prior 
to the campaign when Hammarstedt and Watson had difficulty getting visas, although they 
eventually did receive visas.
763
 2) When the AFP searched the vessel at the conclusion of the 
campaign. With the investigation appearing to have been conducted solely to placate Japanese 
requests. The searched warrant for the Steve Irwin and Bob Barker contains a detailed 
documentation of SSCS actions against Japanese vessels. Given the level of detail and phrasing 
this list was most likely provided by the Japanese government.
764
 The investigation, and similar 
investigations during previous seasons, failed to reach any conclusions.  
3) The Australian government has on occasion surveilled SSCS-ICR interactions. On 
January 10, the Bob Barker was over-flown by an aircraft (most likely an Orion) without 
markings. The plane was hailed. Its origins were unverifiable due to garbled communications, 
however the pilot spoke English and when requested, declined to provide information concerning 
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the whereabouts of the Japanese factory ship.
765
 The New Zealand commissioner noted that the 
plane was not one of theirs, and speculated that it was likely Australian in so far as it had not 
followed New Zealand protocols.
766
 The over-flight of the Bob Barker (and the Steve Irwin) did 
not represent the only time that the Australian government was forced to send assets to the 
Southern Ocean as a result of SSCS operations. In 2008 the Australian government sent the 
Oceanic Viking to the Southern Ocean to monitor the whaling fleet and to “collect evidence for 
potential legal action.”
767
 This customs vessel was ultimately used to transfer Potts and Lane 
from the YM#2 to the Steve Irwin. In 2012, the Australian government was forced to send the 
Oceanic Protector to recover the Forest Rescue activists, at considerable tax payer expense, 
insisted Prime Minister Julia Gillard.
768
  
In addition to forcing the Australian government to send assets into the Southern Ocean, 
SSCS actions have also forced the Australian government to take a position on whaling. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, until 2007 the position of the Australian government was to 
not enforce the EPBC against foreign nationals. This position was logical, in so far as it avoided 
potentially upsetting the ATS, and thus antagonising Japan, one of Australia’s largest trading 
partners.
769
 However, after 2007, the Australian government took an increasingly firm position, 
culminating in its taking Japan before the ICJ.  As discussed, the HSI case cannot fully explain 
the government’s dramatic increase in interest in whaling and adoption of a proactive policy. Nor 
can the government’s sudden action be solely attributed to an increased public awareness and 
interest in whaling due to the attention the issue received as a result of SSCS actions, although 
this likely contributed to whaling becoming an election issue in 2007. Election promises could be 
easily fulfilled by a token gesture, such as the short-lived ‘whale envoy’ to Japan.
770
  
SSCS actions appear to have brought both direct and indirect pressure to bear on the 
Australian government. Media attention of SSCS actions clearly stirred up public sentiment 
against whaling, and did so for a sustained period of time, gradually influencing Australian 
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politics until whaling became an election issue.  SSCS actions also seem to have exerted direct 
pressure on the Australian government. In acting to enforce Australian and international law in 
Australian waters, the SSCS demonstrated a fundamental failure on the part of the Australian 
government, notably the failure of the Australian government to enforce its own laws and to 
uphold its sovereignty within its territory. When Watson criticizes the Australian government as 
being “submissively loyal to the demands of the Japanese government”, he is speaking the 
language of sovereignty and he is speaking directly to government.
771
 The Australian 
government cannot afford to ignore this message when it is backed up with confrontational and 
aggressive actions in its own waters. It is this kind of legal leverage, which is both persistent and 




 During ‘Operation No Compromise’ the SSCS was also able to use the Chilean 
government to leverage Japan and indirectly to influence Australia, though in this case the type 
of leverage was much more conventional.   In an attempt to evade the Bob Barker, the Nisshin 
Maru approached Chilean waters mid-February 2011. The SSCS informed the Chilean 
authorities of the approaching factory ship via an update on their Facebook page and through 
informal contacts.
772
 In response, Senator Juan Pablo Letelier condemned the actions of the 
whalers, and called on authorities to prevent entry and to enforce the law.
773
 Chile quickly 
responded to this challenge to its sovereignty, and the Chilean Navy announced that it was 
monitoring the vessel (through communication with the SSCS), and that it was mobilizing a 
naval vessel to intercept and detain the factory ship should it enter its EEZ.
774
 The government of 
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Chile was in fact monitoring the whaling vessels through the SSCS. Cornelissen was in direct 
conversation with officials in the Chilean Navy, and provided them with hourly updates on the 
position of the factory ship.
775
 Just prior to entering the water of Chile’s Antarctic claim (but not 
its EEZ), the YM#3 disengaged.
776
  The Nisshin Maru maintained an easterly course, until the 
morning of February 18, 2011, when it abruptly altered its course, turning north, within a 
nautical mile of the EEZ of Chile’s Antarctic claim.
777
 The Japanese were unwilling to risk the 
political and material consequences of an adverse Chilean reaction if they entered Chile’s 
continental EEZ.  
Cornelissen described the role that the SSCS played as a case of simple monitoring, 
stating that the SSCS was “relaying information on the whereabouts of a possible illegal entry 
into Chilean waters.”
778
 While the SSCS had no control over the direction of the whaling ship, it 
was responsible for it fleeing beyond its designated whaling grounds and into this political mine 
field. Without the SSCS, the Japanese would have had no reason to be in that part of the world, 
or of risking interdiction by the Chilean navy. The SSCS was able to frame Chile’s intervention 
in order to put further pressure on the Australian government. As Burke noted, Chile has made 
Australia appear even worse, because after years, they’ve done nothing comparable.
779
 This type 
of leverage against Australia involves shame, not of the moral kind, but rather the SSCS appears 
to be leveraging a type of legal shame. 
 
5.3.4 - Accountability Politics. 
 
The conventional image of INGO/TAG accountability politics is one of observation and 
of documentation. Accountability politics generally entails monitoring, which involves activists 
gathering information and documenting instances of non-compliance with treaties and 
agreements. This information is then disseminated through various means, serving to shame non-
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compliers by bringing their non-compliance to light, or by leveraging other actors to intervene. 
The SSCS takes monitoring a step further, attempting to enforce laws through confrontational 
action.  The organization also appears to take into consideration its ability to effectively enforce 
existing laws and agreements when it selects the issues upon which it campaigns.   
 
5.3.4.1 - From Monitoring to Enforcing 
 
The SSCS goes to considerable lengths to present itself as a law enforcement 
organization through the use of legal justifications, language, imagery, practices and 
proportionality in its actions. The organization also attempts to exert legal leverage on states.  
Clearly an important component of SSCS strategy is action itself. The action not only 
produces direct results (disrupting or halting illegal and environmentally harmful activity), but it 
also acts as a powerful focal point, exerting legal leverage on states. Hammarstedt summarized 
SSCS goals, stating that one of the principal goals is to “inspire world governments to uphold 
international conservation law,” and with an operational goal to “get Japan to leave the Antarctic 
Whale Sanctuary.”
780
 Vons highlighted the importance of action in sending this message, 
positing that “If a state signs a law and then doesn’t follow it, it doesn’t matter until a group 
comes along and says ‘Hey! You signed this,’ [which] puts them in a bind.”
781
 The SSCS is 
sending the message, to states, that international laws can and should be enforced, by enforcing 
these laws themselves. In so doing, the SSCS neutralizes any arguments which suggest that 
enforcement is impossible or impractical.  
 Given the centrality of law enforcement to SSCS actions, officers and crew members 
were asked whether the SSCS would still be acting against the Japanese in absence of the IWC 
Moratorium. They consistently replied that the SSCS would still be in the Southern Ocean, and 
rather than providing moral or ecological arguments, cited additional international legal 
violations on the part of the Japanese.
782
 The law enforcement frame remains central. 
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 Moving beyond monitoring to the actual enforcement of laws was presented as a logical 
step, and the only remaining viable option for effectively saving whales after other methods had 
been exhausted, but was also presented as an effective strategy given the political opportunity 
structure. Hammarstedt argued that “we have the public on our side, where do you go from 
there? Governments are already putting pressure on Japan to stop, it’s already illegal in more 




5.3.4.2 - Issue Selection 
 
 The SSCS’s focus on achieving direct results and using its ‘enforcement’ frame is also 
evident in the organization’s issue selection. When asked about issue selection, crew members 
provided the following replies: 
Hammarstedt: whaling selected due to “personal [organizational] history, flagship 
species (we already have the public on our side), as well as the right laws in place, 





Potts: selecting issues “that are winnable, because of public opinion or 









Mike: “whaling is not as big as climate change, but it is symbolic, to show people 




Hammarstedt’s reference to the organization’s history does pointedly explain why the SSCS 
campaigns on whaling, but his statement also suggests other components of SSCS issue selection 
echoed in the statements of the other crew members.  Issues are selected partially based on 
‘winnability’ and the ability to achieve tangible (direct) results (Potts and Amanda). While one 
would expect an organization to select winnable issues, this is not necessarily always the case, 
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sometimes issues are symbolic of a larger issue. For many, in the early anti-whaling campaign, 
whales were seen as a beachhead, such that if we could not protect whales all other 
environmental efforts were in vain. The SSCS is not merely trying to ‘make a statement,’ it is 
trying to achieve something concrete, which supports the classification of SSCS strategy as a 
form of DA. Mike’s statement initially appears to suggest the opposite, however he notes that 
whaling is not a symbol for the environment in general, but rather a symbol that the people can 
intervene, and engage in DA, and by so doing achieve results.  
A central component to SSCS issue selection is the existence of pre-existing legal frames 
upon which to base its enforcement claims (Hammarstedt and Potts). Having a ‘legal foot to 
stand on’ appears important in providing the organization with a license to engage in 
confrontational actions, with ‘international legal red tape’ serving to shield the organization from 
prosecution. Hammarstedt explained that “upholding international law gives us more flexibility, 
we couldn’t target people who engaged in legal or commercial killing.”
788
 The SSCS’s choice to 
campaign on whaling is undoubtedly predicated upon its historical focus on this issue, however, 
as previously explored, whaling persists in several locations around the globe. The SSCS’s focus 
specifically on Antarctic whaling suggests that these other factors may have been significant in 
influencing the organization to focus upon Antarctic whaling. The examination of the SSCS’s 
bluefin tuna campaign will better serve to isolate strategic concerns which influence SSCS issue 
selection. 
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CHAPTER 6 – UNCONVENTIONAL STRATEGIES IN IR – DIRECT ACTION 
6.1 - Unravelling the SSCS Puzzle 
 
In seeking to explain SSCS strategy, a first step is to examine existing theory. While there 
are aspects of conventional INGO/TAG strategy in the actions of the SSCS, it is clear that these 
are not the primary objectives of the SSCS. Two major themes emerge from observations of the 
SSCS’s anti-whaling operations. Firstly, that the organization makes efforts to achieve direct 
outcomes, and secondly that there is a pervasive reference to international law in virtually every 
aspect of SSCS operations.  
The first of these themes points to the strategy of direct action (DA). DA is best 
understood in the domestic context, and is at the fringe of the INGO/TAG literature. The overall 
approach of DA – one of seeking to bring about direct change – seems to explain many of the 
SSCS’s actions. This chapter will explore DA, positioning the SSCS’s use of DA within the 
existing literature on this strategy. Explaining SSCS strategy as DA, carried out in the 
international arena solves only a portion of the puzzle. Several SSCS actions and their effects 
cannot be fully explained using the framework of DA. Components of SSCS strategy relating to 
the second identified theme, such as the SSCS’s extensive efforts to portray itself as an 
international law enforcement and anti-poaching organization, and the type of persistent leverage 
it exerts on states through its international law enforcement claims, and the acute pressure 
leverages on states as a result of international incidents, suggest that SSCS strategy relies on 
additional mechanisms. An examination of the SSCS’s use of DA, in light of these other 
components indicates that the organization engages in the direct enforcement of international 





6.2 - Direct Action 
6.2.1 - DA in the IR Literature 
 
Despite an extensive literature on INGOs and TAGs, very little attention has been paid to 
the use of DA in IR. The coverage which DA receives often fails to understand and to accurately 
classify this strategy. DA is also often seen as being almost exclusively part of domestic 
repertoires.
789
 The TAG repertoires described by Keck and Sikkink constitute indirect forms of 
action. Information and symbolic politics rely on the release of information and framing in order 
to shape public perception. Leverage politics seeks the intervention of more powerful actors. 
Economic forms of leverage, such as boycotts or divestment still rely upon NGOs and TAGs 
convincing the public to boycott a company or product, or to divest. Insider strategies remain 
indirect, because regardless of how involved an NGO/TAG is within an institution, it must 
convince other actors within that institution (through lobbying, information politics etc.) to enact 
policies and to engender agreements. Monitoring and accountability politics rely on ‘naming and 
shaming’ and upon other indirect means of compelling compliance. These strategies all involve 
varying degrees of “persuasion, socialization, and pressure.”
790 
Actions which seek to achieve 
direct outcomes – DA – are conspicuously absent from the literature.   
DA has received the most attention from IR scholars as a result of its use by ‘direct action 
networks’ to disrupt the meetings of international institutions.
791
 As a consequence of these 
actions, IOs have made an effort, in recent years, to conduct their meetings in hard-to-reach 
locations.
792
 Bennett contrasts NGOs, “who primarily seek relations with governmental entities,” 
with direct action networks, which are “involved in all manner of political relations building 
from simply trying to shut down trade meetings, to experimenting with stand-alone regulatory 
systems to monitor and discipline manufacturers and entire industrial sectors.”
793  
While many of 
these efforts do clearly constitute DA, others strain the boundaries of our understanding of the 
term, with such a broad definition doing little to further our understanding of DA as a distinct 
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strategy. One of the challenges concerning the treatment of DA in the IR literature is that it is too 
often poorly defined and at times used to describe actions which are not, in fact, direct.  
It should be noted that the term direct action networks, in other instances referred to as 
environmental direct action movements or groups, has come to be used to refer to groups of 
activists who emphasize DA as their preferred repertoire. This does not necessarily suggest that 
all of their actions constitute DA, and the focus here is on the strategy itself.
794
 Therefore, for 
clarity, when reference is made to DA, it is with specific reference to the strategy of DA and not 
to groups or networks which may have incorporated it into their repertoires. 
DA has received some attention in the literature where it is defined as militant protesting 
or militant symbolic politics. Keck and Sikkink depict ‘Direct Action’ and ‘Direct 
Confrontation’ as forms of protest and symbolic politics, as does Gavin.
795
 Carter also sees DA 
“as a means for people to exert pressure on governments or other powerful institutions such as 
business corporations.”
796 
Finnemore and Sikkink note that “deliberately inappropriate acts … 
can be powerful tools for norms entrepreneurs seeking to send a message and to frame an 
issue.”
797
 Wapner sees DA as a method by which groups generally seek to raise awareness of 
environmental issues, or to “disseminate an ecological sensibility.”
798
 For him, DA is symbolic, 
comprised of “media stunts, exciting images orchestrated to convey a critical perspective toward 
environmental issues.”
799
 Wapner describes DA as attempting to achieve two outcomes: 1) to 
attract media attention – confrontational actions play to the media’s fascination with “sex, 
scandal, and violence,” drawing attention for an issue.
800
 And 2) DA is used to illustrate the 
depth of concern felt for an environmental threat.
801
 By assuming increased personal risk, 
activists ultimately demonstrate their moral commitment to the cause while at the same time 
underlining “how serious they consider certain environmental threats to be.”
802
 In this instance, 
confrontation is used not to achieve a specific objective, but to signal the perceived severity of a 
problem by exposing activists to high personal costs and risks.  
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Whether it is attempting to change the mind of officials or of the public, IR literature 
generally describes DA as militant protest or symbolic politics. An organization whose use of 
‘DA’ seems to conform to this definition is Greenpeace, which frequently incorporates various 
forms of DA into its image events, contributing to the blurring of the distinction between 
symbolic and direct forms of actions.
803
 Greenpeace’s actions remain primarily image events 
whereas a key characteristic of DA is that it seeks direct outcomes first.
804
  While DA may 
contain symbolic elements, its primary purpose is not symbolic politics, but the achievement of 
direct results. 
 
6.2.2 - Direct Action Defined 
 
DA finds its origins in the domestic arena in repertoires of the early radical labour 
movement.
805  
Within a labour context, the term was used to refer to industrial actions such as 
strikes and boycotts. These were not symbolic protests. They were designed “[t]o strike the 




Drawing on both activist and academic sources, a 
clear definition of DA can be presented as follows: a form of action whereby activists seek to 
directly enact the changes they desire or to stop actions to which they are opposed.
807
 As the 
name suggests, DA seeks “to have an immediate impact on a problem or its causes,”
808
 and “the 
means and ends become effectively, indistinguishable.”
809
 Or as Hammarstedt noted, “DA gets 
direct results.”
810
 Doherty elaborates, “[n]ot content to try to influence politicians or institutions, 
protesters have seen direct action as disruption seeking to delay environmentally damaging 
projects and to escalate their costs.”
811
 DA “is totally direct: it’s real and not just mediated 
politics.”
812
 DA is not a form of protest whereby activists entreat other actors to intervene on 
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their behalf; instead activists take action into their own hands, entirely bypassing mediators. 
Direct action is a means of “building the future now,”
813
 proactively seeking to bring about 
change.
814
 As DA does not constitute protest, its practitioners cannot accurately be referred to as 
‘protesters.’  
As to the legality of DA, Jones notes that DA “may be legal or illegal, overt or covert, 
sardonic or sober,” suggesting that DA need not necessarily be unlawful.
815
 While it is often 
associated with law-breaking, as with environmentally motivated sabotage, or ecotage,
816
 DA 
can also include constructive acts such as community or guerilla gardening, soup kitchens and 
free schools (though for the context of this study the focus shall be on confrontational forms of 
DA).
817
 Similarly, while DA may be “confrontational, disruptive and often illegal” it is not 
necessarily violent.”
818
 There is an extensive debate within academic and activist circles as to 
whether property damage, for example, constitutes violence.
819
 Generally speaking, the 
consensus amongst activists who are likely to support the use of DA, is that engaging in 
potentially violent acts (whether this constitutes targeting property or otherwise), depends on 




6.2.3 - The Strategy of Direct Action 
 
The goal of DA in the context of environmental activism is to protect the environment. 
DA seeks to accomplish this: 1) by stopping or preventing environmentally harmful activity 
directly at the source, and 2) by increasing the costs of environmentally destructive activity such 
that this activity becomes economically unviable.  
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Rather than entreating another actor to intervene in order to stop a target from engaging 
in an environmentally harmful activity, DA directly intervenes. This first component of DA takes 
the form of denial – the act of disrupting or delaying some activity. In a domestic setting, 
methods such as blockades (preventing access to space), tree sitting and spiking (preventing 
logging), or the ‘monkeywrenching’ of extractive equipment serve this purpose. This aspect of 
DA is clearly evident in SSCS tactics which are designed to stop the Japanese from whaling such 
as prop-foulers and the blockading of the slipway of the Nisshin Maru, as well as the use of 
butyric acid to make decks unworkable or contaminate whale meat. As Potts notes, the SSCS 
“engages in physically blocking environmental destruction.”
821
 These efforts have been 
successful, in so far as SSCS actions have had a significant impact in reducing the number of 
whales harvested through JARPA.  
 DA also inflicts a direct economic impact on targets through cost escalation.
822 
 Those 
targeted by DA may see an increase in production costs through increased security costs,
823
 lost 
wages, expensive machinery replacement, and slowed production. Companies also incur 
considerable indirect costs. Effective DA campaigns can dramatically increase insurance costs, 
as well as create “a climate of suspicion and instability among creditors and clients,” affecting 
the prospects of future business and investment.
824 
Bennett suggests that this strategy works 
along the lines of Coopman’s concept of ‘resource burn’, the process of “distracting and wearing 
down larger opponents who have trouble fighting such nimble distributed networks.”
825
 Some 
observers note that damages are insured and are likely covered by companies by passing costs on 
to the consumer.
826
 While in some instances this can be the case, primary industries do not have 
the luxury of mass consumer bases to which expenses may be passed along, and as such are 
particularly susceptible to this type of action. Increased insurance premiums add to costs, and a 
significant increase in the bottom line can harm a company’s competitiveness, as was evident in 
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the case of insurance premiums for whalers after SSCS actions against Norwegian whaling 
vessels.
827
   
Most individual acts of DA lack the scale to have sufficient impact on targets to compel a 
change in behavior – the blockading or occupation of a single forest coupe is unlikely to 
bankrupt a logging company. While increasing costs is often considered a success, in order to 
have a dramatic impact on the operations of a target, DA must inflict considerable damage, or 
interfere with operations on a large scale or over an extended period of time. To this end 
‘bottlenecks,’ that is, the reliance of a target on an access point or critical piece of infrastructure, 
are particularly susceptible to DA. In this case JARPA is particularly susceptible to DA given its 
reliance on a single factory vessel. Cost escalation is most assuredly part of the SSCS strategy. 
The SSCS regularly declares that its goal is to ‘sink the Japanese economically’ and crew 
members openly discuss and attempt to calculate the financial impact of SSCS actions on 
JARPA.
828
   
 
6.2.4 - DA and the Media  
 
Many scholars see DA as being oriented primarily around attracting media attention, 
which is portrayed as paramount to all forms of activism.
829
 Jordan notes that a “protest without 
media coverage is like a mime performance in the dark: possible but fairly pointless.”
830
 Even 
many activists see DA as being more symbolic than direct, as a “media stunt – a tactic ineffective 
in the absence of media coverage.”
831
 This need for media coverage features heavily in the 
strategy of Greenpeace actions which “only receive validation as social realities through media 
coverage – without the media presence these events would be meaningless,” as Carroll and 
Ratner note.
832 
Using this interpretation of DA, Greenpeace is indeed engaging in DA, however 
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Here two comments can be made. First, while it is undeniable that DA’s dramatic nature 
produces good copy,
834
 this is not the ultimate goal of DA.
835
 DA is not a form of protest, and 
therefore does not necessarily require an audience.
836
 Some acts of DA may be more aimed at 
attracting media attention, such as those of Greenpeace, but others, such as covert sabotage, 
involve activists avoiding publicity for their actions. Many isolated acts of sabotage go 
unreported, even in activist-run media.
837
 Crew members made reference to the ad hoc group, 
Agenda 21, which has sunk several whaling and fishing vessels over the past decades. The group 
has no spokesperson or website, and generally relies on activist media sources and issues a single 
press release following an action.
838
 Ultimately, as Graeber notes, “it would be possible to have a 
secret direct action,” because regardless of the attention it receives, an act of DA still 
accomplishes something direct.
839
 This is evident with the SSCS, whereby it has engaged in 
actions for which it has sought little or no publicity, where the direct tactical goal was more 
important than attracting media attention.  
While media attention may serve as a force multiplier in some instances, this is not 
always the case. As is evident in ‘SSCS and the Media’ (Chapter 5.3.2.7), movements do tend to 
benefit from media attention. In addition to mobilization, validation, and scope enlargement, DA 
can also use the media coverage to send “warnings to other potential targets.”
840
 The media 
serves the purpose of disseminating what some activists refer to as ‘threat capacity.’ Groups with 
a reputation for engaging in highly damaging actions have a high threat capacity and may win 
victories without the need to act. Media coverage of actions can also further tarnish the image of 
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a target, potentially increasing indirect costs and challenging their ‘social license to operate,’ and 
by damaging their ‘brand image.’
841
  
 However not only are these benefits non-essential to DA, many argue that media 
attention may, at times, have a negative impact on campaigns. As discussed in the context of 
SSCS’s use of the media (see Chapter 5.3.2.7), coverage may be biased, can distort activists’ 
messages and can potentially cause or magnify backlash.
842 
And as a result of activists’ goals “to 
directly change perceived political, social, or environmental injustices,” many reject the 
mediation of their messages “via political elites or the media.”
843
 It has been demonstrated that 
the SSCS has attempted to avoid some of this bias and backlash through its own media strategy, 
but that this media strategy is not central to SSCS strategy. Ultimately what can be said is that 




6.4 - The SSCS and Direct Action 
 
The SSCS’s description of its own approach as ‘aggressive non-violent direct action’ 
appears accurate; SSCS strategy does seem to rely on many of the same mechanisms as DA. The 
SSCS certainly attempts to prevent Japanese whaling and to increase the costs to the whaler. The 
ultimate goal of the SSCS is not to attract media attention. However, observations suggest that 
the SSCS’s use of DA is partly but not entirely consistent with DA in the domestic context. A 
first suggestion might have been that the organization has simply adapted DA for use on the high 
seas and international affairs. While an adaptation to IR explains the SSCS’s use of international 
law to some degree (for example the strategic use of ‘international legal red tape’), it does not 
explain the organization’s insistence that it is engaged in actual law enforcement, nor the 
considerable measures it takes to reinforce this point. Considering the SSCS’s use of DA it 
becomes clear that the organization is using DA to accomplish something altogether different; 
that the direct outcomes it seeks to achieve through DA are intrinsic to the mechanism of its 
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actual strategy. The following discussion postulates that the SSCS is using DA as part of an 
enforcement strategy. This strategy is explored in the following chapter.  
 
6.4.1 - Adaptations to DA 
 
Operating on the high seas requires more than mere tactical innovation; it considerably 
constrains the use of DA. Operating at sea is expensive; ships, fuel, victuals, communication and 
navigation equipment, registration, certification are all requisites. Even the most sophisticated 
land-based DA does not compare, in terms of the cost of purchasing and maintaining a vessel at 
sea. For instance, the Bob Barker was purchased at a cost of $5 million, but the cost of 
purchasing a vessel is often exceeded by its maintenance and operating costs.
845
  The 2009-2010 
campaign, during which the SSCS deployed two vessels for over three months, cost $5.5 million, 
whereas the 2008-2009 campaign during which only one vessel was deployed cost $2.3 
million.
846
 These costs are substantial when compared to most DA actions, but compared to the 
operating budgets of large INGOs such as Greenpeace, they remain practically shoestring. 
Greenpeace for example recently unveiled the purpose-built Rainbow Warrior III at a reported 
cost of £16 million.
847
  
One consequence of high operating costs is the need to operate above ground, in order to 
attract donations and support. In recent years, the SSCS has taken extensive measures to increase 
its visibility. Whale Wars has helped generate considerable revenues for the SSCS. In 2008, the 
tax year prior to the premier of Whale Wars, the SSCS received $3.4 million in contributions; the 
following year contributions reached $9.4 million.
848
 Growing contributions have allowed the 
SSCS to expand its fleet. 
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The use of covert tactics is severely limited on the high seas. While it is relatively simple 
for covert saboteurs to blend into an urban environment following an action, and thereby escape 
prosecution, it is much more challenging for activists operating from a highly visible vessel to 
‘go underground.’ Maintaining a public profile is non-optional; in addition to being expensive, 
ships are difficult to hide, and must eventually dock to re-supply. The inability of the SSCS to 
rely on covert actions suggests that it must develop alternative means to avoid prosecution.  
The ramifications of requiring sufficient funds to own and maintain a vessel, as well as 
the requirements of operating that vessel at sea have a significant impact upon the structure of 
the SSCS, its decision making and its leadership. The harsh reality of maritime operations 
demands “a well-defined command structure as found in any quasi-military operation.”
849
 The 
SSCS and all of its vessels are run hierarchically. Each vessel has a captain and officers, with 
Watson overseeing the majority of strategy and actions during operations.
850
 During the course 
of fieldwork, individual captains appeared to have been granted considerable autonomy in 
making tactical decisions. While anarchy is not a necessary feature of DA, the SSCS strict 
hierarchy represents somewhat of an anomaly amongst radical environmental groups, which 
often prefer methods such as consensus or group decision making and eschew hierarchies.  
The fact that actions are conducted ship to ship, presents additional safety concerns. The 
use of DA against vessels can cause extensive damages. Small fleets represent ideal bottlenecks, 
with vessels making expensive targets, however destructive actions such as those against the 
Sierra and in Reykjavik are not possible on the high seas due to safety concerns – the risk of 
injury is prohibitively high. A final consideration is the need to engage skilled and potentially 
certified, officers and crew; a ship cannot be manned by passion alone and this ultimately serves 
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6.4.2 - SSCS – Beyond DA 
 
Operating on the high seas constrains the SSCS. It must organize itself in such a way as 
to generate revenue in order to sustain operations. Towards this end, the SSCS maintains a public 
and hierarchical organization, with Watson at the top. The SSCS raises funds primarily through 
donations from prominent donors and private citizens, and through sales of merchandise and 
memberships, all of which is aided by the SSCS’s pirate image, dramatic actions and television 
program. Operating above ground obligates the SSCS to take steps in order to shield itself from 
prosecution, which is does by wrapping itself in ‘international legal red tape.’ In addition, the 
organization is careful that its acts appear proportional – it focuses on subverting Japanese profits 
rather than on causing criminal damage. 
While the SSCS does use international law to shield itself from prosecution, it engages 
with the law in a fashion which far exceeds these requirements. As a confrontational and 
aggressive organization operating in the open, the need to protect itself from prosecution does 
not explain the organization’s insistence that it is a law enforcement organization, evidenced 
through such actions as only targeting law breakers, collecting evidence, legal imagery and 
language, the WCN, etc. The SSCS is engaging in DA, but whereas most DA seeks to leverage 
its targets with physical and financial pressure, the SSCS appears to be using DA as a means of 
exerting legal leverage, in addition to these other forms. What, therefore, becomes clear is that 
the SSCS uses DA as a mechanism through which it directly enforces international law. The 
SSCS’s strategy can most assuredly be seen as a form of DA, but one focused on enforcement, 




CHAPTER 7 – DIRECT ENFORCEMENT 
7.1 - The SSCS and Direct Enforcement of International Law 
 
Process tracing of the 2010-2011 campaign revealed that actively enforcing international 
law is central to the SSCS strategy. When the SSCS refers to itself as an international law 
enforcement and anti-poaching organization, it is not only doing so as a rhetorical device, but 
also as an expression of its strategy. The legitimacy of the SSCS’s claims of acting on behalf of 
the WCN are highly contested, and the technical legality of a NSA enforcing the law is 
uncertain. However the technical legality of the SSCS’s claim is not as significant as the fact that 
the SSCS is indeed able to make such a claim. There is some strategic advantage to be gained by 
claiming to enforce international law, and SSCS aggressively seeks to invoke this power. This is 
not to suggest that the SSCS fully understands the mechanisms which drive this power, only that 
the SSCS recognizes that it is provided certain advantages. Just as Wapner describes Greenpeace 
as disseminating ecological sensibility, the SSCS disseminates a legal sensibility.
851
 The SSCS 
uses legal terminology, accuses its targets of violating the law and/or of being poachers, and will 
often cite the violation of specific laws in its communications.  
The organization also supports its enforcement strategy through the use of legal symbols 
and imagery, and by enacting some procedures usually considered the preserve of law 
enforcement bodies, such as gathering evidence. The SSCS selects its targets with an aim to 
supporting its own enforcement claims, specifically selecting targets which can be accused of 
being in violation of the law. Just as most INGOs/TAGs gain their authority and legitimacy from 
their apparent moral high ground, the SSCS draws its legitimacy from its apparent legal high 
ground. In order to support this ‘legal high ground’ the SSCS must exercise restraint and 
proportionality. As Burbach notes, Watson’s recent declaration “that he will no longer 
intentionally ram any Japanese whaling ships further anchors Sea Shepherd's legal authority 
within international conservation law.”
852
 Here the SSCS is avoiding tactics which may make it 
appear to be acting disproportionately or illegally.    
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Over the course of ‘Operation No Compromise’ the SSCS leadership made tactical 
decisions which, to a degree, prevented it from achieving direct operational objectives – that of 
preventing whaling – in exchange for broader strategic aims, notably the furtherance of the 
image of the SSCS as an enforcement organization. For example, as distractions and for 
penetrating defensive netting, the phosphorus ‘Mick Jaggers’ were much more effective than the 
smoke variety, however, they were discontinued in so far as they appeared disproportionately 
aggressive, risking damage to the SSCS’s image as a proportionate law enforcement 
organization.  Gathering evidence and investigating the legality of the fishing lines prior to their 
removal would be unnecessary if the SSCS were merely engaging in DA, but necessary if the 
organization wishes to present itself as a law enforcement organization.  
This chapter will explore, in detail, how and why the ‘direct enforcement’ (DE) strategy 
of the SSCS works, developing the theory of DE. It begins with an overview of characteristics 
typical of DE, then elaborates on how this strategy differs from conventional INGO/TAG 
strategy, before detailing the key mechanisms of DE.  
 
7.2 - Direct Enforcement 
 
Removing content which is specific to the SSCS anti-whaling strategy, a discernible 
strategy involving claims to enforce international law emerges. This strategy can be described as 
‘direct enforcement’ (DE).
853
 DE claims to enforce the law, in order to enable successful and 
protracted use of DA in the international arena, although its use may not necessarily be limited to 
the international arena. DE seeks to achieve the following outcomes: 1) to frustrate or prevent the 
violation of an international law; 2) to raise the material costs of non-compliance to international 
law; and 3) to compel states to comply with international legal frameworks, and to initiate 
enforcement actions of their own.
854
 By invoking international law, activists are also able to use 
DE as a shield from state prosecution, allowing them to engage in confrontational actions 
considered as requisite to accomplishing these outcomes. Invoking the law is also a viable means 
of establishing common ground and of breaking deadlocks which notably emerge around moral 
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issues. In appealing to the law, activists speak the language of states, revealing the failure of 
states to live up to their international obligations through action. Finally, by asserting their right 
to enforce laws, INGOs/TAGs create practices of legality around the laws they claim to enforce, 
thereby strengthening those laws, and simultaneously asserting and strengthening the concept 
that INGOs/TAGs posses the mandate to enforce the law. 
Before considering these mechanisms in greater detail, it is useful to outline some 
features of DE and how it relates to existing understandings of INGO/TAG strategy and the role 
INGOs/TAGs play in IR and international law. DE can be compared to conventional INGO/TAG 
strategies.  Conventional strategies typically seek to exert influence at all stages of the global 
policy-making process, by raising awareness, promulgating norms, and lobbying, or directly 
contributing to international negotiations, and by monitoring compliance with agreements, 
whereas DE focuses primarily on improving compliance through monitoring and enforcement. 
Unlike conventional monitoring efforts, DE does not seek to provide technical and legal 
assistance to states in order to enhance their capacity for compliance, or use ‘naming and 
shaming’ tactics in an attempt to shame actors into compliance. Instead, through DE, activists 
seek to enforce the law by direct intervention. DE does not constitute a form of protest. Activists 
using DE do not appeal to a higher authority to justify taking action. They take power into their 
own hands in order to bring about desired outcomes. DE does attempt to leverage states but does 
not rely on moral appeals. It attempts to compel states into action by articulating their failure to 
fulfill their international obligations, further demonstrating this failure, and undermining claims 
that enforcement is impossible, through action. It seems appropriate to classify DE as a more 
targeted form of DA rather than as a form of advocacy. While conventional INGO/TAG 
strategies typically disseminate technical or scientific information as a means of raising 
awareness or to enable policy formulation, DE relies principally on the dissemination of 
documentation and legal arguments as justification for direct intervention. Finally, like all 
INGO/TAG strategies, DE uses framing, with issues framed in narrow and often technical legal 
terms, rather than in moral terms. Organizations employing DE frame themselves as legitimate 
law enforcers empowered by a legal mandate. 
INGOs/TAGs directly enforcing the law represents a departure from conventional 
understandings of the role of INGOs/TAGs in international law. It extends this role beyond 
monitoring into enforcing, with enforcing enacted without state sanction, as might be the case 
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with a state hiring private security companies to enforce the law on its behalf.
855
 Through DE, 
activists assert their own perceived right to enforce international law. While INGOs/TAGs have 
assumed increasingly prominent roles in international legal proceedings – participating in the ICJ 
and at advisory proceedings, during the formation of international law at most levels, as amicus 
curiae, and through private litigation and arbitration
856
 – these roles are typically granted by 
states. As Rubinton notes, “NGOs must be given ‘standing under general international law’, to 
make their voices heard and their actions felt.”
857 
In engaging in DE, activists do not wait to be 
granted standing, but seize it.  
There is power in acting to enforce existing laws, but doing so is inherently a 
conservative exercise.
858
 Despite the use of ‘radical’ or controversial tactics, DE is, in fact, a 
relatively conservative strategy when compared to DA. DA circumvents existing power 
structures, and by so doing challenges, denies, or rejects them. The world envisioned by DE is 
one where existing (international) laws are followed and enforced by states. In enforcing existing 
laws and by encouraging states to do so, DE reinforces existing structures. The use of DE does 
not necessarily replace DA, but seeks to modify it to optimise effectiveness in the international 
arena. Activists can, of course, engage in DA against international targets engaged in lawful 
behavior – as is the case with Agenda 21 – but by so doing, they leave themselves open to 
prosecution and the need to rely on normative justifications, which in turn risks weakening their 
position. A thorough understanding of DE can add to our understanding of the ways in which 
INGOs/TAGs can exert direct influence in international affairs. 
Perhaps the clearest distinction between DE and DA is evident in issue and target 
selection. Activists wishing to employ DE will select issues around an existing legal framework, 
where they can make a credible claim to be enforcing a law. By extension DE works effectively 
on targets which can be credibly framed as violating a (international) law or laws. It must be 
noted that this claim need not be entirely technically accurate, as in the case of Japanese 
‘research’ whaling, where the legality of the actions of a target remains in question. The 
important point is that activists are able to make a credible claim to be defending the law, for as 
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Hutchinson notes, “international relations are characterised by politics and diplomacy rather than 
strict and technical legalism.”
859
  
The need for tactics to appear proportionate is accentuated in DE, as compared to DA. 
Not only do practitioners need to live up to ethical and pragmatic constraints upon their actions 
(do no harm), they must also act in a fashion considered consistent with those of law 
enforcement. Any law enforcement officer or agency which appears to use disproportionate force 
quickly loses legitimacy. This is even more the case with activists, because they lack the 
perceived license of the state. In appealing to the law, DE gains legitimacy by tapping into the 
credibility generally granted to law enforcement, the law, and the rule of law in general, but only 
so long as it maintains this image. This is evident in the care taken by the SSCS to appear 
proportionate; appearing legal and environmentally friendly are included amongst SSCS’s 
criteria for selecting tactics, along with direct efficacy in stopping the whalers.  
DE is less affected by backlash than normative strategies or DA. More precisely, the 
mechanisms which make DE effective generally work regardless of backlash. SSCS actions have 
led to backlash, and likely to a strengthening of pro-whaling sentiment in Japan by the linkage of 
the issue to nationalism.
860
 Would that the SSCS was trying to raise awareness of whaling and to 
increase Japanese acceptance of anti-whaling norms, its actions would have to be considered a 
failure. However, one of the strengths of DE is that it is capable of accomplishing outcomes 
regardless of the reactions of other actors. The first two objectives of DE – stopping the illegal 
activity and increasing the costs of that activity – can be accomplished regardless of any 
backlash or the failure of legal language or attempts to leverage states. DE benefits from, but 
certainly does not rely on, the actions of others. Regardless of the actions of the Australian 
government, SSCS actions prevented Japanese whaling and increased the costs of the ICR. In 
addition, since the type of leverage DE exerts on states is not dependent on mobilizing popular 
sentiment, it is capable of acting on states regardless of widespread public awareness or support. 
By employing the language of states, DE speaks directly to states, and as a result, by-passes the 
need to communicate to the public.  
It should be noted that the importance of legal framing does not mean to imply that moral 
attitudes and public sentiment are irrelevant to DE-based campaigns. All INGOs/TAGs rely on 
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public support in order to attract volunteers and in securing funding. However, moral claims 
remain secondary to legal claims. Although groups may simultaneously engage in DE and forms 
of principled advocacy, in the context of DE campaigns, normative claims tend to function as a 
support element, intended to aid fundraising rather than to place pressure upon governments. 
Similar to DA, DE does not require, but benefits from, public awareness and mobilization. Even 
without public knowledge, DE would still achieve results with respect to stopping its targets 
from acting and to increasing their costs. DE also holds the possibility of leveraging 
governments without widespread public awareness and mobilization. 
When activists employ DE, they are invariably availing themselves of certain protections 
and benefits. The mechanisms which are at work when activists engage in DE are powerful, 
substantially more powerful than those of conventional DA. In the following sub-sections these 
protections and benefits will be elaborated, leading to the development of the theory of DE.  
 
7.2.1 - DE Shields Activists 
 
 DE affords practitioners protection against potential retaliation and prosecution. The 
practice of engaging targets whose actions violate the law tends to shield activists from legal and 
political prosecution, in so far as targets have unclean hands, and do not want attention drawn to 
their own wrongdoings by indicting activists. Brown notes that the likely reason as to why the 
SSCS “has never been convicted in a court or successfully sued…. is that the vessels  in question 
[those targeted by the SSCS] had also been engaged in criminal activities, so the owners would 
be reluctant to take legal action against the SSCS.”
861 
As a result, no charges have ever been 
made or damages sought as a result of any of the sinkings for which the SSCS takes credit.
862
 
This mechanism, of targeting actors with ‘unclean hands,’ does not offer substantive protection 
to activists who are only targeting norm violators. As is explored in greater detail below, laws are 
less contested than norms, there being greater consequences for violating laws than there are for 
violating norms. Furthermore, and as is particularly the case with environmental issues such as 
whaling, states may find that something that violates a strong international norm may yet be 
                                                 
861
 Brown 2012:156; Khatchadourian 2007. 
862
 Day 1987:56. 
176 
 
consistent with domestic norms. Activists run the risk of a state taking action to satisfy its core 
constituency over international expectations.  
  Despite these protections, if states wished, they could take individual or collective 
measures to shut down groups engaged in DE.
863
 The continued practice of DE activism thus 
depends on a degree of complicity with governments that support stricter enforcement of 
environmental measures.
864
 In as much as the application of international law is costly, pro-
conservationist governments may judge that the benefits from third party enforcement are 
sufficient and, as a result, turn a blind eye to vigilantism or even lend tacit support to such 
practices, as argued by Moffa.
865
 This is evidenced in the Australian government’s treatment of 
the SSCS, whereby it allows the organization to operate from its ports, and when obliged, 
performs a perfunctory investigation of the organization. In addition, by invoking and applying 
international law, activists place moral and political pressure on pro-conservationist governments 
to increase their own enforcement efforts, and may provide these actors with justifiable reasons 
for further actions which might have otherwise lacked political expediency.  
By shielding activists from prosecution, DE enables activists to confront illegal activity, 
thereby stopping that activity, or increasing costs to targets, and creating situations which exert 
leverage against states. Confrontational actions which might otherwise be seen as illegal are re-
framed as components of enforcement actions, and thereby justified, while the actions of targets 
are framed as law breaking, and therefore deserving of enforcement action. It appears as though 
the SSCS has turned its focus to illegal operations after learning from previous attempts to target 
legal operations met with limited success; for example the confiscation of the Farley Mowat by 
the RCMP in 2008 while targeting the legal Canadian seal hunt, and the interception of Whales 
Forever by the Norwegian cutter Andenes in 1992.  
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7.2.2 - The Power of the Law 
 
The primary currency of INGOs/TAGs is typically seen to be norms. INGOs/TAGs 
generally take the role of moral actors, drawing their authority from the moral high ground, 
propagating norms in the international community, shaming norm-violators and so on. Norm 
entrepreneurs face challenges when seeking to introduce new norms, or in grafting new 
interpretations and frames onto existing norms, or in attempting to forge consensus on an issue. 
DE represents a form of framing, whereby issues and practitioners are framed as legal rather than 
normative. Making an appeal to existing laws can be more powerful than appealing to norms. As 
Abbott and Snidal note, “...legalization provides actors with a means to instantiate normative 
values.”
866  
Laws ultimately represent a codification of shared understandings – norms. Laws are 
perceived as powerful and legal arguments as persuasive, because they are grounded in the 
norms of a society – the shared understandings of that society.
867
 Legal arguments are persuasive 
because of the association of law with these criteria of legality, and because there is generally 
support for the rule of law.  
 Appealing to international law invokes belief in the rule of law—a principle that tends to 
enjoy universal support among political authorities as opposed to moral principles which can be 
contested. As Fuller and Nardin argue, a commitment to law and the rule of law does “not 
require fundamental shared commitments to a single political morality, nor the existence of 
centralized political authority.”
868
 This is of particular importance with respect to international 
environmental issues. As discussed, many environmental issues are characterized by clashes 
between competing principles or claims – protecting habitat versus economic development, or 
conservation versus cultural practices. Environmental issues tend to be complicated: they do not 
directly involve bodily harm to individuals or groups, or clearly violate principles of legal 
equality of opportunity; they do not have short and clear causal chains. Many environmental 
issues are difficult to frame as “protecting the often vulnerable people who live in [the 
ecosystem],”
869
 and may lack available charismatic fauna.  Environmental claims based on 
appeals to shared norms and values also carry a substantial risk of back-firing when effective 
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counter-claims are made by groups whose socio-economic and cultural interests may be 
threatened.
870
 This is evident in the Japanese reply to criticism of its whaling program, when it 
claims that whaling is an intrinsic part of its culture and that eating whale is no different than 
eating cow. The existence of opposing norms can often lead to moral and political impasses, 
resulting in inaction on the part of governments not wishing to appear biased towards rival 
domestic constituencies. Governments may even side with norms opposing environmental 
claims, particularly when such claims represent the material interests of a targeted constituency, 
as compared to transnational environmental claims. The annunciation of a legal principle, can 
often serve to transcend a moral standoff, and compel states to act. 
All these components are in play in the whaling issue: opposing pro- and anti-whaling 
norms have forced the IWC to a standstill. The long-time anti-whaling US has been forced to 
weaken its stance in order to obtain IWC approval for its aboriginal whaling quotas. In Japan, a 
clear example of a state favouring domestic interests over transnational ones is evident. The 
government’s staunch pro-whaling position is presented as strength in the face of gaiatsu.
871
 
Normative arguments simply do not resonate in Japan, where whales are generally considered as 
fish. At best these arguments fall on deaf ears, and at worst they are perceived as cultural 
imperialism, effectively strengthening pro-whaling sentiment by making it into a cultural issue. 
Continuing to pursue normative arguments is unlikely to change this state of affairs, and it is 
precisely this kind of situation where legal arguments offer a potential solution.  
The power of laws over norms is evident in the efforts pro-whaling states have 
undertaken in an attempt to overturn the moratorium on commercial whaling through the 
introduction of the Revised Management Procedures (RMP), as well as through efforts made by 
the Japanese, such as emblazoning the word ‘Research’ on the sides of their vessels, to frame 
their actions as ‘research,’ and therefore legal under the ICRW. 
Using DE, activists can engage in jurisdictional arbitrage, framing their actions as 
enforcing laws selected specifically to suit their cause or desired course of action. This has the 
effect of expanding the breadth of arguments, frames, targets and issues, and of thus increasing 
opportunities for success. Using DE does not preclude the use of normative approaches by a 
movement or organization. The presence of DE within the repertoire of a movement helps to 
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strengthen that movement by expanding the spectrum of its actions and critique, as well as by 
allowing a movement to circumvent normative impasses. The SSCS uses a variety of arguments 
against whaling, using DE and speaking primarily to states when critiquing JARPA for violating 
international and Australian domestic law, while appealing to animal rights supporters by 
highlighting the cruelty of the hunt, and to environmental supporters by criticizing the hunt’s 
impact on threatened species.  
 
7.2.3 - The Power of DE Over States 
 
Law matters in IR. Brunée and Toope argue, that “[i]f law were nothing more than 
enforcement by self-interested states, the very concept would not be needed. Power would do its 
own work.”
872
 But laws do matter and have their own power, and DE taps into this power: by 
claiming to enforce international laws where governments fail, activists can succeed in 
leveraging powerful political actors. This kind of leverage was evident in the SSCS’s use of DE, 
particularly with respect to Australia and to a lesser extent Chile.  
DE ultimately speaks the language of states, and while the primary target of normative 
claims are the public or international civil society, the primary audience of DE is states. Whereas 
normative claims may be directed at policy-makers in order to change their perceptions of an 
issue, the chief aim of principled advocacy is to mobilize public sentiment in favour of policy 
change, thereby bringing indirect pressure to bear on governments. The primary targets of the 
legal framing of DE are governments. To borrow from Mégret, DE is “fundamentally 
challenging the state’s behavior [sic] from the point of view of its own international 
obligations.”
873
 The state is the source of law (domestically and internationally), and “[a]t the 
most foundational level, states govern through legal means that are supported by the threat or use 
of force.”
874
 Fundamental to the legitimacy of the international legal regime is “the ability of 
nations to make reciprocal commitments, trusting that such agreements will be upheld” (pacta 
sunt servanda).
875
 In our relatively anarchic international system, states have difficulty “credibly 
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committing themselves to future behavior [sic],”
876
  and as such governments are alert to claims 
that they or their partners are failing to abide by agreements.
877
  
Abbott and Snidal note that “[l]egalization is one of the principal methods by which 




Laws are created with the 
expectation that they will be upheld, and the reputation of a state for compliance has tangible 
political and economic consequences.
879
  The importance of appearing to act in accordance with 
(international) law is such that states will go to lengths to seek legal justification for violations. 
An example is the efforts which the US undertook to justify the legality of its invasion of Iraq.
880
 
States may feel ‘shame’ when they are named as norm violators, but DE calls into question the 
very legitimacy of a state as an international actor – one capable of upholding its international 
agreements or enforcing laws within its jurisdiction.  
When Watson declares that “all Australians should expect the Australian Government to 
enforce the law”, he is not appealing to the ecological sentiment of Australian citizens—rather he 
is appealing to the government’s credibility as an authority capable of making and enforcing 
laws on behalf of its citizens.
881
 The SSCS is shaming the Australian government for its failure 
to uphold its sovereignty, its most basic claim to statehood. The SSCS is not claiming that 
Australia is normatively ‘bad’; it is reminding them that they have failed to enforce their most 
basic obligations as a state. Watson’s most repeated phrase, that “[w]e have all the laws we need 
to stop the slaughter of whales but we lack the political and economic will on the part of 




Rhetoric in and of itself may be insufficient to compel a state into action. It takes very 
little effort to simply call into question the legitimacy of a state through a press release. What 
makes DE effective, and differentiates it from naming and shaming, is that it supports this 
                                                 
876
 Abbott and Snidal 2000:426. 
877
 See also Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Phelps Bondaroff 2014. 
878
 Ibid. and 428. 
879
 Burgerman 2001:8. 
880
 See for example Strachan 2005:48. 
881
 Watson quoted by News.com.au, “Arrest the Whalers, Activist Demands,” October 21, 2009, available at 
http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/national/arrest-the-whalers-activist-demands/story-e6frfku9-
1225789454255 (accessed August 6, 2013). 
882
 Treehugger.com, “Anti-Whaling Warrior, Captain Paul Watson,” November 5, 2008 available at 
http://www.treehugger.com/about-treehugger/anti-whaling-warrior-captain-paul-watson.html (accessed 
November 7, 2013). 
181 
 
rhetoric with DA. By backing claims of non-compliance with (confrontational) actions, DE 
attempts to compel states to change their default policy on an issue (that of having no policy), or 
to change an existing policy from one which permits the violation of international law, to one 
where the law is enforced. DE need not do so through the manufacture of international incidents, 
although these occurrences do level acute pressure on states, often compelling rapid policy 
formation/alteration. The act of enforcing the law, in the absence of state enforcement, can be 
sufficiently powerful, producing a persistent form of pressure on states. By engaging in DE, 
activists set themselves up as an example of the failures of states, goading states into action, by 
declaring ‘if we as a small resource poor NGO can do it, why can’t you as a state?’ The fact that 
an INGO/TAG can effectively enforce compliance trumps arguments that enforcement is 
impractical or impossible, further removing hurdles which would otherwise provide justification 
for non-intervention by states. By speaking the language of law and sovereignty, DE addresses 
states directly, ensuring that this message is heard through (confrontational) DA. In this fashion 
DE is a form of DA, with the application of DA as central to DE. DE represents an optimized 
method of employing DA in the international arena. 
 
7.2.4 - DE as Interactional Law 
 
INGOs/TAGs engaging in DE can have a broader influence upon international law and 
indeed implement international laws themselves. In enforcing laws which have poor compliance, 
activists seek to strengthen the compliance pull – the ability of a law to promote adherence or to 
inspire fidelity – of these laws. In asserting a right to enforce international laws, activists are 
ultimately seeking to reinforce the assertion that they have a right to enforce international law. In 
order to understand these mechanisms, it is useful to examine DE through Brunnée and Toppe’s 
interactional theory of legal obligation. These scholars argue that laws are “generated and 
maintained through social interaction.”
883
 They extend upon the work of Fuller, describing three 
criteria which create strong legal norms: 
First norms can only arise in the context of social norms based on shared 
understandings. Second, internal features of law, which we call criteria of legality, 
are crucial to law’s ability to promote adherence, or to inspire ‘fidelity’. Third, 
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A law may meet all of Fuller’s criteria of legality and be congruent with shared understandings, 
yet still fail to inspire fidelity, becoming ‘dead letter.’
885
 An integral part of strengthening the 
compliance pull of a rule is through practices of legality – interactions – surrounding that rule. 
Brunnée and Toppe insist that “law does not exist merely because legal norms are declared”
886
, 




Using Brunnée and Toope’s framework, DE can be conceived as a practice of legality—
an assertion of legal norms designed to enhance their compliance pull. INGOs/TAGs using DE 
do so as part of what Brunnée and Toope label a community of practice – a group of actors 
(consisting of states and NSAs) that “make, maintain and remake international law.”
888
 In the 
face of non-compliance, “the efforts of such actors to reassert shared norms play a crucial role in 
upholding international legality, and in drawing delinquent actors back towards compliance.”
889
  
Delinquents are not forced into compliance, but as practices of legality surrounding a particular 
law increase, so does the compliance pull of that law. Non-compliance becomes more obvious 
and a more pressing issue in the face of continued efforts at enforcement and greater compliance. 
Gradually a situation where non-compliance may have been commonplace transforms to one 
where it is exceptional, and the pressure on delinquents increases, making them more likely to 
comply.
890
 The creation of practices of legality around an otherwise dead letter law is crucial to 
making that law matter. Laws become dead letter and ineffectual when they are not followed, but 
also when there are no practices of legality surrounding them – efforts to follow the law, efforts 
at enforcements, and recognitions of violation in the event of non-compliance.  
This is particularly applicable with respect to international conservation laws, such as the 
SOWS, which exert modest to weak compliance pull. These laws lack strong enforcement 
measures, monitoring, and other state-driven practices of legality. In this absence, NSAs 
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intervene in order to foster practices of legality through their own initiative. When the SSCS uses 
DE to enforce the SOWS and the commercial whaling moratorium, it is contributing to the 
practices of legality surrounding these regimes and thereby strengthening the compliance pull of 
these regimes. 
Here one might object and argue that DE activism cannot plausibly be construed as a 
practice of legality insofar as activists may violate the law through their enforcement actions.
891
 
Several points can be made in response. DE, arguably, has a precedent in domestic laws that 
allow citizens to undertake arrests in order to prevent a crime.
892
 Domestic law in many countries 
regard acts of ‘citizen’s arrest’ as defensible, provided they adhere to principles of ‘just cause’ 
(which suggests that there must be reasonable grounds to believe that an arrest is necessary in 
order to prevent a crime) and ‘proportionality.’
893
  As has been noted, doctrines of just cause and 
of proportionality play a prominent role in DE strategizing and rhetoric. Furthermore, the laws 
around which DE fosters interactions are not the same laws which activists might violate through 
confrontational action. The SSCS seeks to enforce international conservation law, with its 
actions seeking to create a practice of legality around these conservation laws. If this practice of 
legality violates other legal norms, such as SUA or the IRPCS, it does not adversely affect the 
practice of legality in which the SSCS is engaged, particularly if the SSCS keeps its actions 
proportionate, which, it goes to considerable length to do. Brunnée and Toope postulate that 
“[l]egal obligation can exist even in the face of contrary practice [although] widespread failure to 
uphold the law as formally enunciated leads to a sense of hypocrisy which undermines fidelity to 
law, and may ultimately destroy the posited rule.”
894
 It is unlikely that potential minor violations 
of the IRPCS on the part of the SSCS threaten the compliance pull of these regulations, but it is 
possible that the SSCS’s enforcement of the SOWS or of the commercial whaling moratorium 
may strengthen the compliance pull of these laws. Finally, it is entirely possible that an 
enforcement action could be carried out without violating any laws or regulations. Unlike 
Mégret’s CD as a form of law enforcement, violation of the law by activists is incidental, not 
central to the strategy of DE.  
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It should be noted, that this remains true for hard and soft law. Legal scholars often 
distinguish between hard and soft law. Hard law is used to refer to “legally binding obligations 
that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed 
regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.”
895
 Soft law 
has been described as ‘non-treaty agreements’
896
 and as “non-binding or voluntary resolutions 
and codes of conduct formulated and accepted by international and regional organisations… to 
statements prepared by individuals in a non-governmental capacity, but which purport to lay 
down international principles.”
897
  DE can endeavour to enforce either soft or hard law, although 
efforts to enforce hard law are likely to prove more fruitful, given the clarity of hard law and the 
fact that it is generally perceived as more binding than soft law.  
The practice of engaging in DE is also a form of norm entrepreneurship. When activists 
labour to enforce an international law, they are not only increasing the compliance pull of that 
law by contributing to the practices of legality surrounding it, they are also asserting another 
norm; their right to enforce the law. By acting to enforce international laws, activists are 
attempting to alter the shared understanding of the role of INGOs/TAGs, in order that 
INGOs/TAGs are understood as empowered to enforce the law. The act of an INGO/TAG 
enforcing a law, any law, has the effect of creating a ‘practice of legality’ around the norm that 
activists are empowered to enforce international laws. To adapt Mégret, the direct enforcement 
of international law, “manifests an aspiration by individuals to behave as citizens of the world 
and take international law seriously.”
898
 Activists project an idealistic interpretation of 
international law where individuals can act to uphold the law, not only proposing it theoretically, 
but by enacting it. Activists are assuming a place within a community of practice. The effect of 
this is that DE practitioners are not only asserting that their actions are meaningful to the 
practices of legality within that community, but acting upon these assertions, which has the effect 
of making them part of that particular community of practice – part of reality. In claiming that its 
actions are mandated by the WCN, the SSCS is contributing its own interpretation to the 
practices of legality that surround the WCN, asserting that sections 21 and 24 are a mandate for 
DE. The more interactions the SSCS generates around this interpretation, the more the 
                                                 
895
 Abbott and Snidal 2000:421. 
896
 Hillgenberg 1999. 
897
 Chinkin 1989:851. 
898
 Mégret 2008:16.  
185 
 
interpretation is reinforced and becomes part of shared understandings of the role of 
INGOs/TAGs in IR.  
186 
 
CHAPTER 8 – ISSUE SELECTION AND DIRECT ENFORCEMENT IN OTHER 
CAMPAIGNS  
8.1 - DE Beyond Anti-Whaling 
 
Conceptualizing SSCS strategy as DE serves to explain SSCS actions and the 
mechanisms which make them effective. An analysis of the history of SSCS anti-whaling actions 
reveals some of the learning process which resulted in the development of DE applied to the 
Antarctic anti-whaling campaign. In its earlier campaigns, the SSCS employed DA against both 
legal and illegal targets, and used explosives and intentional rammings. The SSCS has moderated 
its approach, eschewing rammings and the use of explosives and has focused its actions against 
targets which can be claimed to be in violation of the law. The SSCS also avoids engaging in 
confrontational actions within state jurisdictions, in an endeavor to avoid intervention by state 
authorities, such as the Farley Mowat ship confiscation incident or the Whales Forever/Andenes 
incident. The organization has refined DE during the course of its Antarctic anti-whaling 
operations, experimenting with various tactics, adding elements of ‘enforcement and legal 
symbolism’ to its vessels (for example the use of uniforms for the crew and the removal of the 
‘rammed’ category from the ships’ kill flags). Much of the SSCS’s past experience has 
contributed to the development of DE. There are two questions not resolved by studying the 
SSCS Antarctic anti-whaling strategy, a) questions of issue selection, and b) whether DE is 
unique to the anti-whaling campaign.  
The SSCS anti-whaling campaign serves as an excellent case study for the understanding 
of SSCS strategy, but is not as well suited to examining questions of issue selection. In spite of a 
consideration of the Antarctic anti-whaling campaign since its inception, it remains unclear 
whether DE was developed as an optimal strategy following issue selection, or whether the issue 
was selected due to the existence of favourable legal frameworks. As we have seen, whaling has 
long been an issue central to the SSCS; likewise, whales are popular and generally considered as 
charismatic fauna, making them good flagship species. In order to give consideration to issue 
selection, it is therefore useful to examine a campaign which was initiated well after the SSCS’s 
development of DE on the anti-whaling campaign. Towards this end, the SSCS’s bluefin tuna 
187 
 
campaign serves as a useful supplementary case study. As Burke noted, the bluefin tuna 
campaign represents the SSCS ‘testing the waters’ for future campaigns, apparently 
experimenting with the use of more DE-oriented campaigns.
899
 
An examination of the SSCS bluefin tuna campaign also serves another purpose. The 
goal of studying SSCS anti-whaling strategy was not to develop an idiosyncratic description of 
this strategy, but was to further our understanding of how NSAs can exert influence in 
international affairs. Determining whether or not the SSCS applies DE to any of its other 
campaigns can help clarify whether this strategy is specific to the nuances of the whaling issue. 
While legal frameworks favourable to DE exist around Antarctic whaling, the issue also has 
other features which make it well suited to INGO/TAG campaigning in general. Whales are 
charismatic, making them well suited to serve as flagship species, and the anti-whaling norm has 
been widely proliferated. Operations occur in a remote area, relies on a single factory ship 
(bottleneck) and the Japanese whaling industry, despite the government support it receives, is 
small. Using the SSCS anti-whaling campaign as a case study serves to identify DE, but a 
separation of DE from the whaling issue is necessary in order to ascertain that DE is not unique 
to the issue.  
Study of the SSCS strategy in its bluefin tuna campaign indicates that DE is not unique to 
the whaling issue. Scrutiny of this campaign, reveals learning on the part of the SSCS and that 
the SSCS has indeed focused more specifically on legal claims and enforcement.
900
  The bluefin 
tuna issue is bereft of any of the notably favourable characteristics present in the whaling issue. 
The SSCS having adopted this issue despite its apparent shortcomings suggests that issue 
selection was motivated, at least in part, by the existence of legal frameworks favourable to DE. 
Comparing the SSCS’s use of DE on the bluefin tuna campaign with approaches taken by 
organizations such as Greenpeace, which employed DA on the same issue, serves to illustrate 
how DE differs from other INGO/TAG strategies.   
After examining the SSCS’s use of DE in its bluefin tuna campaign, this chapter 
concludes with a survey of other NSAs which employ DE in order to establish that DE is not an 
idiosyncrasy of the SSCS, but can be employed by a range of actors across a range of issues. 
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Towards this end, the use of DE by other marine and land-based conservation groups and the use 
of DE on other, non-conservation related campaigns is explored.  
 
8.2 - DE in Other SSCS Campaigns – Blue Fin Tuna  
8.2.1 - Background and Conventional INGO/TAG Efforts 
 
Overfishing is a serious problem, with fish populations in decline worldwide. Chief 
amongst the species currently threatened is the bluefin tuna. Scarcity and high demand has led to 
soaring prices: the average price for a mature tuna is now over $75,000, and record-breaking 
prices are set each year for particularly large specimens.
901
 This tends to provide incentive for 
overfishing, both legal fishing under government quotas and illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing (IUU). As a result, scientists now believe bluefin tuna may be commercially extinct in the 
Mediterranean Sea in fewer than 5 years.
902
 Although the problem is widely recognized, 
intergovernmental efforts to address the issue have been hampered by a combination of poor 
enforcement capabilities and lack of political will.
903
  
The main body responsible for the management of Atlantic tuna is the International 
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT). Created in 1972, ICCAT is 
charged with the conservation of tuna in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas, but has proven 
incapable of stopping IUU fishing. Member states have repeatedly failed to reduce official catch 
limits, as recommended by the ICCAT Standing Committee on Research and Statistics, and 
ICCAT resolutions to curb IUU fishing having been widely disobeyed.
904
  Similar to the IWC 
and other conservation regimes, ICCAT lacks concrete enforcement measures and economic 
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interests appear to outweigh conservation issues.
905
 In addition to ICCAT regulations, bluefin 
tuna fisheries in the Mediterranean are also regulated by the European Commission, which has 
incorporated ICCAT quotas and regulations into the European common fisheries policy (CFP).
906
 
The Commission is in charge of testing national inspection systems to ensure that they 
effectively comply with regulations, however it only employs 25 inspectors who are capable of 
conducting 130 inspections per year.
907
 ICCAT employs no independent inspectors, relying 
instead on those of contracting governments.
908
 Due to these meager efforts, tuna populations 
continue to drop.  
The challenges faced by campaigners on the bluefin tuna issue are synonymous with 
those inherent to many environmental issues. Tuna lack key attributes, such as clear resonance 
with existing international norms, to make them amenable to conventional advocacy 
strategies.
909
 Similarly, the issue lacks a clear human dimension, a clear causal chain, particularly 
potent or symbolic cases, and clear identifiable perpetrators to be held to account.
910
 One way in 
which environmental campaigners have sought to overcome these problems, is through the use of 
a flagship species, however bluefin tuna, unlike whales, lack the requisite charismatic features. 
The WWF implicitly made this point when it ran an advertisement campaign featuring images of 
bluefin tuna wearing a panda mask, with the caption “Would You Care More if I Was a 
Panda?”
911
 Few conservation groups have attempted to mobilize public opinion on the issue, and 
instead have focused on lobbying policy-makers, and on monitoring and enforcing existing 
fisheries regulations. 
Since 2009 a number of INGOs/TAGs have sought to address the problem through a 
range of strategies. Conventional lobbying strategies were used, with organizations such as 
Oceana, the PEW Environment Group, WWF and Greenpeace providing information and 
technical advice to delegates in an effort to convince ICCAT to adopt tougher regulations and 
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 When these efforts were unsuccessful, INGOs/TAGs turned their attention to 
CITES. Similar strategies were employed within CITES, and as a result, it was widely expected 
that bluefin tuna would be included in Annex I of CITES, which would have banned trade in this 




8.2.2 - DE and Bluefin Tuna 
 
While bluefin tuna may lack characteristics which make them favourable to conventional 
INGO/TAG strategies, the bluefin tuna issue does have characteristics which invite the use of 
DE, specifically the existence of regulatory framework, in the form of ICCAT quotas and the 
CFP. In 2010, both the SSCS and Greenpeace sent vessels to the Mediterranean to document 
IUU fishing and to harass fishing boats.
914
 The SSCS employed a distinctly DE strategy, while 
Greenpeace’s approach can be more accurately described as symbolic politics and DA. In May 
2010, Greenpeace deployed the Rainbow Warrior and Arctic Sunrise to blockade the French port 
of Frontignan. Greenpeace called for an “immediate closure of the Mediterranean bluefin 
fishery…until scientists can verify that the species has recovered.”
915
 In doing so, Greenpeace 
was seeking to draw attention to the issue of bluefin tuna overfishing, and to prevent fishing 
from occurring. Since Greenpeace instituted the blockade before annual quotas had been 
reached, many of the boats targeted were engaged in legal fishig, prompting the European 
Commission for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries to condemn the blockade, and relegating the 
strategy into the category of image politics and DA.
916
 Later in the campaign, two Greenpeace 
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RIBs were sunk and an activist struck with a boat hook, after French fishermen, fishing legally, 
reacted violently to efforts to release their catch.
917
 A Greenpeace blog entry described how  
in the middle of the melee I was talking on radio to a patrolling French warship, 
there to monitor the fishery. They called us to read out a pre-prepared script about 
how ICCAT had everything under control, and they were monitoring the fishery 
closely. When I explained we were taking action precisely because ICCAT had 
not done enough their response was to ask us not to interfere with the fishing 
operations because they were legal. To that I simply replied that it didn't matter if 
the fishery was legal, if it was pushing the species towards extinction and that we 




The limitations of DA in this context are clear; the French could not be leveraged into taking 
action, because, as the blogger notes, Greenpeace was targeting legal operations. 
The SSCS, by contrast, adopted an approach which was consistent with DE, only 
targeting unregistered vessels and those which continued to fish after the close of the season, 
and/or after their nation had exceeded its allotted quota. A SSCS press release from 2010 
highlights the campaign’s enforcement focus and draws a clear distinction between and DE and 
the approach adopted by Greenpeace: 
SSCS does not believe that publicity stunts and harassment of legal fishing 
operations is the answer to the problem of saving the bluefin tuna from 
extinction... we did not come to the Mediterranean to hang banners and protest. 
Our job is to investigate, identify, and intervene against illegal fishing 
operations...We are an anti-poaching organization and not a protest group.
919 
 
As this quote attests, throughout its campaign to protect bluefin tuna, SSCS has taken great care 
to portray itself as acting in defense of international law. Watson articulated the strategy of the 
SSCS bluefin tuna campaign, noting that  
[i]t is a strategic choice to target only the poachers. It is more difficult and more 
dangerous, but more effective. I don’t really see the benefit of blocking a perfectly 
legal fishing vessel from leaving port for a few hours, which will in any case leave 
to go fishing as planned, with fishers aboard who are a little more upset with 
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‘environmentalists.’ We are interested in concrete results. Destructive but legal 
fishing must be fought on legal grounds. At sea, we fight the poachers because 
they are the ones we are in a position to stop.”
920
 
This statement makes it clear the desired intent of DE to avoid backlash by deflecting potential 




The SSCS sent several ships to the Mediterranean to document illegal fishing practices. 
However, activists did not engage or harass fishing vessels until the European Commission for 
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries announced on June 9, 2010 that the official annual tuna quota had 
been reached. Only at this point did the SSCS target fishing boats which continued to operate. 
On June 17, 2010, the Steve Irwin challenged the Cesare Rustico, an Italian vessel towing two 
cages containing bluefin tuna. After notifying ICCAT of a possible violation to fisheries laws 
and receiving no response, five SSCS divers entered the cages and cut the nets, releasing an 
estimated 800 tons of fish back into the sea.
922
 Following this action, the SSCS was sued by Fish 
& Fish, the owners of the damaged fishing equipment. The court case was resolved on June 25th 
2012, when it was dismissed from a UK court when the justice determined that the court was not 
the proper place to hear the case. While the principle of unclean hands did not shield the SSCS 
from legal attack in this case, the complicated legal issues surrounding the incident involving the 
Cesare Rustico – the fact that the Italian owners of a vessel, fishing in Maltese waters, claimed 
damages from a Dutch registered vessel, owned by SSCS UK, operated by an INGO, and 




What the bluefin tuna case study does illustrate is that the SSCS has made DE central to 
its strategy, and that its language is focused on enforcement and the law. Conservation 
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significance clearly played a part in issue selection, yet there are many issues with similar 
conservation significance upon which the SSCS does not campaign. The issue has clearly been 
adopted due to the existence of favourable legal frameworks which make the use of DE possible.  
It is difficult to determine whether the campaign to save bluefin tuna has had a 
measurable effect on the recovery of fish stocks. Continuing concerns amongst biologists seem 
to suggest that all efforts so far have been insufficient. One of the challenges faced by the bluefin 
tuna campaign is that there are no easily targeted bottlenecks which would make DE more 
effective. Unlike the whaling issue, where the Japanese fleet’s dependence on one factory ship 
makes it particularly susceptible to confrontational action, bluefin tuna are caught by thousands 
of fishing vessels throughout the Mediterranean. What can be said is that the SSCS’s DE-based 
campaign appears more successful than previous advocacy efforts in reducing IUU fishing, and 
in forcing key players, such as the European Commission, to pay heed. 
 
8.3 - DE and Other Campaigns 
 
While the bluefin tuna case serves to illustrate that DE is not exclusive to the SSCS’s 
anti-whaling campaign, additional investigation is required to determine whether DE is an 
idiosyncrasy of the SSCS. An examination of other (I)NGO/TAGs reveals that DE is being 
employed on marine conservation issues by other (I)NGOs, and on land-based conservation 
issues. This indicates that DE is not exclusively an international phenomenon and that it can be 
employed in a domestic context. DE is also not exclusive to (I)ENGOs/ETAGs, and has been 
employed on non-environmental/conservation issues.  
 
8.3.1 - DE and Marine Conservation 
 
The strategy of DE in maritime conservation campaigning is not exclusive to the SSCS. 
Several smaller conservation organizations, emulating the SSCS model, have recently emerged.  
The Black Fish (TBF) is a European-based marine conservation group launched by former SSCS 





 TBF engages in what it describes as ‘citizen led enforcement.’
925
 The organization has 
purchased a RIB and operates several aerial drones (UAVs), which it currently employs in 
“[p]atrolling areas of the Mediterranean Sea to monitor the illegal use of driftnets and where 
possible taking action to challenge illegality.”
926
 Another fledgling organization is the Earthrace 
Conservation Society, formed by Pete Bethune after a falling out with Watson following the 
Bethune-Ady Gil incident (Chapter 5.3.3.3, above). Thus far, this organization has demonstrated 
limited activity, and has been primarily involved in monitoring sealing in Namibia.
927
 Another 
organization, the Blue Seals, formed by long-time SSCS activist Peter Brown, owns a sea plane 




There are also examples of groups without any ties to the SSCS employing DE. Recent 
years have witnessed the emergence of a number of local fisher organizations in Mexico created 
with the purpose of protecting local stocks from overexploitation by outsiders and with the 
enforcement of local protected areas. The organization Eco-Alianza has helped found the group 
Pescadores Vigilantes (Vigilant Fishermen) in Loreto Mexico, as a response to sporadic official 
enforcement of fishing regulations and permits which lead to fishing from mainland fleets 
threatening the Loreto fish stocks and the violation of permit schemes in the Parque Nacional 
Bahia de Loreto.
929
 A host of similar organizations have sprung up across Mexico. While most of 
these organizations work essentially as monitoring groups, as a presence to deter would-be 
poachers and to report poaching incidents to the authorities, they also confront poachers, and 
conversations with an official with the Mexican Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca 
(CONAPESCA) suggest that these confrontations  may be aggressive and can often lead to 
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 Another such group is the Mendocino Abalone Watch (MAW) in California, USA, 
whose stated purpose is “to enhance regulatory enforcement and protection of the abalone 
resource along the Mendocino Coast.”
931
 Although groups such as MAW focus principally on 
monitoring, they also confront poachers directly. For example, MAW has been known to make 
citizen’s arrests of abalone poachers.
932
 The emergence of groups employing DE independent of 
any sort of dissemination of strategy linked to the SSCS suggests that this is not required in order 
for groups to develop DE-based strategies on their own, and that the strategy has been adopted 
by a number of independent actors. These organizations’ use of DE in domestic settings indicates 
that the use of DE is not limited to the international setting. 
It appears that relying on DE as a principal strategy tends to be favoured by small 
organizations. This can be attested to the fact the targeted enforcement actions can be much less 
expensive than widespread awareness raising efforts which must reach millions in order to be 
effective. This is not to suggest that DE cannot be a component of the strategies used by larger 
organizations. A case in point is Greenpeace, whose principal strategy is symbolic politics. There 
are also elements of DE employed by several Greenpeace campaigns both at sea, and on land. 
For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Greenpeace deployed Sirius in an anti-dumping 
campaign in the Atlantic Ocean. Activists piloted zodiacs under the dumping platforms of the 
UK registered Gem and other vessels, to prevent them from illegally dumping barrels of toxic 
and radioactive waste.
933 
These actions represent a combination of the Greenpeace ‘human 





8.3.2 - Conservation DE on Land 
 
While the high seas present an ideal theatre in which to employ DE due to limited 
jurisdiction and enforcement by states and often overlapping regulatory frameworks, the use of 
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DE is not limited to this theatre. DE has been implemented in coastal waters, as in the case of the 
Pescadores Vigilantes, and on land, by MAW. Greenpeace has also incorporated DE into some 
of its land-based campaigns. For example, in 1991, following several months of scientific 
research and a legal action, which sought to establish that the outflow from a pipe was in 
violation of the 1989 Water Act, Greenpeace activists temporarily blocked the outflow pipe of 
the Albright & Wilson plant in Cumbria (UK). Albright & Wilson subsequently sued Greenpeace 
for £250,000 in lost production and £50,000 in damages. The plaintiffs lost the suit, and not only 




8.3.3 - DE on Other Issues 
 
The use of DE is evidently not limited to (marine) environmental organizations and 
campaigns. One salient example of the use of DE is the case of ‘hacktivism’ – vigilantism on the 
internet. In many ways the internet shares similar legal characteristics with the high seas. 
Computer hackers (‘hacktivists’) have taken advantage of this to engage in DE online. A 
prominent example is that of anti-child pornography vigilantes, such as Ethical Hackers Against 
Pedophilia which engages in “direct vigilantism by hacking into and disabling suspected 
offenders’ computers, posting anti-pedophile messages on pedophile bulletin boards, and 
swamping pedophile newsgroups with the aim of closing them down.”
936
 The hacker group 
‘Anonymous’ launched ‘#OpPedoChat’, a campaign which promises “defaces, logs & dox and 
the occasional domain hijack” of child pornography websites.
937
 In 2011, the group’s operation 
‘#OpDarknet’ claimed responsibility for “taking offline over 40 websites used for sharing 
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pedophilia - and for exposing the names and identifying information of more than 1500 alleged 
pedophiles that had been using the sites.”
938
  
DE has been used on a wide range of issues where activists can make a credible claim to 
enforce the law. DE can be more readily employed by small relatively resource poor 
organizations and groups, suggesting that an additional benefit of DE is its cost effectiveness 
relative to conventional INGO/TAG strategies. Of course, there is also evidence of DE being 
incorporated into the campaigns of larger organizations, which suggests that its use is not limited 
to these small resource-poor groups. It seems as though the permissive nature of legal structures 
such as those governing the high seas and the internet, which are ripe with flagrant non-
compliance, also facilitate the use of DE. However, it is evident from the noted examples that 
DE is not exclusive to use in such theatres and that it can also be implemented in domestic 
settings. Additional research will undoubtedly reveal more (I)NGOs/TAGs which use DE or 
incorporate elements of DE into their campaigns. 
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION 
9.1 - Innovation at the Margins 
 
This study was launched with the intent of gaining insight into the strategy of the SSCS 
and by so doing to expand our understanding of the strategies employed by IENGOs and 
ETAGs. The SSCS is an organization whose strategy is unlike any described in the INGO/TAG 
literature. It is a relatively small and resource-poor organization employing an aggressive and 
confrontational outsider strategy, a strategy which defies classification in Keck and Sikkink’s 
typology of INGO/TAG actions. Existing literature on the role of NSAs in IR suggests that such 
a strategy can be expected to achieve marginal success, however the SSCS has been successful in 
achieving its ambitious goals and in compelling states into action. The SSCS has effectively 
disrupted Japanese whaling and has also leveraged the Australian government into taking steps 
to enforce the laws within its jurisdiction.  
A close examination of the SSCS anti-whaling strategy reveals that the SSCS is engaging 
in DE – whereby it actively and aggressively seeks to enforce existing marine conservation laws 
through the use of DA. The organization’s confrontational actions serve to effectively force its 
targets to comply with international laws. Enforcement need not necessarily require 
confrontation or aggression, however given circumstances, this may be the most effective form 
of enforcement. Escalating costs to a non-compliant target and physically preventing its illegal 
actions is an effective way of ensuring compliance.  
Engaging in confrontational intervention makes for effective enforcement but it also 
exposes activists to potential retaliation from targets and from state intervention. DE employs 
several mechanisms which greatly reduce potential retaliation. Activists are protected by the 
principle of unclean hands, in as much as targets do not wish to draw attention to their own 
wrongdoings by indicting activists. If claims of non-compliance are credible, the target is less 
likely to retaliate. A further deterrent is the tangled web of international laws in which activists 
surround themselves and their operation, secure in the knowledge that states wish to avoid 
complications or potentially embarrassing international incidents.  
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Activists’ claims to enforcement also exert considerable leverage on states to enforce 
their own laws and live up to international obligations. This approach eschews the use of moral 
in favour of legal leverage. Rather than criticizing states for violating (potentially contested) 
norms, DE speaks the language of states, not only criticizing their failure to live up to their 
international commitments and obligations, but through the use of confrontations which cannot 
be ignored. Appealing to the law and enforcement of the law is powerful. Using the law allows 
activists to speak a universal language, which can be effective in circumventing moral deadlocks. 
In speaking directly to states, DE obviates the need to mobilize large segments of the population, 
and to a considerable degree insulates activists and campaigns from possible backlash of public 
opinion. 
While the SSCS is able to take advantage of the complex legal context specific to the 
Southern Ocean, a survey of other groups similarly engaged in DE indicates that DE is not 
limited to use on the high seas. The requirements of DE appear to be that activists must be able 
to make convincing claims to legal authority, appear and behave as law enforcement, select 
targets which are violating laws, and protect themselves by entwining their campaigns in law and 
legalities in general. An examination of the SSCS’s use of DE on its bluefin tuna campaign 
indicates that the strategy may be particularly well suited to issues that otherwise lack 
characteristics considered favourable to INGO/TAG campaigning. The fact that it can be 
difficult to identify environmental problems with short causal chains and which involve clear 
ideas about right and wrong, and that many pressing environmental issues also lack charismatic 
flagship species which might otherwise compensate for these weaknesses, make DE well suited 
to environmental issues.
939
 Effective campaigns employing DE can be extended beyond issues 
involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, legal equality of opportunity, or charismatic 
fauna. Instead, issues only require existing legal framework upon which enforcement claims can 
be made in order to serve as the subject of effective INGO/TAG campaigns.  In this way, DE is 
highly versatile, as activists can engage in a form of jurisdictional arbitrage, selecting from a 
range of international and domestic laws upon which to make their enforcement claims.  
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9.2 - Limitations and Challenges of DE 
 
DE is not without limitations and is far from a strategic panacea. While potentially 
extending the range of issues upon which activists can successfully campaign, DE’s reliance on 
an existing legal frameworks serves as a limitation of the strategy: because DE can only enforce 
laws once they are enacted, other conventional INGOs/TAGs strategies are still necessary at 
earlier stages of the global policy making process; specifically in the agenda setting and 
negotiation stages. DE is suited to ensuring compliance at the implementation stage.  
DE requires that practitioners find a well considered balance between aggression and 
confrontation while maintaining an image as an enforcement organization. As elaborated upon, 
the ‘practices of legality’ which constitute DE can easily appear as ‘practices of illegality’ should 
practitioners fail to appear proportionate. This may mean avoiding the use of tactics which might 
otherwise prove effective. Activists engaging in DE must also expend considerable effort in 
promoting and maintaining their image. Such efforts influence the types of issues upon which 
they can campaign, the structure and leadership of the organization, and may further limit the use 
of other strategies. As is evident in the case of the SSCS’s exclusion from IWC meetings, DE 
may not be compatible with other conventional INGO/TAG strategies.  
DE also suffers from an additional constraint, notably target selection and the overall 
effectiveness of DA. DA, and as a consequence DE, appears most effective against bottlenecks 
and against private targets. Examination of the SSCS’s bluefin tuna campaign reveals that the 
effectiveness of this campaign suffered for lack of an easily targeted bottleneck. In this case, the 
SSCS was only able to target a single vessel out of potentially thousands, and while the release 
of 800 bluefin tuna may be significant to the targeted company, the impact of this action on the 
industry was minimal, particularly when compared to the organization’s impact on Japanese 
whaling. The ‘cost escalation’ or ‘resource burn’ component of DE and DA is more difficult to 
enact against wealthy targets, particularly states. One of the challenges facing the SSCS in its 
efforts to ‘put the whalers out of business,’ is that JARPA and the ICR are subsidized by the state 





9.3 - An Expanded Role for NSAs in IR 
 
Understanding DE serves to expand our understanding of the role of INGOs and TAGs in 
IR. This study has demonstrated that there is indeed a larger role for DA in IR, notably as the 
enforcement mechanism of DE. DE challenges classification in Keck and Sikkink’s typology of 
actions,
940
 whereas this study suggests an expansion of the typology to include the new category 
of ‘enforcement politics.’ When the SSCS engages in DE it is actively enforcing compliance, 
rather than merely documenting and reporting instances of non-compliance. By so doing, the 
SSCS reaches high into the hierarchy of Florini and Simmons’ ‘instruments of power’ to tools 
which are generally seen as belonging exclusively to states.
941
 The success of the SSCS approach 
challenges IR scholars who claim that INGOs and TAGs lack any ‘real enforcement power,’ and 
instead rely on persuasion.
942
 The strategy is highly coercive and physically alters targets’ 
behaviour.  
In employing DE, the SSCS discards the role of protesting supplicant, seeking to 
persuade, influence and advocate, and assumes an expanded role of an actor who is capable of 
engaging in aggressive action which has a tangible and significant impact in IR. This is a bold re-
imagining of the role of NSAs in IR, one which suggests that individuals can endeavour to 
uphold international laws when states fail. Importantly, this vision of an expanded role for NSAs 
in international law is not simply advocated, it is aggressively enacted. When activists move to 
enforce a specific international law, they not only strengthen practices of legality surrounding 
that law (and therefore its compliance pull), but they also assert their right to enforce that law. 
Activists’ use of DE also demonstrates that they are not constrained to operate within parameters 
of actions granted to them by states. Activists assert their right to enforce laws absent of any state 
sanction. This assertion represents a bold re-interpretation of the role of NSAs in IR. 
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9.4 - Practical Implications 
 
This study also sought to contribute to improvement and refinement of IENGO/ETAG 
strategies. DE is a relatively inexpensive, versatile, and aggressive outsider strategy, which is 
capable of levelling considerable power in the international arena. A comprehensive analysis of 
this strategy can refine its application, increase its rate of success, and perhaps foster further 
ameliorations and innovation. Pressing environmental problems which imperil ecosystems 
worldwide require urgent action on every possible front, expanding the role of NSAs is 
particularly valuable in the face of prolonged inaction on the part of states.  
Opportunities for the use of DE by INGOs/TAGs most certainly abound. There are hosts 
of pressing environmental problems which cannot be effectively addressed using conventional 
INGO/TAG strategies, but which do have laws upon which claims to DE could be based. Issues 
such as climate change and ecosystem conservation have long causal chains and are difficult to 
frame simply in terms of right or wrong. Tragedies of the commons such as these too often lack 
clear easily defined and targeted ‘villains.’  Issues such as the expansion of krill fisheries and 
ocean acidification present a challenge to conventional INGO/TAG strategies, yet protecting 
creatures such as molluscs and crustaceans, for instance, is absolutely vital to the stability of 
marine ecosystems. The use of DE may well be suited to such issues. 
DE is attractive to activists because it produces concrete, direct and often immediate 
results. The question arises as to whether activists can wait for conventional advocacy and 
awareness raising efforts to have an effect on international policies? Activists may turn to 
approaches which express the urgency of the situation and which promise more immediate and 
tangible results. 
DE may be preferred on certain issues which would otherwise be amenable to 
conventional INGO/TAG strategies. Environmental activists can turn to DE as a means of 
avoiding the use of potentially divisive and backlash-inducing moral claims. Working with 
groups to facilitate adherence to the law may be a more constructive approach – one conducive 
to constructing alliances – than accusing such groups of being norm violators. The whaling issue 




On the subject of alliance building, DE may serve as a means of engaging stakeholders in 
conservation. As in the case of the Pescadores Vigilantes, locals can assume a prominent role in 
conservation.  In this case, fishers were not driven to enforce local permitting schemes and to 
protect fish stocks out of conservation concerns, but were motivated as a means of protecting 
their wellbeing and livelihood.  Regardless of the motivations prompting its use, DE serves as a 




DE offers the potential of extending the effectiveness of campaigning beyond the 
conclusion of an international agreement. All too often, hard fought international environmental 
agreements have lapsed into ‘dead letter’ status once the issue-attention cycles surrounding them 
wane. Conventional monitoring strategies which rely on ‘naming and shaming’ require ongoing 
public attention focused on the issue, which in turn makes them less effective as the attention a 
specific issue receives recedes. It is at this stage that DE, which does not depend on mobilizing 
public sentiment, can be particularly effective.  
DE has distinct appeal for relatively resource poor INGOs/TAGs. The examination of 
other groups employing DE revealed that many such groups lack the resources necessary to 
engage in more conventional INGO/TAG strategies.
944
 Widespread awareness campaigns, 
designed to reach millions are expensive in comparison to targeted enforcement actions which 
can be carried out on a modest budget. 
 
9.4 - Additional Questions 
 
Findings contained herein lead to the formulation of additional questions. First, does the 
use of DE limit an INGO’s/TAG’s ability to employ other strategies and is the use of DE 
complimentary to other strategies? Clearly, monitoring is well paired with DE. While the SSCS’s 
use of aggressive and confrontational DE may have severely limited its ability to employ insider 
strategies, it does not preclude their use by other organizations. For example, TBF is attempting 
to employ its DE in cooperation with states and regulatory authorities.
945
 DE may therefore be 
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effectively coupled with insider strategies involved in policy making. Exploration of other 
groups engaging in DE will likely shed more light on these questions and is likely to reveal areas 
for additional research into the effective combination of DE with other strategies.  
Another question enquires into which level of law – domestic, international, or 
potentially other sources – are best suited to DE? Anton suggests that the SSCS may have 
stronger claims to enforcement if it were to seek to enforce Australian domestic, rather than 
international, conservation laws.
946
 Anton also draws attention to a limited number of states (he 
counts 21) which have laws permitting ‘citizen arrest’, which, in so far as the domestic arena is 
concerned, may constrain the use of DE.
947
 Additional research will be required to ascertain if 
this is in fact the case, and to identify additional jurisdictions which might prove favourable to 
the use of DE.  
Another pertinent question asks are there other sources of law which may support the use 
of DE, such as municipal or tribal law? Can activists engage in DE in order to enforce laws of 
their own pronouncement, or laws originating from sources other than the state or international 
agreements? Would such actions still maintain the authority and power of DE, or stray into the 
domain of CD? Additional areas of inquiry involve the potential use of components of DE, such 
as enforcement imagery and rhetoric, to bolster the effectiveness of campaigns in the absence of 
definable acts of DE. This generally addresses exploring the power of legal claims compared to 
other types of claims. The findings of this study broadly support the claim that there is power 
inherent in actions which seek to enforce the law, and by extension, that evoking the law can 
strengthen rhetoric and serve as a means to circumvent deadlocks which tend to occur as a result 
of protracted normative conflicts. A comparison of moral versus legal claims and their relative 
effectiveness may well prove particularly informative.   
Finally, while the single case study of the SSCS served as an excellent means of 
identifying and elaborating DE strategy, additional studies can increase our understanding of this 
strategy and carry the promise of further revelations regarding the use of direct enforcement by 
(I)NGOs/TAGs. 
 
                                                 
946
 See Anton 2010a. 
947
 Anton 2010a:6. These include Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Brazil, India, 





Abbey, Edward. Hayduke Lives! A Novel. United States: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 
-------- The Monkey Wrench Gang. Salt Lake City: Dream Garden Press, 1985. 
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” 
International Organizations, 54:3 (Summer, 2000), 421-456. 
Ackerman, Peter, and Christopher Kruegler. Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of 
People Power in the Twentieth Century. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994.  
Anderson, Jon. “Spatial Politics in Practice: The Style and Substance of Environmental Direct 
Action.” Antipode, (2004), 106-125. 
Andonova, Liliana B., and Ronald Mitchell. “The Rescaling of Global Environmental Politics.” 
Annual Review of Environment and Resources, 35 (2010), 255-282. 
Andresen, Steiner, and Tora Skodvin. “Non-state Influence in the International Whaling 
Commission, 1970-1990.” Global Environmental Politics, 3:4 (2008), 61-86. 
Anonymous. “On the Frontlines: With Captain Paul Watson and the Sea Shepherd Conservation 
Society.” Resistance: Journal of the Earth Liberation Movement (Fall 2009), 13-19, 31, 
35.  
Anonymous. “Down With the Empire! Up with the Spring!” Do or Die: Voices from the 
Ecological Resistance. Vol. 10. (July 2003). 
Anton, Donald K. “Protecting Whales by Hue and Cry – Is There a Role for Non-State Actors in 
the Enforcement of International Law?” The Australian National University College of 
Law Research Paper, No. 10-08 (April, 2010a). 
------- “Dispute Concerning Japan’s JARPA II Program of ‘Scientific Whaling’ (Australia v. 
Japan).” The American Society of International Law, 14:20 (July 8, 2010b). 
-------- “Antarctic Whaling: Australia’s Attempt to Protect Whales in the Southern Ocean.” 
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 36 (2009), 319-351. 
-------- “Australian Jurisdiction and Whales in Antarctica: Why the Australian Whale Sanctuary 
in Antarctic Waters Does Not Pass International Legal Muster and is also a Bad Idea as 
Applied to Non-Nationals.” Asia Pacific Journal of Environmental Law, 11:3&4 (2008), 
159-192. 
-------- “False Sanctuary: The Australian Antarctic Whale Sanctuary and Long-Term Stability in 
Antarctica.” Sustainable Development Law and Policy, 8 (2007-2008), 17-24. 
Arnold, Ron. Ecoterror: The Violent Agenda to Save Nature, the World of the Unabomber. 





Arts, Bas. “Non-State Actors in Global Environmental Governance: New Arrangements Beyond 
the State.” In New Modes of Governance in the Global System: Exploring Publicness, 
Delegation and Inclusiveness. Eds. Mathias Keonig-Archibugi and Michael Zürn. 
Hamshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, 177-200. 
-------- “Gemeinschaftsgüter: Recht, Politik, und Ökonomie.” Preprints aus der Max-Planck-
Projecktgruppe, Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter, Bonn, Germany, 2003-2004. [Non-States 
Actors in Global Governance: Three Faces of Power]. 
-------- “International Policy Arrangements of State and Non-State Actors.” In Non-State Actors 
in International Relations. Eds. Bas Arts, M. Noortman, and B. Reinalda. Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2001, 41-58. 
Ashbridge, David, and Tom Clark. The Seventh Boat. 2012. 
Atkinson, Paul, and Martyn Hammersley. “Ethnography and Participant Observation.” In 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Eds. Norman K. Denzin, and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 
London: SAGE, 1994, 248-261. 
Auer, Matthew. “Who Participates in Global Environmental Governance? Partial Answers from 
International Relations Theory.” Policy Sciences, 33:2 (2000), 155-180. 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority. “Fact Finding Report Into the Reported Collision 
Involving the New Zealand Registered Craft Ady Gil and the Japan Registered Whaling 
Ship Shonan Maru No. 2 in the Southern Ocean on 6 January 2010.” Government of 
Australia. 
Bailer, Stefanie, Thilo Bodenstein, and V. Finn Heinrich. “Explaining the Strength of Civil 
Society: Evidence from Cross-Sectional Data.” International Political Science Review, 
34:3 (June, 2013), 273-288. 
Bailey, Jennifer L. “Arrested Development: The Fight to End Commercial Whaling as a Case of 
Failed Norm Change.” European Journal of International Relations, 14:2 (2008), 289-
318. 
Baker, C. Scott, G.M. Lento, F. Cipriano, M.L. Dalebout, S.R. Palumbi, Mutsuo Goto, and Seiji 
Ohsumi. “Scientific Whaling: Source of Illegal Products for Marker?” Science, 290:5497 
(December 1, 2000), 1695-1696. 
Barley, Stephen R. “Images of Imaging: Notes on Doing Longitudinal Field Work.” 
Organization Science, 1:3 (1990), 220-247. 
Barry, Donald. Icy battleground: Canada, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the 
Seal Hunt. St. John’s: Breakwater Books Ltd., 2005. 
Becker, Howard S. “Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation.” American 
Sociological Review, 23:6 (December, 1958), 652-660. 
Becker, Howard S., and Blanche Geer. “Participant Observation and Interviewing: A 
Comparison.” Human Organization, 16:3 (Fall, 1957), 28-32. 
Beltran, Allana. “Tasmania: We Will Always Be Together in the Forest.” In The Next Eco-
Warriors: 22 Young Women and Men Who are Saving the Planet. Ed. Emily Hunter. San 
Francisco: Conari Press, 2011, 73-84. 
207 
 
Bennett, Andres, and Colin Elman. “Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study 
Methods.” Annual Review of Political Science, 9 (2006), 455-476. 
Bennett, Andrew. “Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages.” In 
Models, Numbers & Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations. Eds. Detlef F. 
Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2004, 19-
55. 
Bennett, W. Lance. “Social Movements Beyond Borders: Understanding Two Eras of 
Transnational Activism.” In Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, 
Passions, and Power. Eds. Della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow. United States: 
Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005, 203-226. 
Berger-Eforo, Judith. “Sanctuary for the Whales: Will This be the Demise of the International 
Whaling Commission or a Viable Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?” Pace 
International Law Journal, 8 (1996), 439-483. 
Besel, Richard D., and Renee S. Besel. “Whale Wars and the Public Screen: Mediating Animal 
Ethics in Violent Times.” In Arguments about Animal Ethics. Eds. Greg Goodale and 
Jason Edward Black. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010, 163-177. 
Best, Steven, and Anthony J. Nocella II. “Introduction: Behind the Mask: Uncovering the 
Animal Liberation Front.” In Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the 
Liberation of Animals. Eds. Best, Steven, and Anthony J. Nocella II. New York: Lantern 
Books, 2004, 9-64. 
Bethune, Pete. Whale Warrior. Auckland: Hodder Moa, 2010. 
Betsill, Michele M., and Elisabeth Corell. “Analytical Framework: Assessing the Influence of 
NGO Diplomats.” In NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations 
in International Environmental Negotiations. Eds. Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell. 
Cambridge, US:MIT Press, 2008,19-41. 
-------- “NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A Framework for 
Analysis.” Global Environmental Politics, 1:4 (November, 2001), 65-85. 
Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. “Transnational Networks and Global Environmental 
Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program.” International Studies 
Quarterly, 48:2 (June, 2004), 471-493. 
Bevington, Douglas, and Chris Dixon. “Movement-Relevant Theory: Rethinking Social 
Movement Scholarship and Activism.” Social Movement Studies, 4:3 (December, 2005), 
185-208. 
Birnie, Patricia. International Regulations of Whaling: From Conservation of Whaling to 
Conservation of Whales and Regulation of Whale Watching. New York: Oceana 
Publishing, 1985.  
Blok, Anders. “War of Whales: Post-Sovereign Science and Agnostic Cosmopolitics in Japan-
Global Whaling Assemblages.” Science, Technology & Human Values, 36:1 (2011), 55-
81. 
-------- “Contesting Global Norms: Politics of Identity in Japanese Pro-Whaling 
Countermobilization.” Global Environmental Politics, 8:2 (2008), 39-66. 
208 
 
Bob, Clifford. The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism. 
Cambridge: CUP, 2005a. 
Bolton, John R. “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?” Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 1 (2000) 205.   
Bornick, Brooke A. “Bounty Hunters and Pirates: Filling in the Gaps of the 1982 U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.” Florida Journal of International Law, 17 (2005), 
259-270. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. “Participant Observation.” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 
9:2 (June, 2003), 281-294. 
Bowen-Jones, Evan, and Abigail Entwistle. “Identifying Appropriate Flagship Species: The 
Importance of Culture and Local Contexts.” Oryx, 36:2 (April, 2002), 189-195. 
Bramble, Barbara J., and Gareth Porter. “Non-Governmental Organizations and the Making of 
US International Environmental Policy.” In The International Politics of the 
Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions. Eds. Andrew Hurell and Benedict 
Kingsbury. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, 313-353. 
Bratman, Eve. “Dynamics of Repitition? Transnational Advocacy Networks and Twenty Years 
of Belo Monte Dam Activism.” International Studies Association (ISA) Annual 
Convention, April 1-4, 2012, San Diego, USA. 
Brown, Jackson. “Eco-Warriors: An Invisible Line?” Australian and New Zealand Maritime Law 
Journal, 26 (2012), 152-162. 
Brown, Michael and John May. The Greenpeace Story. London: Dorling Kindersley, 1989. 
Brunnée, Jutta, and Stephen J. Toope. Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An 
Interactional Account. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law. 
Cambridge: CUP, 2010. 
Burawoy, Michael. “The Extended Case Method.” Sociological Theory, 12:1 (March, 1998), 4-
33. 
Burbach, David T. “Whale Wars and Future Wars: Assessing the Sea Shepherd Campaign 
Against Japanese Antarctic Whaling.” Unpublished manuscript, presented at 
International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, April 1-4, 2012, San Diego, 
USA. 
Burgerman, Susan. Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action. New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2001. 
-------- “Mobilizing Principles: The Role of Transnational Activists in Promoting Human Rights 
Principles.” Human Rights Quarterly, 20 (1998), 905-923. 
Burnett, John S. Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror in the High Seas. London: 
Plume Books, 2003. 
Cameron, Silver Donald. “Paul Watson.” The Green Interview, July 2009. Available at 
http://greeningourlives.com/TGI-downloads/Paul%20Watson%20Transcript.pdf 
(accessed June 6, 2013). 
209 
 
Caprari, Amanda M. “Lovable Pirates? The Legal Implications of the Battle Between 
Environmentalist and Whalers in the Southern Ocean.” Connecticut Law Review, 42:5 
(July, 2010), 1493-1526. 
Carlarne, Cinnamon Piñon. “Saving the Whales in the New Millennium: International 
Institutions, Recent Developments and the Future of International Whaling Policies.” 
Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 24:1 (2005-2006), 1-48. 
Caro, T.M., and Gillian O’Doherty. “On the Use of Surrogate Species in Conservation Biology.” 
Conservation Biology, 13:4 (August, 1999), 805-814. 
Carpenter, Charli R. “Governing the Global Agenda: ‘Gate-keepers’ and ‘Issue Adoption’ in 
Transnational Advocacy Networks.” In Who Governs the Globe? Eds. Deborah D. Avant, 
Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell. Cambridge: CUP, 2010, 202-237. 
-------- “Studying Issue (Non)-Adoption in Transnational Advocacy Networks.” International 
Organization, 61 (Summer, 2007a), 643-667. 
-------- “Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Theorizing Issue Emergence and Nonemergence in 
Transnational Advocacy Networks.” International Studies Quarterly, 51 (2007b), 99-120. 
Carroll, William K., and R. S. Ratner. “Media Strategies and Political Projects: A Comparative 
Study of Social Movements.” The Canadian Journal of Sociology, 24:1 (Winter, 1999), 
1-34. 
Carter, Alan. A Radical Green Political Theory. New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Carter, April. Direct Action and Democracy Today. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005. 
Charnovitz, Steve. “Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law.” The American 
Journal of International Law, 100:2 (April, 2006), 348-372. 
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. The New Sovereignty: Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreements.  USA: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
Chelliah, John, and Brian D’Netto. “Japanese Whaling Strategies.” The Management Case Study 
Journal, 8:2 (2008), 65-82. 
Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict.  New York: Colombia University Press, 2011. 
Chinkin, C.M. “The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law.” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38:4 (October, 1989), 850-866. 
Cianfrani, Carmen, Gwenaëlle La Lay, Luigi Maiorano, Héctor F. Satizábal, Anna Loy, and 
Antione Guisan. “Adapting Global Conservation Strategies to Climate Change at the 
European Scale: The Otter as a Flagship Species.” Biological Conservation, 144:8 
(August, 2011), 2068-2080. 
Clapham, Phillip J., Simon Childerhouse, Nicolas J. Gales, Lorenzo Rojas-Bracho, Michal F. 
Tillman, and Robert L. Brownell Jr. “The Whaling Issue: Conservation, Confusion, and 
Casuistry.” Marine Policy, 31 (2007), 314-319. 
Clapham, Phillip J., et al. “Whaling as Science.” BioScience, 53:3 (March, 2003), 210-212. 
210 
 
Clucas, Barbara, Katherine McHugh, and Tim Caro. “Flagship Species on Covers of US 
Conservation and Nature Magazines.” Biodiversity Conservation, 17 (2008), 1517-1528. 
Cohen, Ian. Green Fire. Australia: Angus and Robertson, 1997. 
Collier, David. “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science & Politics, 44:4 
(October, 2011), 823-830. 
Corell, Donna E. “No Peace for the Greens: The Criminal Prosecution of Environmental 
Activists and the Threat of Organizational Liability.” Rutgers Law Journal, 24 (1992-
1993), 773-805. 
Coronado, Rod. “My Heroes Have Always Killed Cowboys: An Interview with Rod Coronado.” 
Do or Die: Voices from the Ecological Resistance. Vol. 10. (July 2003), 113. 
Court, Joan. The Bunny Hugging Terrorist. Cambridge: Selene Press, 2009. 
Cracknell, Jon. “Issue Arenas, Pressure Groups and Environmental Agendas.” In The Mass 
Media and Environmental Issues.  Ed. Anders Hansen. Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1993, 3-21. 
Crawford, James, and Donald R. Rothwell. “Legal Issues Confronting Australia’s Antarctica.”  
Australian Year Book of International Law, 13 (1990-1991), 53-88. 
Creswell, John W., and Dana L. Miller. “Determining Validity in Qualitative Inquiry.” Theory 
into Practice, 39:3 (Summer, 2000), 124-130. 
Cussler, Clive. White Death. United States: Penguin, 2010. 
D’Amato, Anthony, and Sudhir K. Chopra. “Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life.” American 
Journal of International Law, 85 (1991), 21-62. 
Dai, Xinyuan. “Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism.” International 
Organization, 59:2 (Spring, 2005), 363-398. 
Dale, Stephen. McLuhan’s Children: The Greenpeace Message and the Media. Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 1996. 
Darby, Andrew. Harpoon: Into the Heart of Whaling. New South Whales: Allen & Unwin, 2007. 
Darke, Peta, Graeme Shanks and Marianne Broadbent. “Successfully Completing Case Study 
Research: Combining Rigour, Relevance and Pragmatism.” Information Systems Journal, 
8 (1998), 273-289. 
Davis, Ruth. “Enforcing Australian Law in Antarctica: The HSI Litigation.” Melbourne Journal 
of International Law, 8:1 (2007), 142-158. 
Day, David. The Whale War. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1987.  
De Groot, Larens. Hunting the Hunters: At War With the Whalers. United States: Adlard Coles 
Nautical, Forthcoming, January 2014. 





Della Porta, Donatella, and Sidney Tarrow. “Transnational Processes and Social Activism: An 
Introduction.” In Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions, and 
Power. Eds. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow. USA: Rowan and Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 2005, 1-20. 
DeLuca, Kevin Michael, and Jennifer Peeples. “From Public Sphere to Public Screen: 
Democracy, Activism, and the ‘Violence’ of Seattle.” Critical Studies in Media 
Communication, 19:2 (June, 2002), 125-151. 
DeLuca, Kevin Michael. Image Politics: The New Rhetoric of Environmental Activism. New 
York: The Guilford Press, 1999. 
Dewalt, Kathleen M., and Billie R. Dewalt. Participant Observation: A Guide for Fieldworkers. 
California: Altamira Press, 2002. 
Do or Die – Voices from Earth First! No.7, 1998. 
Doherty, Brian. “Manufactured Vulnerability: Protest Camp Tactics.” In Direct Action in British 
Environmentalism. Eds. M. Paterson Seel and B. Doherty. London: Routledge, 2000, 62-
79. 
Doherty, Brian, Alexandra Plows, and Derek Wall. “Environmental Direct Action in Manchester, 
Oxford and North Wales: A Protest Event Analysis.” Environmental Politics, 16:5 
(2007), 805-825. 
------- “‘The Preferred Way of Doing Things’: The British Direct Action Movement.” 
Parliamentary Affairs, 56 (2003), 669-686. 
Doherty, Brian, and Timothy Doyle. “Beyond Borders: Transnational Politics, Social 
Movements and Modern Environmentalism.” In Beyond Borders: Environmental 
Movements and Transnational Politics. Eds. Brian Doherty and Timothy Doyle. New 
York: Routledge, 2008, 1-16. 
Doherty, Brian, Matthew Paterson, and Benjamin Seel. “Direct Action in British 
Environmentalism.” In Direct Action in British Environmentalism. Eds. M. Paterson Seel, 
and B. Doherty. London: Routledge, 2000, 1-24. 
Durland, Steven. “Witness: The Guerrilla Theatre of Greenpeace.” Performance, 40 (Winter, 
1987). 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette, and Teale Phelps Bondaroff. “From Advocacy to Confrontation: 
Direct Enforcement by Environmental Transnational Advocacy Networks.” International 
Studies Quarterly (Forthcoming - December, 2014). 
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Building Theories from Case Study Research.” The Academy of 
Management Review, 14:4 (October, 1989), 532-550. 
Emel, Jody, and Jennifer Wolch. “Witnessing the Animal Movement.” In Animal Geographies: 
Place, Politics, Identity in the Nature-Culture Borderlands. Eds. Jennifer Wolch and Jody 
Emel. London and New York: Verso (1998), 507-531. 
Epstein, Charlotte, and Kate Barclay. “Shaming to ‘Green’: Australia-Japan Relations and 




Epstein, Charlotte. “WorldWideWhale.Globalization/Dialogue of Cultures?” Cambridge Review 
of International Affairs, 16:2 (July, 2003), 309-322. 
Erikson, Patricia Pierce. “A-Whaling We Will Go: Encounters of Knowledge and Memory at the 
Makah Cultural and Research Center.” Cultural Anthropology, 14:4 (November, 1999), 
446-583. 
Erwood, Steve. The Greenpeace Chronicle: 40 Years of Protecting the Planet. Amsterdam: 
Greenpeace International, 2011. 
Essemlali, Lamya, with Paul Watson. Captain Paul Watson: Interview with a Pirate. Ontario: 
Firefly Books, 2013. 
European Commission. “The Common Fisheries Policy: A User’s Guide.” European 
Commission, 2009. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/ 
publications/pcp2008_en.pdf (accessed September 16, 2013). 
Eyerman, Ron, and Andrew Jamison. “Environmental Knowledge as an Organizational Weapon: 
The Case of Greenpeace.” Social Science Information, 28:1 (March, 1989), 99-120. 
Falleti, Tulia. Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America. New York: CUP, 
2010. 
-------- “Theory-Guided Process-Tracing in Comparative Politics: Something Old, Something 
New.” APSA-CP Newsletter, 17:1 (Winter, 2006), 9-14. 
Fassin, Yves. “Inconsistencies in Activists’ Behaviours and the Ethics of NGOs.” Journal of 
Business Ethics, 90 (2009), 503-521. 
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 
International Organizations, 52:4 (Autumn, 1998), 887-917. 
Fisher, William F. “Doing Good? The Politics and Anti-Politics of NGOs Practices.” Annual 
Review of Anthropology, 26 (October, 1997), 439-464. 
Florini, Ann M., and P.J. Simmons. “What the World Needs Now?” The Third Force. Ed. Ann 
M. Florini. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, 1-15.  
Foreman, Dave and ‘Bill Haywood’ Eds. Ecodefence: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching. 2
nd 
Ed. Arizona: Ned Ludd, 1987. 
Freeland , Steven, and Julie Drysdale. “Co-operation or Chaos? – Article 65 of United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Future of the International Whaling 
Commission.” Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law, 
2:1 (2005), 1-36. 
Gamson, William A. The Strategy of Social Protest. Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1975. 
Gamson, William A., and Gadi Wolfsfeld. “Movements and Media as Interacting Systems.” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political Science and Social Science, 528 (July, 
1993), 114-125. 
Garmon, Tina. “International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of Piracy and Terrorism in 
the Wake of September 11
th
.” Tulane Maritime Law Journal, 27 (2002-2003), 257-275. 
213 
 
Gavin, Neil T. “Pressure Group Direct Action on Climate Change: The Role of the Media and 
the Web in Britain – a Case Study.” The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 12 (2010), 459-475. 
Gerring, John. “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?” American Political Science 
Review, 98:2 (May, 2004), 341-354. 
Gibb Dyer, W. Jr. and Alan L. Wilkins. “Better Stories, Not Better Constructs, to Generate 
Better Theory: A Rejoinder to Eisenhardt.” The Academy of Management Review, 16:3 
(July, 1991), 613-619. 
Gitlin, Todd. The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the 
New Left. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2003. 
Gordenker, Leon, and Thomas G. Weiss. “NGO Participation in the International Policy 
Process.” Third World Quarterly, 16:3 (September, 1995), 543-555. 
Graeber, David. Direct Action: An Ethnography. Oakland: AK Press, 2009. 
Green, Archie. Wobblies, Pile Butts, and Other Heroes: Laborlore Explorations. United States: 
University of Illinois, 1993. 
Green, Jeffrey. A Line in the Sand. California: Creative Arts Book Company, 2003. 
Greene, Jody. “Hotis Humani Generis.” Critical Inquiry, 34 (Summer, 2008), 683-705. 
Grescoe, Taras. Dead Seas: How the Fish on Our Plates is Killing our Planet, London: Pan 
Books, 2009. 
Guilfoyle, Douglas. “Political Motivation and Piracy: What History Doesn’t Teach Us About 
Law.” EJIL: Talk!, June 17, 2013. Available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/political-
motivation-and-piracy-what-history-doesnt-teach-us-about-law/ (accessed July 14, 2013). 
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights 
Enforcement Problem.” International Organization, 62:4 (Fall, 2008), 689-716. 
Hammarstedt, Peter. “In Defense of Seals.” In The Next Eco-Warriors: 22 Young Women and 
Men Who are Saving the Planet. Ed. Emily Hunter. San Francisco: Conari Press, 2011, 
129-138. 
Hayes, Graeme. “Vulnerability and Disobedience: New Repertoires in French Environmental 
Protests.” In Beyond Borders: Environmental Movements and Transnational Politics. 
Eds. Brian Doherty and Timothy Doyle. New York: Routledge, 2008, 125-142. 
Heazle, Michael. “Scientific Uncertainty and the International Whaling Commission: An 
Alternative Perspective on the use of Science in Policy Making.” Marine Policy, 28 
(2004), 361-374. 
Heller, Peter. The Whale Warriors: The Battle at the Bottom of the World to Save the Planets 
Largest Mammals. New York: Free Press, 2007. 
Hillgenberg, Hartmut. “A Fresh Look at Soft Law.” European Journal of International Law, 




Hirata, Keiko. “Why Japan Supports Whaling.” Journal of International Wildlife Law and 
Policy, 8 (2005), 129-149. 
-------- “Beached Whales: Examining Japan’s Rejection of an International Norm.” Social 
Science Japan Journal, 7:2 (2004), 177-197. 
Hoek, Andrew. “Sea Shepherd Conservation Society v. Japanese Whalers, the Showdown: Who 
Is the Real Villain?” Stanford Journal of Animal Law and Policy, 3 (2010), 159-193. 
Holt, Sidney. “The Tortuous History of ‘Scientific’ Japanese Whaling.” BioScience, 53:3 
(March, 2003a), 204-206.  
-------- “Aiding and Abetting the Whaling Industry.” BioScience, 53:5 (May, 2003b), 449. 
Hunter, Robert. The Greenpeace to Amchitka: An Environmental Odyssey. Vancouver: Arsenal 
Pulp Press, 2004.  
-------- Warriors of the Rainbow: A Chronicle of the Greenpeace Movement. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1979.  
Hunter, Robert, and Rex Weyler. To Save A Whale: The Voyages of Greenpeace. San Francisco: 
Chronicle Books, 1978. 
Hutchinson, Andrew. “Baleen Out the IWC: Is International Litigation an Effective Strategy for 
Halting the Japanese Scientific Whaling Program.” Macquarie Journal of International 
and Comparative Environmental Law, 3 (2006), 1-33. 
Iliff, Mike. “The International Whaling Regime Post 2007.” Marine Policy, 32 (2008), 522-527. 
Ingalsbee, Timothy. “Earth First! Activism: Ecological Postmodern Praxis in Radical 
Environmentalist Identities.” Sociology Perspectives, 39:2 (Summer, 1996), 263-276. 
Ishii, Atsushi, and Ayako Okubo. “An Alternative Explanation of Japan’s Whaling Diplomacy in 
the Post-Moratorium Era.” Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, 10 (2007), 
55-87. 
Jabour, Julia, and Mike Iliff. “Theatre Sports in the Southern Ocean: Engagement Options for 
Australia in Whale Research Protest Action.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
63:2 (2009), 269-289. 
Jasanoff, Sheila. “NGOs and the Environment: From Knowledge to Action.” Third World 
Quarterly, 18:3 (1997), 579-594. 
Jefferies, Cameron S.G. “Strange Bedfellows or Reluctant Allies?: Assessing Whether 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOs) Should Serve as Official 
Monitors of Whaling for the International Whaling Commission (IWC).” Windsor Review 
of Legal and Social Issues, 26 (2009), 75-104. 
Jenkins, Brian Michael, et al. “A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions 
Against Maritime Targets.” The RAND Paper Series, P-6906 (September, 1983), 1-26. 
Jenkins, Jane Kathryn. “International Regulation of Driftnet Fishing: The Role of Environmental 
Activism and Leverage Diplomacy.” Indiana International and Comparative Law 
Review, 4 (1993-1994), 197-218. 
215 
 
Joachim, Jutta. “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women’s 
Rights.” International Studies Quarterly, 47:2 (June, 2003), 247-274. 
Jones, Pattrice. “Mothers with Monkeywrenches: Feminist Imperatives and the ALF.” In 
Terrorists or Freedom Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals. Eds. Best, 
Steven, and Anthony J. Nocella II. New York: Lantern Books, 2004, 137-156. 
Jordan, Grant. “Politics Without Parties: A Growing Trend.” Parliamentary Affairs, 51:3 (1998), 
314-328. 
Jordan, Tim. Activism! Direct Action, Hacktivism, and the Future of Society. London: Reaktion 
Books, 2002. 
Jorgensen, Danny L. Participant Observation: A Methodology for Human Studies. London: Sage 
Publications, 1989. 
Joshi, Sudhanshu. Dictionary of Legal Terms. New Delhi: Excel Books, 2011. 
Kalland, Arne. “Management By Totemization: Whale Symbolism and the Anti-Whaling 
Campaign.” Arctic, 46:2 (June, 1993a), 124-133. 
-------- “Whale Politics and Green Legitimacy: A Critique of the Anti-Whaling Campaign.” 
Anthropology Today, 9:6 (December, 1993b), 3-7. 
Kanehara, Atsuko. “Legal Responses of Japan to the Impediments and Harassments by Foreign 
Vessels Against Japanese Vessels During Research Whaling in the Antarctic Sea.” 
Japanese Yearbook of International Law, 52 (2009), 553-582. 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. “Transnational Advocacy Networks in International 
and Regional Politics.” International Social Science Journal, 159 (1999) 89-101. 
-------- Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998. 
Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. “From Santiago to Seattle: 
Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics.” In Restructuring World 
Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Eds. Sanjeev Khagram, 
James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, 
3-23. 
Khatchadourian, Raffi. “Neptune’s Navy: Paul Watson’s Wild Crusade to Save the Oceans.” The 
New Yorker (November 5, 2007). 
Klein, Natalie. “Whales and Tuna: The Past and Future of Litigation Between Australia and 
Japan.” The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 21 (2008-2009), 143-
217. 
Kolb, Felix. “The Impact of Transnational Protest on Social Movement Organizations: Mass 
Media and the Making of ATTAC Germany.” In Transnational Protest and Global 
Activism: People, Passions, and Power. Eds. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow. 
United States: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005, 95-120. 
Lange, Jonathan I. “Refusal to Compromise: The Case of Earth First!” Western Journal of 
Speech Communication, 54 (Fall 1990), 473-494. 
216 
 
Lassiter, Unna I. “Marine Animal Oriented Organizations, Cultural Diversity, and Attitudes 
Toward Marine Wildlife.” Working Paper #7, (July, 2000), 1-48. 
Leader-Williams, and Holly Dublin. “Charismatic Megafauna as ‘Flagship Species.” In  
Priorities for the Conservation of Mammalian Diversity: Has the Panda had its Day? 
Eds. Abigail Entwistle and Nigel Dunstone. Cambridge: CUP, 2000, 53-84. 
Lester, Libby. “Species of the Month: Anti-Whaling, Mediated Visibility, and the News.” 
Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 5:1 (2011), 124-139. 
Letcher, Andy.  “‘Gaia Told Me To Do It’: Resistance and the Idea of Nature within 
Contemporary British Eco-Paganism.” Ecotheology, 8:1 (2003), 61-84. 
Likar, Lawrence E. Eco-Warriors, Nihilistic Terrorists, and the Environment. Santa Barbara: 
Praeger Security International, 2011. 
List, Peter C., ed. Radical Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics. California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, 1993. 
MacLeod, Dylan A. “International Consequences of Norway’s Decision to Allow the 
Resumption of Limited Commercial Whaling.” Dalhousie Law Journal, 17 (1994), 83-
104. 
Mandel, Robert. “Transnational Resource Conflict: The Politics of Whaling.” International 
Studies Quarterly, 24:1 (March 1980), 99-127. 
Manes, Christopher. Green Rage: Radical Environmentalism and the Unmaking of Civilization. 
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1990. 
Maritime New Zealand. “Investigation Report: Ady Gil and Shonan Maru No. 2 Collision on 6 
January 2010.” Maritime New Zealand, November 2010. 
Mathison, Sandra. “Why Triangulate?” Educational Researcher, 17:2 (March, 1988), 13-17. 
McGrath, Chris. “Injunction Granted in Japanese Whaling Case.” HSI Technical Bulletin (2008), 
available at http://www.hsi.org.au/editor/assets/legal/HSI_Technical_Bulletin_Japanese_ 
whaling_case.pdf (accessed August 2, 2013). 
-------- “Japanese Whaling Case Appeal Succeeds.” Human Society International, Australia 
(2006). Available at 
www.hsi.org.au/editor/assets/legal/Japanese_whaling_case_20_July_2006.pdf (accessed 
November 12, 2013). 
McHendry, George F. Jr. “Whale Wars and the Axiomatization of Image Events on the Public 
Screen.” Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 6:2 (2012), 
139-155. 
McIntyre, Joan. Mind in the Waters: A Book to Celebrate the Consciousness of Whales and 
Dolphins. Scribner, 1974. 
Mégret, Frédéric. “Civil Disobedience and International Law: Sketch for a Theoretical 
Argument.” (July 19, 2008) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1163270.  
217 
 
Menefee, Samuel Pyeatt. “The Case of the Castle John, or Greenbeard the Pirate?: 
Environmentalism, Piracy and the Development of International Law.” California 
Western International law Journal, 24:1 (Fall, 1993), 1-16. 
Miles, Matthew B., and Michael Huberman. Qualitative Data Analysis. 2
nd
 Ed. Thousand Oaks: 
SAGE Publications, 1994. 
Miller, Claire. “Whale Meat Losing Popularity in Japan.” Ecological Society of America, 4:5 
(June, 2006), 233. 
Mills, Brendon J. and Howard R. Ernst. “Maritime Eco-Extremism Reconsidered: Understanding 
Fourth Generation Eco-Warriors in the Modern Media Age.” In Maritime Private 
Security: Market Responses to Piracy, Terrorism, and Waterborne Security Risks in the 
21
st
 Century. Eds. Claude Berube and Patrick Cullen. United Kingdom: Routledge, 2012. 
Mittelman, James H. “Globalization and Environmental Resistance Politics.” Third World 
Quarterly, 19:5 (December, 1998), 847-872. 
Moffa, Anthony L.I. “Two Competing Models of Activism, One Goal: A Case Study of Anti-
Whaling Campaigns in the Southern Ocean.” Yale Journal of International Law, 37 
(2012), 201-214. 
Molland, Noel. “A Spark That Ignited a Flame: The Evolution of the Earth Liberation Front.” In 
Igniting A Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth. Eds. Steven Best and Anthony J. 
Nocella II. Oakland: AK Press, 2006, 47-58. 
Morikawa, Jun. Whaling in Japan: Power, Politics and Diplomacy. London: C. Hurts & Co. 
Ltd., 2009. 
Morris, David B.  Earth Warrior: Overboard with Paul Watson and the Sea Shepherd 
Conservation Society. Golden: Fulcrum Publishing, 1995. 
Mossop, Joanna. “When is a Whale Sanctuary not a Whale Sanctuary? Japanese Whaling in 
Australian Antarctic Maritime Zones.” Victoria University of Wellington Law Review, 36 
(2005), 757-773. 
Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the 
Impact of Human Rights INGOs. International Studies Quarterly, 56 (2012), 1-16. 
Nagtzaam, Gerry, and Pete Lentini. “Vigilantes on the High Seas?: The Sea Shepherds and 
Political Violence.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 20:1 (2008), 110-133. 
Nardin, Terry. “Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society.” In International Society: 
Diverse Ethical Perspectives. Eds. David R. Mapel and Terry Nardin. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1998, 17-35. 
Nelson, Paul. “Agendas, Accountability, and Legitimacy Among Transnational Networks 
Lobbying the World Bank.” In Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social 
Movements, Networks, and Norms. Eds. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn 
Sikkink. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002a, 131-154. 
Nelson, Paul. “New Agendas and New Patterns of International NGO Political Action.” 
Voluntas, 13:4 (December, 2002b), 377-392. 
218 
 
Nucci, Benjamin. “From Comity to Comedy: The Ninth Circuit’s Blanket Injunction on the Sea 
Shepherd’s Southern Ocean Activities May be Laughing in the Face of Established 
International Law.” Arizona Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, 3 (2013), 1051-
1059.  
O’Neill, Kate. “Transnational Protest: States, Circuses, and Conflict at the Frontline of Global 
Politics.” International Studies Review, 6 (2004), 233-251. 
Peet, Gerard. “The Role of (Environmental) Non-Governmental Organizations at the Marine 
Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), and at the London Dumping Convention (LDC).” Ocean & Coastal Management, 
22 (1994), 3-18. 
Phelps Bondaroff, Teale. “Sailing With the Sea Shepherds.” Journal of Military and Strategic 
Studies, 13:3 (Spring, 2011), 1-55. 
-------- “Bitter Green: The Strategy of Ecotage.” Unpublished thesis. University of Calgary, 
Alberta, Canada (June, 2009). 
-------- “Throwing a Wrench Into Things: The Strategy of Radical Environmentalism.” Journal 
of Military and Strategic Studies, 10:4 (Summer, 2008), 1-23. 
Plant, Glen. “International Law and Direct Action Protest at Sea: Twenty Years On.” 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 33 (2002), 75-117. 
-------- “Civilian Protest Vessels and the Law of the Sea.” Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law, 14 (1983), 133-163. 
Plows, Alexandra, Derek Wall, and Brian Doherty. “Covert Repertoires: Ecotage in the UK.” 
Social Movement Studies, 3:2, (October 2004) 199-219. 
Potts, Benjamin. “Taking the Whale War Hostage.” In The Next Eco-Warriors: 22 Young 
Women and Men Who are Saving the Planet. Ed. Emily Hunter. San Francisco: Conari 
Press, 2011, 51-62. 
Pralle, Sarah B. Branching Out and Digging In: Environmental Advocacy and Agenda Setting. 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006. 
-------- “Venue Shopping, Political Strategy, and Policy Change: The Internationalization of 
Canadian Forest Advocacy.” Journal of Public Policy, 23:3 (September, 2003), 233-260. 
Price, Richard. “Review: Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics.” World 
Politics, 55:4 (July, 2003), 579-606. 
Princen, Thomas, and Matthias Finger. Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the 
Local and the Global. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Raustiala, Kal. “State, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions.” International 
Studies Quarterly, 41:4 (December, 1997), 719-740. 
Rawcliffe, Peter. Environmental Pressure Groups in Transition. Manchester: Manchester 




Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. “The Socialization of International Rights Norms Into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction.” In The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change. Ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Katheryn Sikkink. 
Cambridge: CUP, 1999, 1-38. 
Risse, Thomas. “The Power of Norms versus the Norms of Power: Transnational Civil Society 
and Human Rights.”In The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society.  Ed. 
Ann Florini. Tokyo and Washington: Japan Centre for International Change and Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1999, 177-210. 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. Ed. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, 
Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge: CUP, 1995. 
Roberts, Clayton. The Logic of Historical Explanation. University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1996. 
Roeschke, Joseph Elliott. “Eco-terrorism and Piracy on the High Seas: Japanese Whaling and the 
Rights of Private Groups to Enforce International Conservation Law in Neutral Waters.” 
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, 20 (2009), 99-137. 
Rohrschneider, Robert, and Russell J. Dalton. “A Global Network? Transnational Cooperation 
Among Environmental Groups.” The Journal of Politics, 64:2 (May, 2002), 510-533. 
Rootes, Christopher. “Facing south? British Environmental Movement Organisations and the 
Challenge of Globalization.” In Beyond Borders: Environmental Movements and 
Transnational Politics. Eds. Brian Doherty and Timothy Doyle. New York: Routledge, 
2008, 72-90. 
-------- “A Limited Transnationalization? The British Environmental Movement.” In 
Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions, and Power. Eds. Donatella 
Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow. USA: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005, 21-44. 
-------- “Environmental Protest in Britain 1988-1997.” In Direct Action in British 
Environmentalism. Eds. M. Paterson Seel, and B. Doherty. London: Routledge, 2000, 25-
61. 
Rosebraugh, Craig. Burning Rage of a Dying Planet: Speaking for the Earth Liberation Front. 
New York: Lantern Books, 2004. 
Rothwell, Donald R. “Australia v. Japan: JARPA II Whaling Case before the International Court 
of Justice.” Proceedings instituted by Australia against Japan: Application Instituting 
Proceedings, 31 May 2010. The Hague Justice Portal.  
Routledge, Paul, Corinne Nativel, and Andrew Cumbers. “Entangled Logics and Grassroots 
Imaginaries of Global Justice Networks.” In Beyond Borders: Environmental Movements 
and Transnational Politics. Eds. Brian Doherty and Timothy Doyle. New York: 
Routledge, 2008, 143-163. 
Rowell, Andrew. Green Backlash: Global Subversion of the Environmental Movement. London: 
Routledge, 1996. 
Rubinton, David Scott. “Toward a Recognition of the Rights of Non-States in International 
Environmental Law.” Pace Environmental Law Review, 9:2 (Spring, 1992), 475- 494. 
220 
 
Rutch, D. “The Strategies and Action Repertoires of New Movements.”In Challenging the 
Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies. Eds. R. J. 
Dalton and M. Kuechler. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, 156-175. 
Ryan, Charlotte. Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organizing. Boston: 
South End Press, 1991. 
Ryan, Trevor. “The ‘Whale Wars’ Come to the Japanese Courtroom: Comparing Approaches to 
Activism.” Canberra Law Review, 10 (2011), 1-27. 
-------- “Peter Bethune on Trial in Japan: What Charges, and What Outcome?” Paper presented 
to the Australian National University conference, Pirates of the Southern Ocean? (April 
15, 2010), Australian National University. 
-------- “Sea Shepherd V Greenpeace? Comparing Anti-Whaling Strategies in Japanese Courts.” 
New Zealand Yearbook of International Law, 7 (2009), 131-168. 
Sakaguchi, Isao. “The Roles of Activist NGOs in the Development and Transformation of IWC 
Regime: The Interaction of Norms and Power.” Journal of Environmental Studies and 
Sciences (March, 2013). 
Sand, Peter H. “Japan’s ‘Research Whaling’ in the Antarctic Southern Ocean and the North 
Pacific Ocean in the Face of the Endangered Species Convention (CITES).” Review of 
European Community and International Environmental Law, 17:1 (2008), 56-71. 
Sasser, Erika N., Aseem Parkash, Benjamin Cashore, and Graeme Auld. “Direct Targeting as an 
NGO Political Strategy: Examining Private Authority Regimes in the Forestry Sector.” 
Business and Politics, 8:3 (2006), Article 1, 1-32. 
Saunders, Clare. “Reformism and Radicalism in the Climate Camp in Britain: Benign 
Coexistence, Tensions and Prospects for Bridging.” Environmental Politics, 21:5 (2012), 
829-846. 
Scarce, Rik. Eco-Warriors: Understanding the Radical Environmental Movement. Updated ed. 
California: Left Coast Press Inc., 2006. 
Scheiber, Harry N., Kathryn J. Mengerink, and Yann-huei Song. “Ocean Tuna Fisheries, East 
Asian Rivalries, and International Regulation: Japanese Policies and the 
Overcapacity/IUU Fishing Conundrum.” University of Hawai’i Law Review, 30:1 
(January, 2008), 97-165. 
Schiffman, Howard S. “Scientific Research Whaling in International Law: Objectives and 
Objections.” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law, 8 (2001-2002), 473-
485. 
Schmidtz, David. “Islands in a Sea of Obligation: Limits of the Duty to Rescue.” Law and 
Philosophy, 19 (2000), 683-705. 
Schofer, Evan, and Ann Hironaka. “The Effects of World Society on Environmental Protection 
Outcomes.” Social Forces, 84:1 (September, 2005), 25-47. 
Schwartz, Morris S. and Charlotte Green Schwartz. “Problems in Participant Observation.” The 
American Journal of Sociology, 60:4 (January, 1955), 343-353. 
221 
 
Seel, Benjamin, and Alex Plows. “Coming Live and Direct: Strategies of Earth First!” In Direct 
Action in British Environmentalism. Eds. M. Paterson Seel, and B. Doherty. London: 
Routledge, 2000, 112-132. 
Seymour, Frankie. All Hearts on Deck: A Personal Account of the 1981-2 Campaigns of the Sea 
Shepherd. Canberra: Boris Books, 1993. 
Shapiro, Michael. “Conversation: Sea Shepherd’s Paul Watson.” Earth Island Journal (Autumn, 
2010). 
Sikkink, Kathryn. “The Power of Networks in International Politics.” In Networked Politics: 
Agency, Power, and Governance. Ed. Miles Kahler. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2009, 228-248. 
-------- “Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider Coalition.” In 
Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions, and Power. Eds. Donatella 
Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow. United States: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
2005, 151-174. 
-------- “Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power.” In 
Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. 
Eds. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002, 301-318. 
-------- “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western 
Europe.” In Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Eds. 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. 
Sikkink, Kathryn, and Jackie Smith. “Infrastructure Change: Transnational Organizations, 1953-
93.” In Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and 
Norms. Eds. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002, 24-46. 
Simmons, P. J. “Learning to Live with NGOs.” Foreign Policy, 112 (Autumn, 1998), 82-96. 
Siurua, Hanna. “Nature Above People: Rolston and ‘Fortress’ Conservation in the South.” Ethics 
& Environment, 11:1 (Spring, 2006), 71-96. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “The Role of NGOs in International Law-Making.” International Law 
and International Relations. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000a, 96-
151. 
-------- “Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order.” In Democratic 
Governance and International Law. Eds. Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth. Cambridge: 
CUP, 2000b, 199-237. 
-------- “The Real New World Order.”Foreign Affairs, 76:5 (September/October 1997) 183-197.   
Sluka, Jeffrey A. “Participant Observation in Violent Social Contexts.” Human Organization, 





Stairs, Kevin, and Peter Taylor. “Non-Governmental Organizations and the Legal Protection of 
the Oceans: A Case Study.” In The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, 
Interests, and Institutions. Eds. Andrew Hurell and Benedict Kingsbury. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992, 110-142. 
Stoett, Peter J. The International Politics of Whaling. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997. 
Strachan, Hew. “The Lost Meaning of Strategy.” Survival, 47:3 (Autumn, 2005), 33-54. 
Strausz, Michael. “Cetaceans and Citizens: International Norms and Debates about National 
Identity in Japan.” Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Washington, 2007. 
Stuart, Avelie, Emma F. Thomas, Ngaire Donaghue, and Adam Russell. “’We may be Pirates, 
but we are not Protesters’: Identity in the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society.” Political 
Psychology, 20:20 (2013), 1-25. 
Suhre, Sarah. “Misguided Morality: The Repercussions of the International Whaling 
Commission’s Shift from a Policy of Regulation to One of Preservation.” The 
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 12 (1999-2000), 305-329. 
Sullivan, Andrew. “Distant, Amicable and Enduring: New Zealand-Japan Relations.” Japan 
Aktuell, 2 (2007), 60-80.  
-------- A Whale Hunt: How A Native American Village did What No One thought It Could. New 
York: Touchstone, 2000. 
Sunday Times Insight Team. Rainbow Warrior: The French Attempt to Sink Greenpeace. 
London: Key Porter Books, 1986. 
Susskind, Lawrence E. Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global 
Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Sydney Panel of Independent International Experts on Japan’s Special Permit (‘Scientific’) 
Whaling Under International Law. “Summary of Findings.” 2007. Available at 
http://cbialdia.mardecetaceos.net/archivos/download/ParisPanelReportui21169.pdf 
(accessed June 24, 2013). 
Tarrow, Sidney. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: CUP, 2005. 
-------- “Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics.” Annual 
Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 1-20. 
-------- “Paradigm Warriors: Regress and Progress in the Study of Contentious Politics.” 
Sociological Forum, 14:1 (March, 1999), 71-77. 
Tarrow, Sidney, and Donatella della Porta. “Conclusion: ‘Globalization,’ Complex 
Internationalism, and Transnational Contention.” In Transnational Protest and Global 
Activism: People, Passions, and Power. Eds. Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow. 
United States: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005, 227-246.  
Tarrow, Sidney, and Doug McAdam. “Scale Shift in Transnational Contention.” In 
Transnational Protest and Global Activism: People, Passions, and Power. Eds. Donatella 




Thomas, Daniel C. “Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy.” In Restructuring World Politics: 
Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Eds. Sanjeev Khagram, James 
V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002, 71-95. 
Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. Contentious Politics. London: Paradigm Publishers, 2007. 
Tinch, Rob, and Zara Phang. “Sink or Swim: The Economics of Whaling Today.” World Wildlife 
Fund and Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, (June, 2009). 
Underdal, Arild. “One Question, Two Answers.” In Environmental Regime Effectiveness. Eds. 
Edward L. Miles, Arild Underdal, Steiner Andresen, Jørgen Wettestad, Jon Birgr 
Skjærseth, and Elaine M. Carlin. Cambridge, UK: MIT Press, 2002, 3-46. 
van Drimmelen, Benjamine. “The International Mismanagement of Whaling.” Pacific Basin Law 
Journal, 10 (1991), 240-259. 
van Ginkel, Rob. “Gentle Giants, Barbaric Beasts and Whale Warriors: Contentious Traditions, 
Eco-Political Discourse and Identity Politics.” MAST, 6:1 (2007), 9-43. 
-------- “Killing Giants of the Sea: Contentious Heritage and Politics of Culture.” Journal of 
Mediterranean Studies, 15:1 (2005), 71-98. 
Vanderheiden, Steve. “Radical Environmentalism in an Age of Antiterrorism.” Environmental 
Politics, 17:2 (April, 2008), 299-318. 
-------- “Eco-Terrorism or Justified Resistance? Radical Environmentalism and the ‘War on 
Terror.’” Politics and Society, 33:3 (September, 2005), 425-447. 
Vivanco, Luis A. “Conservation and Culture, Genuine and Spurious.” In Reconstructing 
Conservation: Finding Common Ground. Eds. Ben A. Minteer and Robert E. Manning, 
London: Island Press, 2003, 57-73. 
Walpole, Matthew J. and Nigel Leader-Williams. “Tourism and Flagship Species in 
Conservation.” Biodiversity and Conservation, 11 (2002), 543-547. 
Walton, David. “The Role of Prime Ministers in Australia-Japan Relations: Howard and Rudd.” 
The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 99:409 (2010), 
429-437. 
Wapner, Paul. “Horizontal Politics: Transnational Environmental Activism and Global Cultural 
Change.” Global Environmental Politics, 2:2 (May, 2002), 37- 62. 
-------- Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics. Albany, USA: State University of New 
York Press, 1996. 
-------- “Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics.” World 
Politics, 47:3 (April, 1995), 311-340. 
Watanabe, Wendy. “Commercial Whaling and Ocean Resource Management.” Loyola 
International and Comparative Law Review, 3 (1980), 67-82. 
Watson, Paul. “ALF and ELF – Terrorism Is as Terrorism Does.” In Terrorists or Freedom 
Fighters? Reflections on the Liberation of Animals. Eds. Steven Best and Anthony J. 
Nocella II. New York: Lantern Books, 2004, 279-287. 
224 
 
-------- Seal Wars: Twenty-five Years on the Front Lines with the Harp Seals. New York: Firefly 
Books, 2003. 
-------- writing as Gray Wolf, with Hummingbird. “Epilogue: Marine Monkeywrenching.” In 
Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching. 3
rd
 California: Abbzug Press, 2002, 
442-462. 
-------- “Neptune’s Manifesto.” Whole Earth (Fall, 1998), 
http://wholeearth.com/issue/2094/article/46/neptune’s.manifesto# (June 29, 2011). 
-------- Ocean Warrior: My Battle to End the Illegal Slaughter on the High Seas. London: Vision 
Paperbacks, 1994. 
-------- “Goodbye to Greenpeace.” In Radical Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics. Ed. 
Peter List. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993a, 172-177. 
-------- “Raid on Reykjavik.” In Radical Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics. Ed. Peter 
List. California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993b, 172-177. 
-------- “Tora! Tora! Tora!” Radical Environmentalism: Philosophy and Tactics. Ed. Peter List. 
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993c, 177-184. 
--------Earthforce! An Earth Warrior’s Guide to Strategy. Los Angeles: Chaco Press, 1993d. 
-------- “On The Precedence of Natural Law.” Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation, 3 
(1988), 79-90. 
-------- as told to Warren Rogers. Sea Shepherd: My Fight for Whales and Seals. ed. Joseph 
Newman. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982. 
Wenzel, George. Animal Rights, Human Rights: Ecology, Economy and Ideology in the 
Canadian Arctic.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991. 
Weyler, Rex. Greenpeace: How a Group of Ecologists, Journalists, and Visionaries Changed the 
World. Vancouver: Raincoast Books, 2004. 
Willets, Peter, Ed. ‘The Conscience of the World’: The Influencing of NGOs in the UN System. 
London: Hurst and Company, 1996. 
Williams, Phil. “Transnational Criminal Networks.” In Networks and Netwars: The Future of 
Terror, Crime, and Militancy. Eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. Santa Monica: 
RAND, 2001, 61-97. 
Wortley, Richard, and Stephen Smallbone. “Child Pornography on the Internet.” US Department 
of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Problem-Oriented Guides for 
Police No.41, 2006. 
Yanacopulos, Helen. “Cutting the Diamond: Networking Economic Justice.” In Networked 
Politics: Agency, Power, and Governance. Ed. Miles Kahler. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2009, 67-78. 
Zelko, Frank. Make It a Green Peace! The Rise of Countercultural Environmentalism. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013. 
Zürn, Michael. “Review: The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A Review of Current 
Research.” World Politics, 50:4 (July, 1998), 616-649. 
225 
 
APPENDICES   
Appendix 1 
 
Appendix 1 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 






Appendix 2 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 






Appendix 3 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 





Appendix 4 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 













Appendix 5 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 


















































Appendix 6 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 














Appendix 7 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 







Appendix 8 has been approved for restriction in the final thesis, but was made available 
to examiners at the time of the examination. 
 
 
 
